I. Introduction

In discussing exempla, it seems fitting to begin with an example of one. In a celebrated passage, Polybius describes for Greek readership some of the ἔθσιμοι—habits or customs—that enabled the Romans to overcome the Carthaginians. First he points to the aristocratic funeral (6.53–54), in which wax masks representing ancestors of the deceased are conveyed in the cortège, and a eulogizer, himself a scion of the family, recounts these ancestors’ deeds on the community’s behalf. All this pomp, says Polybius, is socially efficacious. Young men who observe this spectacle are fired with the desire to endure and risk everything for the community, in order to win such immortality and renown for themselves (§53.9–54.3). Indeed, he adds, many Romans have done noteworthy deeds with just this end in view (§54.4–5). He continues (§54.6–55.4):

This paper has been long in the making, and many institutions and individuals had a hand in shaping it. I thank the Institute for Research in the Humanities in the University of Wisconsin and the American Council of Learned Societies for providing the resources for a sabbatical leave during which these ideas took shape; also audiences at the APA annual meeting in 2001, at Indiana University, the University of Texas at Austin, and the Archaeological Institute at the University of Munich. I further thank Hans Beck, Karl-Joachim Hölkescamp, Bob Kaster, Chris Kraus, Ellie Leach, Ralf Von den Hoff, and two exceptionally engaged referees for CP for their careful readings and advice on particular issues; also David Wray for sharing a valuable manuscript of a work in progress. All translations are my own.

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Many such stories concerning many men are related by the Romans, but one notable instance will suffice for the present, offered as an example and as proof. It is said that one Horatius Cocles was fighting against two adversaries on the opposite end of the bridge over the Tiber that lies before the city. When he saw a large force of enemy reinforcements approaching, fearing that they would force a passage and storm into the city, he turned to those behind him and shouted that they should withdraw immediately and tear down the bridge. While they did as he bid and tore it down, he stood fast, receiving a large number of wounds, and checked the onslaught of the enemy, his adversaries being astounded not so much by his strength as by his resolution and boldness. Upon the collapse of the bridge, the enemy was prevented from attacking and Cocles, hurling himself into the river in his armor, purposefully gave up his life, reckoning the safety of his fatherland and the renown that would accrue to him thereafter more valuable than his current existence and the portion of his life remaining. Such, it seems, is the impulse and love of honor regarding noble deeds that is engendered in Roman youths by their customs.

Polybius implies that Horatius acted in imitation of unnamed predecessors: to such actions are young Romans stirred when they hear the deeds of past heroes narrated during a funeral. Yet he also acted in hopes of winning similar glory for himself; and the fact that Romans often tell his story suggests that he succeeded, providing a model for imitation to future generations just as he himself acted in light of existing canons. Other literary texts bear out Polybius’ suggestion that Horatius’ story was resonant: I know more than thirty narratives of or references to this deed in Roman literature. Sometimes, as here, there is a full-scale narrative, while other times his name is mentioned in passing, with the expectation that the reader can supply, from his preexisting knowledge of the narrative, whatever details are pertinent to the context.

Now, while Polybius has detached this narrative from all historical context—he does not inform his reader when, under what circumstances, or to what political or military end Horatius did his deed—he does supply crucial cultural context: he implies that the Romans themselves tell the story as a “stand-alone” (i.e., without narrative historical context) just as he himself has done; and he implies that such narrativizing has an ethical aim. In section III below, I discuss further the exemplum’s capacity for historical decontextualization in the service of ethics. In the meantime, let us bring Livy’s version of the story into consideration, since it does provide a narrative historical context.

According to Livy, Horatius’ deed dates to the second year of the Republic, the consulship of P. Valerius Publicola II and T. Lucretius (2.9.1). Tarquinius Superbus, deposed as king of Rome the previous year, had appealed to Lars Porsenna, king of Clusium, to reinstall him by force. Porsenna agreed, and led his army against Rome the next year. First he seized the Janiculum, ejecting a Roman garrison. These soldiers fled across the one bridge

1. Likewise Plut. Publicola 16.3; this consular year corresponds to 508 B.C.E. on Varro’s chronology, and 504 on Livy’s. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, meanwhile, places the deed in the following year, the consulship of Valerius Publicola III and Horatius Pulvillus II (5.21.1, cf. 5.35.3)—a year unrecorded by Livy. On the confusion in the consular lists for these years (and hence in the dating of Porsenna’s attack) see Broughton 1951, 1.6–7; on early chronology generally see Cornell 1995, 218–23, 399–402.
that spanned the Tiber, the *pons sublicius* or “bridge on piles,” with Por-
senna’s troops in hot pursuit. At this point (2.10.1–4) Horatius, in the rear
guard, declares that he will hold up the Etruscan attack while his compan-
ions attempt to break down the bridge. The narrative continues (2.10.5–11):

(5) vadit inde in primum aditum pontis, insignisque inter conspecta cedentium pugnae terga
obversis comminus ad ineundum proelium armis, ipso miraculo audaciae obstupefexit
hostes. . . . (8) circumferens inde truces minaciter oculos ad proceres Etruscorum nunc
singulos provocare, nunc increpare omnes: servitia regum superborum, suae libertatis
immemores alienam oppugnatum venire. (9) cunctati aliquandiu sunt, dum alius alium,
ut proelium incipient, circumspectant; pudor deinde commovit aciem, et clamore sublato
undique in unum hostem tela coniciunt. (10) quae cum in obiecto cuncta scuto haesient,
neque ille minus obstinatus ingenti pontem obtinerat gradu, iam impetu conabantur
detrudere virum, cum simul fragor rupti pontis, simul clamor Romanorum, alacritate per-
fecti operis sublatus, pavore subito impetum sustinuit. . . . (11) ita sic armatus in Tiberim
desiluit multisque superincidentibus telis incolumis ad suos tranavit, rem ausus plus
famae habituram ad posteros quam fidei. (12) grata erga tantam virtutem civitas fuit;
statua in comitio posita; agri quantum uno die circumaravit, datum.

(5) Then he strode to the very entrance of the bridge. Among those who showed their
backs as they withdrew from the conflict, he was conspicuous for turning his weapons
at close quarters to face the approaching battle, confounding the enemy with the very
spectacle of his boldness. . . . (8) Then, casting his fierce eyes threateningly toward the
Etruscan forefighters, he now challenged them individually, now derided the lot: they
were slaves of arrogant kings, and heedless of their own freedom they had come to
attack someone else’s. (9) The Etruscans hesitated for a while, while each looked to an-
other to begin the battle; then shame roused them to attack, and raising a shout they
hurled their javelins from all sides against their solitary enemy. (10) But when all had
stuck in his protective shield, and he was holding the bridge no less resolutely with his
magnificent stance, they were then trying to dislodge the hero with a charge, when the
crash of the severed bridge, and at the same instant the cheer raised by the Romans
thanks to the speedy completion of their task, checked the Etruscan onslaught with sud-
den dread. . . . (11) In full armor as he was, he leaped into the Tiber and, through a
thick shower of javelins, swam safely across to his companions, having dared a deed that
would gain more glory than credence with future generations. (12) The state was grate-
ful for such great bravery: a statue was erected in the *comitium*, and as much land as he
plowed around in one day was granted him.

Considering this narrative together with Polybius’, I would note four
aspects that are more or less prominent in both. First, Horatius’ deed is
*spectacular*: he stands conspicuously alone on the bridge, under the Ro-
mans’ gaze from behind and the Etruscans’ from before. In both versions,
Horatius maintains verbal and visual contact with the Romans who work to
demolish the bridge, and is an object of astonishment to the Etruscans. In-
deed, in Livy, and in other accounts too, the emotional engagement of these
audiences of witnesses receives as much attention as the performer’s own
actions, if not more.2 According the audience such prominence foregrounds

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2. For the audience’s engagement, note that the Etruscans focalize much of Livy’s account: in §5, it is
to their gaze that most Romans turn their backs, but Horatius (to their amazement) turns his weapons; in §9
the hesitation and shame are theirs. But the Romans too are engaged; note their cheer (§10).
the fact that the action is meaningful and relevant with reference to the values and interests of the community (or communities) before whose eyes the action is done. Second, the audience’s evaluation of the deed is central. In Livy, the concrete expression of that evaluation forms the narrative climax: the Romans indicate their gratitude (grata erta tantam virtutem civitas fuit) by granting a statue and land. In Polybius, it is partly the positive report (euv-κλειο) he expects among the Romans that makes him willing to die. And in both versions, even the enemy acknowledges the hero’s qualities. Third, commemoration of the deed is functionally and thematically important in both accounts. The narrative itself is a self-conscious form of commemoration, remarking how future audiences will receive the deed: “the renown that would accrue to him thereafter” (Polybius); “bound to gain more glory than credence with posterity” (Livy). Livy’s account also adverts to a second commemorative device, a statue—erected in the comitium, no less, the political heart of the republican Forum and the most frequented, looked-upon place in the city. Fourth, imitation: in Polybius, this narrative is adduced as evidence that Romans imitate the glorious deeds recounted in funeral orations, and in Livy’s history, another actor in due course is said to imitate him (Cloelia, at 2.13.6–8; see section III below).

I have just summarized the main features of what I call “exemplary” discourse in Roman culture, a discourse linking actions, audiences, values, and memory. The four principal components of this discourse can be schematized more generally, as follows:

1. An action held to be consequential for the Roman community at large, and admitting of ethical categorization—that is, regarded as embodying (or conspicuously failing to embody) crucial social values. In Horatius’ case, this category is normally stated or implied to be virtus, or something related. Virtus, etymologically “behavior appropriate to a man,” can be a capacious ethical category, especially when used to translate αρετη in philosophical contexts. In a long-standing Roman ethical vernacular, however, it encompasses a narrower, more specific range of consequential action: a soldier’s

3. “Spectacular” events, in which a judging audience figures prominently, are common in Livy and Polybius. For Livy see, e.g., the battle of the Horatii and Curiatii, the Verginia episode, and duels such as Torquatus and the Gaul, with discussion by Feldherr (1998, 127–31, 203–12, 82–111, and passim); for Polybius, see Davidson’s overview (1991, 11–18).

4. In Livy the Etruscans marvel at his audacia; in Polybius, at his ὑπόστασις and τοῦμα (cf. n. 2 above). Val. Max. 3.2.1 stresses both the Roman and Etruscan evaluations: unus itaque tot civium, tot hostium in se oculos convertit, stupentes illos admiratione, hos inter laetitiam et metum haesitantes . . . quapropter discedentes Etrusi dicere potuerunt “Romanos vicimus, ab Horatio victi sumus.”

5. Two accomplices, Larcius and Herminius, are attached to Horatius in some versions of the story (e.g., Livy 2.10.6–7; Dion. Hal. 5.24.1; Plut. Publicola 16.6; Serv. in Aen. 11.642; see Fugmann 1997, 42). But they do not much detract from his individual glory, as they are said to withdraw before the collapse of the bridge, leaving Horatius alone to fight and leap into the river.

6. Virtus is Livy’s category (2.10.12: grata erta tantam virtutem civitas fuit); also Culex 358–61, Sen. Ep. 120.7, Quint. Inst. 5.11.10. Other categories: this story falls under the rubric de fortitudine in Val. Max. 3.2.1 (similarly Cic. Leg. 2.10); his ἀνδρεία is praised at Dion. Hal. 5.25.4; and at Plut. Mor. 317D–E he is an acolyte of ἀρετή, in contrast to those who follow θύχη (ἀρετή also at Plut. Publicola 16.9, Dion. Hal. 5.25.3). At Frontin. Str. 2.15.5 he exemplifies the proper way to retreat (de effugiendo).
bravery or steadfastness in battle. This is how the term functions in Horatius’ case.7

2. An audience of eyewitnesses who observe this action, place it in a suitable ethical category (e.g., virtue or pietas or gratia), and judge it “good” or “bad” in that category; I call this the “primary” audience. In most cases this audience is a subset of the Roman community, the group for whom the action is most consequential—but in military contexts, as we have seen, the enemy too may be invoked as a valid judging audience. These audiences, by their very spectatorship and evaluation, constitute the action as consequential for the community, and thereby transform it into a socially and ethically significant “deed,” a res gesta.

3. Commemoration of the deed—that is, commemoration not only of the action, but of its consequence to the community, and of the ethical evaluation it received from the primary audience. Commemoration occurs by means of a monument, a device that calls the deed to memory; monuments include narratives, statues, scars or other bodily marks, toponyms, cognomina, and even rituals, to name just a few.8 Monuments aim to make the deed more widely visible by constructing “secondary” audiences—persons who were not eyewitnesses, but who learn of the deed through the monument (e.g., by reading the narrative, looking at the statue, or inquiring about the scar). The witnessing of a secondary audience therefore has a broader scope than that of the primary audience: for included in the secondary audience’s field of view is both the action itself and the primary audience’s prior evaluation of it. That is, secondary audiences typically see the “deed” already constituted as such by the primary audience’s judgment, freighted with social consequence and ethical significance. Secondary audiences therefore form their own judgments in full knowledge of what the primary audience thought. Clearly, a monument (such as an honorific statue or laudatory narrative) invites secondary spectators to concur with the primary audience’s judgment, to agree that the action was done well or badly in the pertinent ethical category. But as we shall see, secondary spectators have minds of their own, and do not slavishly accept their predecessors’ verdicts.

4. Finally, imitation: any spectator to such a deed, whether primary or secondary, is enjoined to strive to replicate or to surpass the deed himself, to win similar renown and related social capital—or, for negative examples, to avoid replicating an infamous deed. How Romans determined degrees of similarity, and evaluated or ranked deeds relative to one another, will be discussed below. For now, suffice it to say that the imitator typically seeks to become “the new X” or “another X,” or at least something comparable to

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7. On the ethical domain(s) encompassed by the category virtue in the late Republic and Empire, see McDonnell 2003; also Roller 2001, 20–26; Barton 2001, 34–43, 281–83. See Lendon 1999, 304–16, for (traditional, military) virtue in Caesar; Moore 1989, 5–17, for virtue and related categories in Livy; and Eisenhut 1973 for a survey of occurrences in many Latin texts.

X in the socioethical significance of his or her action. With imitation, then, we come full circle to (1), actions of potential social consequence done before a judging audience of witnesses. Here we perceive a cyclical dimension to exemplary discourse: deeds generate other deeds, spawning ever more audiences and monuments, in an endless loop of social reproduction.

This scheme requires three immediate comments. First, the community of Romans involved in doing, witnessing, evaluating, and monumentalizing deeds is the *populus Romanus* at large, not just elites. The actors of monumentalized deeds tend to be elites (victorious generals and the like), but are not elites exclusively. For instance, the most valorous Roman soldier of all, Siccius Dentatus, is represented as sub-elite. Again, certain monumental forms, such as honorific statues and cognomina, were apparently reserved for elites. But other, equally compelling forms, like narratives and scars, could be attached to actors of any status; and all these forms could be interpreted by observers of any status. Even when narratives were ensconced in literary texts—which in general presuppose a literate, leisured readership, and functioned primarily as medium of communication among elites—they could still be made available to illiterate Romans through recitations and other types of performance. The quantity, variety, and accessibility of monumental forms suggests that actors of every status took care to submit their actions to the scrutiny of a broad cross-section of the people, in whose collective name and interest they normatively acted. Exemplary discourse, then, encompasses all of Roman society, from the loftiest aristocrats to the humblest peasants, laborers, and slaves.

Second, exemplary discourse has powerful ideological effects. The schematic form, traced above, exposes what Romans from the late Republic onward took to be the normal or normative way in which social values were established and instilled, deeds were done and evaluated accordingly, and social reproduction occurred. In some cases, this schema may describe the actual unfolding of an action in the public eye, the evaluation it receives,

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9. Literary texts often present the simple desire for glory as the impulse for imitation (e.g., Polybius). However, some texts present a more complex engagement between spectator and spectacle: see Feldherr 1998, 82–111, on Livy (highly relevant to this paper), and Barisch 1994 on emperors and aristocrats in imperial Rome.

10. Exemplary sub-elite actors: for Siccius see Gell. 2.11, Val. Max. 3.2.24, Plin. *HN* 7.101, Dion. Hal. 10.36–38; Caesar’s centurions, depicted in *B Gall.* and *B Civ.*, are similar. Also, Val. Max. 3.2.6 attributes to elites in the good old days (here, the second century B.C.E.) anxiety about being outdone in *virtus* by people beneath them in *dignitas*. Hölkeskamp (1996, 303–12, esp. 305, 310) shows how monuments implicate both elites and sub-elites in the same ideological structure. See also Horsfall 1996, 109–14 (and passim) on the range of cultural production consumed by both elites and sub-elites; also Bell 1999, 273–76. In general, elite and sub-elite values overlap but are hardly identical, and may coexist uneasily in various social spheres: see, e.g., Alston 1998 and Lendon 1997, 237–66, on the army; also de Libero 2002, 179–85, and Leigh 1995, 200–205, on the class and status implications of wounding.

11. Habinek (1998, 45–59) discusses the acculturative effects of early Roman literature upon elites; but see Bell 1999, 264–67 (and passim), on recitations of Vergil and the availability of the *Aeneid* to nonreaders. Within literary texts, the audiences described as observing and judging an action are often representative of the Roman people as a whole: for instance, “spectacular” events in Livy (n. 3 above) are observed by the *populus Romanus*, whether assembled as an army in the field, a mob in the Forum, or even the voting tribes and centuries at the elections (which are another venue for the witnessing-and-judging phenomenon).
and its transmutation into monumental and imitable form. More important, however, is that Romans assumed that actions, audiences, monuments, and social value were or should be linked in these ways. They often acted with a view toward being observed, evaluated, monumentalized, and imitated, and assumed that other people did likewise—even if most actions did not actually achieve so glorious an afterlife. Similarly, any object that looked “monumental” was likely, at some point, to be assimilated into exemplary discourse. For as we will see, the expectation that the elements of exemplary discourse stuck together was so strong that any given element could attract or spawn the others. Thus the ideological salience of Horatius’ story is not compromised by the recognition—even in antiquity—that it is fabulous. On the contrary, this and many other narratives were socially efficacious because they manifest a narrative structure in which action, judging audiences, commemoration, and imitation are all present and all work together. Each element presupposes and implies the others; it is the ensemble that gives meaning to each part.

Third, while this (simplified) scheme may leave the impression of monolithic, seamless coherence, in fact the production of exemplary discourse is beset at every turn by instabilities, contradictions, and contestation. An action may be evaluated positively in one ethical category, but negatively in another; or perhaps different aspects of an action carry divergent value. How are these conflicting judgments to be reconciled or weighed? An object that some viewers interpret as monumental, hence part of exemplary discourse, can be rejected by other viewers, who contend that its appearance is deceptive and it has no monumental quality at all—or there may be disputes about precisely what, or whom, a certain monument commemorates. Finally, how one goes about imitating an exemplary deed—what constitutes legitimate imitation, and whether a given actor has produced one—is often fiercely disputed. To produce an exemplum, then, is to struggle constantly to establish or disestablish a particular interpretation of an action’s value, a monument’s reference, or an imitator’s success, and alternative readings threaten to (or do) proliferate at every instant. But far from undermining the ethical cogency of the exemplum, these ubiquitous opportunities for debate and contestation are the lifeblood of exemplary discourse—this is how every example can be made anew, or deployed in a novel way, to meet the requirements of any new contingency.

My aim in what follows is twofold. First, I seek to demonstrate that exemplary discourse, as schematized above, describes an actual Roman way of confronting the past, of giving it value and purpose. Indeed, I argue that the socioethical dynamics of exemplarity are fundamental to Roman historical consciousness itself. For a Roman, the question of what the past is, and

12. Doubts: *rem ausus plus famae habituram ad posteros quam fidei* (Livy 2.10.11); *tunc illa tria Romani nominis prodigia atque miracula, Horatius Mucius Cloelia, qui nisi in annalibus forent Hodie fabulae viderentur* (Flor. 1.4.3). But the phrases *plus famae habituram ad posteros* and *prodigia atque miracula* show that these deeds are admired, monumentalized, and imitable despite their questionable facticity.
what it is for, is closely tied up with the monuments that mediate his or her encounters with the past—monuments in narrative, plastic, or other form—that sort actions into various ethical categories and then re-present them as deeds to later audiences in an injunctive, hortatory rhetorical mode. Second, I argue that this model of exemplary discourse enables us to grasp the social and ideological functioning of exemplary figures in any given present, and in any particular context, in which they appear.

I pursue this double aim by examining two exemplary figures, as they appear in narratives and other monumental forms from the middle Republic onward: Horatius Cocles in section II, and Cloelia in section III. Individually and as a pair, these figures admit of especially productive analysis. They are among the most frequently adduced exemplary figures in surviving Roman texts, and were commemorated in a variety of monumental forms. Moreover, each actor’s deed was done in the same mythistorical context, the war with Porsenna of the second or third year of the Republic. This, together with several structural parallels between their deeds, caused Roman writers to pair and compare them frequently. Because of their frequent attestation in many different contexts, these figures enable us to study in some detail the exemplary discourse in which they participate—how that discourse functions in the various contexts in which it appears; also, where and why it generates contestation and instability in producing these figures as exempla. Through these figures, then, we can learn much about how and to what ends Roman society constructed and consumed its own past.

The relationship of this work to previous scholarship also warrants brief discussion, since the idea that actions, audiences, values, monuments, and memory are interrelated is not radically new. Within Roman studies, numerous scholarly works have examined linkages among these phenomena, focusing on particular periods, problems, authors, or objects—examining, for instance, the “theatricality” or “spectacularity” of Roman public life, or the ethical implications of human action, or the audiences for and “messages” of honorific statues. Beyond classics, social and cultural theorists have formulated the concept of “collective (or social) memory,” and philosophers have examined the problematics of arguing from part to whole, from specific to general.13 For Roman studies, however, the work of examining these elements together in their cultural wholeness has barely begun. The structure of subfields within the discipline of classics is partly responsible: while texts and visual objects (obviously) were originally parts of a cultural continuum, classicists are typically trained to work with just one corpus of material or another. For the student of exemplarity, then, one challenge is to bring what archaeologists and art historians know together with what literary and historical scholars know, to comprehend the relationship and con-

13. For “collective memory” or “social memory” the locus classicus is the work of Maurice Halbwachs, with recent investigations by Aleida and Jan Assmann (extensive bibliography in Hölkeskamp 1996 and especially 2001); in cultural history, Pierre Nora’s Les lieux de mémoire deserves pride of place, along with the journal History and Memory. The philosophical investigation of examples is most closely associated with Immanuel Kant, with recent interventions by Jacques Derrida. I will discuss elsewhere questions these works raise for Roman exemplarity.
Exemplarity in Roman Culture

tinuity between two species of monument—namely images and texts—in Roman culture. A second challenge is to bring discrete cultural phenomena, such as the “theatricality” of Roman society or the “messages” of images, into focus as part of a larger whole. Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp’s preliminary but pathbreaking article “Exempla und mos maiorum: Überlegungen zum kollektiven Gedächtnis der Nobilität” (1996) shows the promise of pursuing this synthetic approach.

This paper’s aims also differ from most earlier studies of the traditions surrounding the war with Porsenna and its Roman heroes (including Horatius and Cloelia). Three approaches to this topic have predominated. The first is Quellenkritik—the attempt to sort the many versions of these narratives into family groups based on lineal descent from other versions, often with the aim of recovering these earlier versions, or even the original one. Quellenkritik distinguishes various components of the narratives, considering some earlier and others later, or some better and others worse. Regarding the legends of the war with Porsenna, some scholars (for instance) have sought to identify and atheitize certain elements as “late” accretions, introduced into a preexisting form of the legends by the historiographer Valerius Antias.14 Second, structuralist scholars of comparative religion have linked these stories with legends found in other cultures, seeking to identify shared structures within Indo-European (and other) myth and religion. Thus Horatius Cocles has been connected with other legendary figures who lack an eye and/or limb, and are seen either as embodying aspects of sovereignty or as resisting tyranny.15 This approach can be combined with Quellenkritik, so that comparative religion provides the ur-version that some source critics posit. A third approach seeks to recover the historical or cultural actualities that lay behind the production of these legendary tales. Thus it is argued that the stories of Horatius, Cloelia, and Mucius Scaevola provide a fig leaf by which Romans dissembled the fact that Porsenna captured the city; or that these stories describe archaic religious rituals in a transmuted, misrepresented form; or that these stories received their form and content from a mid-republican narrative oral tradition; and so on.16 These approaches all


15. Dumézil ([1940] 1988, 143–48) argues that Horatius Cocles and Mucius Scaevola have parallels in Norse mythology and elsewhere, and that such figures are expressions of an original Indo-European one-eyed and one-handed god representing magic and legal aspects of sovereignty. Moeller (1975) offers a Dumézilian analysis of various one-eyed and one-legged figures from Roman mythistory (including Horatius). Lincoln (1991, 244–58) critiques Dumézil’s approaches and conclusions, arguing that such figures represent resistance to, or embody the antithesis of, illegitimate kingship.

16. For the view that Porsenna, if historical, actually captured Rome (so Plin. HN 34.139; and Tac. Hist. 3.72), see, e.g., Fugmann 1997, 38; Alföldi 1965, 72–75; cf. Cornell 1995, 217–18. Gagé (1988, 242–45) challenges the legend’s historicity in a different way, arguing that there was no war with Porsenna, but an economic crisis misremembered as a military siege. Scholars who see the origin of these stories in oral poetry that incorporated elements of Indo-European myth (thus accepting Dumézil’s conclusions in some
seek origins and univocality: the single earliest form of the legend, the period and sociohistorical context of the legend’s formation, the Indo-European gods or heroes, the actual events. Scholars employing such approaches, therefore, seek to discover the original events, structures, and meanings that they believe are implicit in, but concealed, misremembered, or transmuted by our texts, due to the lapse of time or distortion in the tradition.

For my part, I will not seek to discover original versions and lost meanings. My aim is to grasp the meanings and functions of Horatius and Cloelia in precisely those phases of Roman society in which our surviving narrative accounts (and other monumental forms) were produced and consumed. For the object of my study is Roman exemplary discourse itself, as manifested in surviving texts and other representations—the discourse within which Romans encompassed these legendary figures. This discourse, in all its co-gency, complexity, and contradiction, lives in and through the multivocal narratives, the welter of contested variations, and the multiplicity of uses to which Romans, at any given moment, put their exemplary figures.

II. HORATIUS COCLES

Monuments

We have examined two detailed accounts of what Horatius did, and noted the prominence of eyewitnesses (Romans and Etruscans) who attest that the action is consequential for their community and provide its initial positive evaluation. Further aspects of the action itself and the primary audience’s engagement will emerge below. But let us pursue here the third component of exemplary discourse, as schematized above: namely, commemoration—how knowledge of the action and of the evaluation it initially receives is transmitted to wider audiences, who respond to that knowledge in turn. For Horatius’ deed, as for most exemplary deeds, narratives are arguably the premier monumental form. This is not only because narratives happen to survive. There can be no commemoration of any sort without narrative, since even nonnarrative monumental forms explicitly refer to, or implicitly require, a narrative that accounts for their occasion.17 But just as nonnarrative monuments typically imply a narrative, so narratives often refer to nonnarrative monuments. This “cross-referencing” suggests that any single monumental form was seen as just one element in a systematic marshalling of resources for preserving and transmitting memory, each element of which reinforces form), and consider the “historicization” of these myths a later development, thereby bracket all questions of historicity (e.g., Ogilvie 1965, 258; Forsythe 1994, 253; Frier 1979, 59). That the stories of Horatius and/or Cloelia conceal/reveal ancient rituals involving the Tiber or the pons sublicius: Gagé 1988, 236, 241; 1973, 10–12; Ogilvie 1965, 258. For recent surveys of scholarly opinion see Cornell 1995, 215–18 (on the whole end-of-the-Tarquins saga), and Forsythe 1994, 252–57 (on Horatius and Cloelia in particular).

17. So Habinek 1998, 49–50. Source critics sometimes dismiss narratives that account for other monuments as “aetiological” myths, that is, secondary, inferior accretions that are merely retrojected from these monuments, and carry no independent explanatory value. In exemplary discourse, however, such narratives and the monuments they explain are parallel means of commemoration—indeed, the narrative has ideological primacy because it is explanatory, regardless how and when it was actually produced.
and complements the effects of the others. In the next few pages I examine five monumental forms associated with Horatius—all but one “cross-references” in narrative accounts—considering how they function qua monuments within exemplary discourse, and also how they function in their particular social and literary contexts.

1. To begin with the most obscure monument: Propertius in Poem 3.11 implies that the temple of Apollo at Leucas, which commemorates Augustus’ victory at Actium, eclipses all prior monuments and the great deeds they represent. He names several particular monuments that the temple overshadows: among these are (59–62) “the spoils of Hannibal,” “the monument of defeated Syphax,” “the broken glory of Pyrrhus,” the Lacus Curtius, and “the path of Cocles [that] bears witness to the cutting of the bridge” (Coclitis abscissos testatur semita pontes, 63). This “path of Cocles” is otherwise unknown, but must have been a reasonably familiar feature of the urban landscape, one whose name linked it with Horatius’ deed and so called that deed to the memory (testatur) of those who knew of it. 19

2. Similarly, the pons sublicius itself may serve as a monument to Horatius’ deed. The elder Pliny notes—tangentially, in a discussion of marble—that the bridge was built entirely of wood and had no iron nails, “because it was torn down with such difficulty when Horatius Cocles defended it.”20 Thus this curious feature of the city’s built environment serves as a monument to the deed, summoning it to the memory not only of Pliny’s (probably elite) reader, but of anyone at all, of any status, who might inquire about the bridge’s distinctive construction. And just as the bridge commemorates the deed, so the deed explains the bridge. This explanation, as Pliny gives it, is purely pragmatic, though it also accounts for the taboo against the use of iron in the bridge’s construction: because iron fastenings so hindered the work of Horatius’ companions, an ironless building technique was adopted thereafter, in case the need should arise again.21 Modern scholars reject this explanation for the bridge’s construction, and the Horatius connection with it.22 But my point is that at least some Romans were prepared to comprehend

18. For narratives referring to honorific statues, see below. For honorific statues accompanied by explanatory inscriptions, the summi viri of the Forum Augustum are famous instances (among innumerable others). A more complex form of cross-referencing is seen on coins that carry images of monumental commemoration. See, e.g., a denarius minted by Marcus Philippus (56 B.C.E.), whose reverse shows the arches of the Aqua Marcia surmounted by an equestrian statue (discussion in Crawford 1974, no. 425/1, and Bergemann 1990, 35); also a group of coins dating to the 1st s.C.E. showing Trajan’s column (Claridge 1993, 15–16).

19. The text of Prop. 3.11.59–70 is vexed, leaving many readings and the ordering of the couplets in doubt. Nevertheless, the thematic importance of monuments, memory, and witnessing is clear: see Gurval 1995, 203–7, and Shackleton Bailey 1956, 174–75.

20. Plin. HN 36.100: quod item [sc. being constructed sine ferreo clavo] Romae in ponte sublicio religioso est, posteaquam Coclite Horatio defendente aegre revolsus est.

21. Dion. Hal. (9.68.2) offers a similar explanation, though without reference to Horatius: the Tiber, he says, could only be crossed by means of a bridge, ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ μία ξύλοθρακτος, ἦν ἕλμον ἐν τοῖς πολέμιοις. Cf. Dion. Hal. 3.45.2, 5.24.1, and Serv. in Aen. 8.646, all implying that the bridge was already constructed of wood in Horatius’ day; also Plut. Num. 9.2–4.

22. Some scholars prefer a religious explanation, and regard Horatius’ leap either as a devotio or pia culum for the bridge itself, or as a doublet for the throwing of the argēi: see Delcourt 1957, 177–78; Le Gall 1953b, 80–86 (esp. 81–82 on the wooden construction); Le Gall 1953a, 78–82 (on its religious import).
this otherwise obscure curiosity as a monument, connecting it with an exemplary deed that was bound to be imitated in due course (“easier to tear down next time . . .”). That is, they made sense of it by integrating it into exemplary discourse.

3. A third form of monument consists in a physical trace of the deed that the hero carries around with him ever after. While Polybius has him die in the act and Livy has him escape unscathed (likewise Val. Max. 3.2.1 and Sen. Ep. 120.7), most accounts assert or presuppose a different outcome: that he indeed survived, but suffered a crippling wound to his hip. Servius, explaining why Horatius was depicted on Aeneas’ shield, tells the story as follows (in Aen. 8.646):

et cum per sublicium pontem, hoc est ligneum, [sc. Porsenna] transire conaretur, solus Cocles hostilem impetum sustinuit, donec a tergo pons solveretur a sociis: quo soluto se cum armis praecipitavit in Tiberim, et licet laeus in coxa, tamen eius fluenta superavit: unde est illud ab eo dictum, cum ei in comitiis coxae vitium obiceretur “per singulos gradus admineor triumphi mei.”

. . . and when [Porsenna] sought to cross over on the pons sublicius, that is, the wooden one, Cocles alone held up the enemy’s attack until the bridge could be torn down behind him by his companions. Once it was down he threw himself into the Tiber wearing his armor and, though wounded in the hip, still overcame its current. Hence the famous bon mot of his, when during the elections his hip injury was held against him: “With every step, I am reminded of my triumph.”

The point of Horatius’ bon mot is that his detractors too should be reminded of his great deed when they see him limping along. War wounds, and scars in particular, appear frequently in Roman texts as markers of valorous conduct. Wounds incurred in the proper way, located in the right part of the body, inscribe into the living flesh of the hero the record of his valor, for all the world to see, so long as the hero lives. Narratives of the conflict of the orders, for instance, portray veterans who are at risk of debt bondage baring their scar-covered chests to public view; likewise in Cicero and in the rhetorical treatises we hear of defendants whose lives or property are at risk exposing their scars to the judges. The aim of such display is to persuade the audience that this person’s record of valiant military service to the state, attested by his scars, should earn him favorable consideration in the current situation. Horatius’ case, as Servius presents it, is similar. By alluding to the limp’s origin, Horatius transforms it into a monument to his deed, one that should summon his defense of the bridge to the memory of his interlocutors. Yet, a wound is a contestable, unstable monument. It does not convey (as many monuments do) whether the action it attests was deemed consequential for the community, or what evaluation it received from a pri-

mary audience. Presumably, his limp was “held against him” by a viewer who inserted the wound into a different discourse, one in which physical imperfection correlates with moral and social inadequacy. Indeed, this ambiguity—Is the disfigured person *turpis* or *fortis*? Are the marks on his body *dehonestamenta* or *decora*?—is endemic in Roman discussions of wounds; the wounded person is always on his mettle to dress his injury persuasively in the discourse of exemplarity, lest others make it a grounds for despising him. Providing a narrative of origins, as Horatius does here, achieves two key ends at once: it inserts the injury into exemplary discourse by asserting its monumentality, and seeks to stabilize that discourse by supplying what the wound inherently lacks as a monument, namely, that it does not by itself convey whether the deed was consequential and how it was originally evaluated.

To what end? The reference to elections suggests that Servius imagines that Horatius was standing for public office, when an opponent asserted that his disability made him unsuitable. By “monumentalizing” his limp, however, Horatius turns his detractor’s argument on its head, converting the limp from a liability to an advantage in the eyes of the voters; for the *populus Romanus*, assembled into its constituent tribes or centuries for voting, is the main audience for Horatius’ words (and limb). It is they who cast the votes, and who constitute the community for whom his deed is consequential—particularly so in an electoral context, since they would not be voting at all had he not preserved the *res publica*. Like those who display their scars in court or under other circumstances of risk and opportunity, Horatius is presented here as attempting to convert one form of social capital—the deference and respect that the *populus Romanus* grants him in return for meritorious service on their behalf—into another form, in this case the honor of holding a magistracy, which he hopes will be conferred upon him now, in gratitude and as further reciprocation for his deed.

Servius has reason to imagine that Horatius would have sought to exchange his social capital in this way. In Sallust’s *Bellum Iugurthinum*, Marius, in a speech as consul, reminds the people that they elected him not for his noble ancestry, but for his military decorations and “scars in the front of the body” (*cicatrices advorso corpore*, Iug. 85.29). Likewise Plutarch, in...

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24 For these alternative and competing discourses about wounds, cf. Publ. Sent. N 12: *non turpis est cicatris quam virtus parit*; also Cic. De or. 2.249 and Plut. Mor. 331B–C, where persons disabled by wounds initially feel shame about going forth in public, but are reassured that an honorable reading can be maintained by allusion to the wound’s origin: cf. Plaut. Curc. 392–400, Curt. 4.14.6. Excellent discussion of these matters in de Libero 2002. 183–87. Scars convey “inherent” information about their origin only in certain locations: wounds to the front are “good,” showing one faced the enemy; those to the back are “bad,” suggesting one fled—or, if they are whip marks, evincing slavish treatment (cf. Leigh 1995, 196–99). Wounds located elsewhere, such as the hip (Horatius) or the testicles (M. Servilius Geminus Pulex, Livy 45.39.16–20, Plut. Aem. 31.8–9), are therefore especially ambiguous, even more in need of narrative buttressing.

One tradition locates Horatius’ wound in his buttocks (Dion. Hal. 5.24.3, Plut. Publicola 16.8), which Wiseman interprets (1998, 83) as an invention of Valerius Antias—an attempt to make Horatius look undignified so that Valerius Publicola would look better by comparison. His *Quellenkritik* here is sheer conjecture, and implausible anyway: as the Servilius Geminus example shows, even a wound in an “undignified” place could potentially be narrativized into exemplary discourse and so constructed as a monument to a great deed.
his *Quaestiones Romanae*, suggests a reason why office seekers used to canvass in togas without wearing tunics underneath: perhaps they wanted their scars to be visible to the voters (*Mor.* 276C–D; cf. *Coriol.* 14.1–3). As these texts show, the idea that elites whose bodies attest their martial valor might on this ground seek election had broader cultural currency, so its application to Horatius is unsurprising. And Horatius, indeed, seems to have been imagined as an elite. The Horatii were a patrician clan, to whom tradition ascribed other prominent members in the regal period and early Republic; Dionysius of Halicarnassus (5.23.3) makes Horatius the nephew of the consul Horatius Pulvillus, and a descendant of the surviving member of the Horatii who defeated the Curiatii in the reign of Tullus Hostilius, thereby securing Rome’s ascendancy over Alba Longa. Thus Horatius could be imagined as consular material by birth as well as for his achievements. Servius does not report the election’s outcome, but other accounts say that his crippling wound left him unfit for the duties of high office, wherefore he never held the consulship or other military command. Perhaps his absence from the consular *fasti*, despite high birth and achievement, spurred the fabrication of a reason why he was never elected (so Münzer 1913, col. 2334)—especially since Larcius and Herminius, his forgettable accomplices in some accounts, appear in one chronology as the consuls of year four (Dion. Hal. 5.36.1). At any rate, while his wound constitutes the social capital on which he was imagined to trade in standing for office, it also provides a pragmatic reason why this exchange was not consummated.

While Servius presents Horatius as monumentalizing his own wound, in other texts other social actors invoke that wound to summon his deed to memory. In Book 45 Dio Cassius places in Cicero’s mouth a “Philippic” against Marc Antony, ostensibly delivered in the senate early in 43 B.C.E. Speaking of the incident at the Lupercalia where Antony offered Caesar a...
crown, Dio’s Cicero demands, “Have we, who expelled the Tarquins and rejoiced in Brutus’ deed, who threw Capitolinus from the rock and killed Spurius, have we commanded you to install someone as king over us . . . ? No, by the rods of Valerius and the law of Porcius, no, by the leg of Horatius and the hand of Mucius, no, by the spear of Decius and the sword of Brutus!” Here Horatius’ deed is indexed by reference to his (wounded) leg, which therefore serves as an icon of freedom, along with Valerius Publicola’s lowered fasces, Mucius Scaevola’s incinerated right hand, and the rest: each is a monument calling to memory the great freedom-preserving deed in which it was involved, and which Antony’s actions threaten to undo. In Book 46, Antony’s ally Fufius Calenus replies at length, also before the senate. He says that Antony, in fact, made certain that Caesar would reject the crown, because he chose to offer it in a way and in a place that made it impossible to accept. Thus he secured Rome’s freedom from this would-be tyrant: “Anthony did not break his leg for nothing so that he himself might escape, nor burn off his hand to scare Porsenna, but ended Caesar’s tyranny by wisdom and cunning, surpassing the spear of Decius and the sword of Brutus.” Calenus’ meaning is not entirely clear when he implies that Horatius “broke his leg for nothing so that he himself might escape,” but he must mean, at least, that Horatius’ action was somehow ineffectual, and besides aimed for self-preservation rather than a greater good. In any event, he is rejecting Cicero’s use of the injury as an icon of libertas, and imposing some lesser meaning upon it. By contrast, the really effective defender of libertas is Antony, whose actions at the Lupercalia far surpass any of these overrated ancient deeds. Thus Antony is presented either as actually doing what the ancient models are wrongly credited with having done, or as doing it better.

On some accounts, a second monument to Horatius’ valor is inscribed into his body—and attached to his name as well. For the cognomen Cocles is explained as meaning “one-eyed,” either by derivation from co- and oc-ulus, or as a corruption of the Greek κυκλωψ. And why this cognomen? Several accounts say that Horatius earned it by losing an eye in an earlier battle; thus he already bore an onomastic (and bodily) monument to his martial valor before ever stepping onto the pons sublicius. The claim that Horatius fought heroically once before is only ever found as an explanation

28. Dio Cass. 45.32.3: . . . οὐ μά τὰς ῥάβδους τῆς Οἰδαλερίου καὶ τὸν νόμον τῶν Πορκίου, οὐ μά τὸ σκέλος τὸ Ὄρατιος καὶ τὴν χείρα τὴν Μουκίου, οὐ μά τὸ ὄδος τὸ Δέκιου καὶ τὸ ἄτομο τὸ Βρούτου (cf. 45.31.2).

Also Verg. Aen. 8.646–51, where Horatius and Cloelia, shown together on Aeneas’ shield, are said to have defended libertas against Porsenna/Tarquin (Gurval [1995, 223–24] discusses the theme of freedom on the shield); similarly Livy 2.10.8; and Juv. 8.262–65.

29. Dio Cass. 46.19.8: . . . ὁ σκέλος ἄλος καταξάνθον ἵνα αὐτὸς φύγῃ, οὐδὲ χείρα κατακαίεσθαι ἵνα Πορσένναν φοβήσῃ, ἀλλὰ τὴν τυραννίδα τὴν τοῦ Καίσαρος σοφίᾳ καὶ πρεπετυχεί, καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ ὄδος τὸ Δέκιου καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἄτομο τὸ Βρούτου, μασάνθον.

30. Derived from oculus: Varro, Ling. 7.71, ab oculo cocles, ut ocelus, dictus, qui unum haberet oculum (cf. Suda ε 1610, κ 1921, α 118). Derived from or synonymous with κυκλωψ: Plut. Publicola 16.7; Enn. Sat. 67 (apud Varro, Ling. 7.71). For cocles simply meaning “one-eyed” (with no specific etymology implied), see, e.g., Plaut. Cenc. 392–94; Plin. HN 11.150 (distinguishing the cognomen Cocles as “one-eyed from birth” from Luscinus, “having lost an eye”); Serv. in Aen. 8.649 (cocles as the older word for what we now call luscus). Further citations at TLL Onomasticon, s.v. “Cocles.”

31. Dion. Hal. 5.23.2: Πόσπλος δ’ Ὅρατος ὁ καλούμενος Κόκκας ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὄνων ἐλευθερίαν ἐκχοντες ἐν μάχῃ τοῦ ἔποκεν ὀφθαλμῶν: De vir. ill. 11: Horatius Cocles illo cognomine quod in alio proe-lio oculum amiserat; Suda ε 1610; Plut. Publicola 16.7 (quoted n. 33 below).
of his cognomen, suggesting that this earlier deed is indeed an “aetiological myth,” retrojected from the name for which it accounts. Münzer, indeed, declares this back story a “lamentable evasion” (“eine klägliche Ausflucht,” 1913, col. 2335) necessitated because no one could find a way to connect the cognomen to his defense of the bridge, the only deed for which he was known.32 What this explanation illuminates, however, is the Romans’ propensity to order their world according to the cognitive framework of exemplary discourse. Upon encountering an object, like a cognomen or wound, that might be monumental (because such objects commonly were), they were disposed to comprehend it by means of a narrative that confirmed its monumentality by integrating it into exemplary discourse. Thus, the “battle wound” explanation of the cognomen Cocles asserts that the hero was already decorated with a monumental name, which simultaneously pointed to a visible wound and averred that this wound was received in a consequential act of military valor. 33 In defending the bridge, then, he imitates his own prior deed of valor, which itself provided the model and standard for his future actions; he initiates and terminates his own exemplary loop. Thus, through exemplary discourse, the Romans render the otherwise obscure cognomen comprehensible, transforming it into a monument freighted with social and ethical weight.

4. Only one monument commemorating Horatius’ deed survives independently of literary texts. The object is a bronze medallion (fig. 1), minted by Antoninus Pius between 140 and 144 C.E., as the legend COS III indicates. Numerous coins and medallions from this period feature early Roman themes on the reverse; many scholars explain this thematic cluster as anticipating the nine hundredth anniversary of the city’s founding in 148.34 On the reverse, the legend COCLES identifies the hero explicitly, lest anyone miss the reference. As viewers of this scene we look downstream, so that the Etruscans are on the right and the Romans on the left. The pons sublicius—shown arched, yet clearly supported by piles—passes between the belligerents.

32. Just one account, to my knowledge, connects the lost eye with the defense of the bridge: Plutarch (Mor. 307D–E [Parallela Graeca et Romanal]) says that an Etruscan arrow struck his eye before he swam back to the Roman side. This event presumably explains the cognomen, though Plutarch does not make the connection explicitly. This unique version (differing even from Plut. Publicola 16.7–8) was likely generated to bring the story into line with the Greek “parallel,” given immediately before (307D): Philip II of Macedon suffering an arrow to the eye while swimming a river near Olynthus.

33. By this explanation Cocles is a precise parallel for Mucius Scaevola, whose cognomen is said to refer to his missing right hand, thus both cross-referencing the mark already present on the body and attesting that the primary audience approved the deed whereby he acquired that mark. Plutarch (Publicola 16.7) offers both this and an alternative explanation for the cognomen Cocles: ὁ δ’ ὀρατός τὸν Κόκλην ἐπανάμικνυς, ἐν πολέμῳ τῶν ὁμάτων θάτερον ἐκκοπεῖς ὡς δ’ ἔτερον λέγομαι, διὰ συμπόρον τῆς μίνος ἐνδοκυκύθεις, ὅπερ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ διορίζον τὰ οὖματα καὶ τὰς ὀρίσεις συγκεκριθαί. This alternative, where the cognomen marks a simple physiognomic anomaly, deprives it of monumental status and removes it from exemplary discourse.

34. See, e.g., Toynbee 1925; alternative explanations by Coarelli (1999, 112) and Krumme (1995, 212–20). Discussion and photographs in Krumme 1995, 134–36 (and generally at 203–20), cat. no. 69/1 and fig. 137; Gnecchi 1912, 2.9 and pl. 43.4 (image reproduced at Lexicon Topographicum Urbis Romae 4.436, fig. 38); Le Gall 1953b, p. 81 and pl. 4; and Banti 1983, 2.3.58, no. 52. The legend COCLES also appears on the obverse of a restoration denarius of Trajan (after 107 C.E.), accompanying a head of Roma; however, the original coin of the early second century B.C.E. lacks this legend, which is therefore a Trajanic modification. On this coin see Krumme 1995, 138, 190–92, cat. no. 48/1; also BM Coins, Rom. Emp. 3.138.
The attention that these opposing forces lavish upon the hero in the water brings out the spectacularity of his action, constituting the "public eye" in which it occurs. One Etruscan poises a javelin, while Horatius swims through substantial waves to the Roman side, his shield slung over his back, his helmet on his head, and apparently (at least as drawn here; the photographs are less clear) still wearing his lorica. On the left bank, one Roman wields the axe with which he has just chopped a gap in the bridge. Another at the far left extends his right hand, palm upward, toward the momentous scene unfolding before him, perhaps a demonstrative gesture ("look!") but also one of reception and welcome for the returning hero. This gesture makes clear that we are not merely seeing Horatius in action before an audience of eyewitnesses: we see the moment at which that primary audience (or at least the Romans) marks his action as noteworthy and, by welcoming him, judges it beneficial to the collective. With this gesture, the primary audience constitutes the action as a "deed." Thus this medallion is a perfect monument, as defined above: it records the action itself, along with the eyewitnesses’ positive evaluation of the action as consequential and good; it then places all this information before our—the (secondary) spectators’—eyes, inviting us to reproduce the primary audience’s approval.

Who the original secondary audience, actual or intended, may have been is unclear. Medallions were not intended to circulate like coins, and were normally struck in limited numbers for narrow distribution. Intended
recipients, when identifiable, seem normally to have been elites, and the objects themselves were often used as jewelry or for other decorative purposes. Perhaps, then, this object was intended for an elite viewership, and may not have come before the eyes of a wider population. Yet the image accords closely enough with key features of a widespread narrative that it must have been recognizable to a viewer of any status—especially when glossed by the legend COCLES, which would have assured identification by all who were even minimally literate.36

Yet we must note specifically what aspect of the deed this image commemorates. Though we may read into it the whole story—his solo fight against great odds, his plunge into the river, possibly a grievous wound to his leg or hip—none of this is actually depicted in this scene. What it shows, rather, is the hero swimming through rough water while burdened with a full complement of armor. In the narrative accounts too, we find that his armor conspicuously accompanies him in the water. Thus in Livy (2.10.11) he swims across in full armor, unwounded but amidst a shower of Etruscan javelins (perhaps implied also on the medallion, where an Etruscan poises his javelin), while in Plutarch (Publicola 16.8) he swims across in armor not only while wounded, but with an Etruscan spear lodged in his buttock; meanwhile Seneca (Ep. 120.7) stresses that he emerged from the river with all his armor, “as safely as if he had crossed by way of the bridge.” Other accounts are similar.37 Why this widespread insistence that his armor accompanied him in the river? Probably its explanation is found in the long-standing Graeco-Roman warrior ethic, wherein flight from battle is disgraceful, and a soldier who returns without all of his arms gives reason to infer that he fled. For a soldier would only drop his heavy equipment in order to run away expeditiously; in a proper “fighting retreat,” where he withdraws facing the enemy, he would need his full complement of weapons and armor. Moreover, the enemy could be expected to gather up abandoned equipment as spoils, erecting trophies on the battlefield and adorning the temples and houses of their native city, as monuments to their victory and to the greater shame of the defeated.38 Now, Horatius undeniably retreats before the Etrus-

36. For the recipients and uses of medallions see Toynbee 1944, 112–21; also 1925, 171–72, on the possible audience for the “early Rome” medallions in particular.
38. The disgrace of leaving arms on the battlefield, indicating defeat and flight, is widely attested in Greek and Roman texts; Nisbet and Hubbard (1978, 113–14) collect numerous references. Note that, in our case, Seneca makes Horatius value his armor no less than his life (Ep. 120.7): non minus sollicitus . . . ut armatus quam ut salvus exiret. For the fate of abandoned arms as booty in the city of the victor, see, e.g., Hölscher 1978, 318–24 (“Beutedenkmäler”). For Roman warrior/combat values in general, see Barton
can onslaught, and in the water even turns his back to the enemy (as the medallion shows)—an action that, on the face of it, demands censure for cowardice, not praise for noteworthy valor. Retaining his armor, however, guarantees that the retreat was “proper,” and can be recuperated as a display of valor. The strenuous insistence in these accounts and on the medallion that he took all his armor with him, then, betrays a difficulty in the production of Horatius as an exemplum (“He retreated . . .”), even while doing the work necessary to stabilize the problem and smooth it over (“. . . but was valorous anyway”).

Finally, for Roman readers and viewers of the late Republic and Empire, the swimming itself enhances the glory of the deed. Swimming is frequently represented in literary texts as a manly pursuit, and is often associated with other athletic activities—riding, footraces, javelin throwing—that were part of a soldier’s training.\(^\text{39}\) Indeed, feats of swimming appear in battle narratives as noteworthy elements of performances that are striking on other grounds as well. In Vergil’s *Aeneid* the Rutulian champion Turnus, fighting alone and pressed hard by the Trojans, leaps into the Tiber in full armor and is carried to safety (*Aen.* 9.815–19). To Romans of the early Empire, this vignette likely recalled the paradigm of Horatius, even while purporting to give Turnus chronological precedence. In a more historical vein Q. Sertorius, wounded and unhorsed at the battle of Arausio, reportedly swam the Rhone in full armor (Plut. *Sert.* 3.1); and Suetonius says that Julius Caesar, cast overboard during the battle of Alexandria, swam a considerable distance holding up his record books with one hand to keep them dry and “holding his cloak in his teeth, lest the enemy take it as a spoil.”\(^\text{40}\) If swimming had broad cultural currency as an indicator of valor, as these texts suggest, then Horatius’ feat of swimming may itself have been thought to contribute to the overall valor of the deed (and the paradigm of Horatius may in turn have informed these other accounts: see below under “Imitation”). Indeed, if we ask why Horatius needs to survive his plunge into the river, the valor associated with swimming—enhanced by doing so in armor, in a turbulent river, and perhaps while wounded, all with the result of bringing his armor home—may provide the answer.\(^\text{41}\) Under such circumstances he might have been expected to drown, as he does in Polybius’

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\(^{39}\) Swimming as military training: Hor. *Carm.* 1.8 (with Leach 1994, 335–38), 3.7.22–27, 3.12 (also Reis 1994, 47–60, on the athletics in these poems); Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 20.6; Veg. *Mil.* 1.10. German warriors are said to excel at swimming rivers in full armor: Tac. *Hist.* 4.12, *Ann.* 2.8.3; *ILS* 2558 (cited by Konrad 1994, 43–44; q.v. for further references and discussion). In general see also Mehli 1931, cols. 861–63. I thank Jonathan Chicken and Ellie Leach for discussion of these matters.

\(^{40}\) Suet. *Iul.* 64: *Alexandriae circa oppugnationem pontis eruptionem hostium subita consuls in scapham pluribus eodem praecipitantibus, cum desilisset in mare, nando per ducentos passus evasit ad proximam havem, elata laeva ne libelli quos tenebat madefierent, paludamentum mordicus trahens ne spolio poteretur hostis; cf. Plut. *Caes.* 49.7–8; [Caes.] *B Alex.* 21.2–3.

\(^{41}\) Turbulence: note the large waves on the medallion; also Dion. Hal. 5.24.3, περί γάρ τοῦ ὄπερεψημον τῶν σαφῶν σχήματος ὁ ῥοὺς ὄβες ἲν καὶ βάθα ἐποίησε μεγάλας (i.e., he is caught up in rapids and whirlpools), and Val. *Max.* 3.2.1, nec ullo verticis circuitu actus (i.e., he manages to avoid the whirlpools). At Sen. *Ep.* 120.7, the water merely flows fast.
version. This is no disgrace, but does preclude him from displaying his valor in the river.42

5. Horatius’ statue, alone among the monuments examined here, has attracted considerable scholarly attention, since several of its attested characteristics pose problems for archaeologists and art historians. Much information about this statue provided by literary texts43 is consistent, or can plausibly be interpreted as consistent. First, the statue was erected by public authority, to honor his deed and/or to recompense him for the disabilities he suffered. That is, the populus Romanus reciprocated his service on its behalf with a monument that not only called the deed to memory, but also reified their collective positive judgment that the deed served their interests.44 Second, the statue was erected in the most public of places: either in the comitium proper, or in the Volcanal on the southern flank of the comitium. Because this corner of the republican Forum is described as the most visible, most frequented, or most important place—as stands to reason, since the comitium, the curia adjacent to it on the north side, and the rostra adjacent on the south side constituted the political heart of the republican Roman state—then the value of this gift by the collective was enhanced by the care taken to ensure its visibility. Since the statue’s job qua monument is to construct secondary audiences for the great deed, it could collect the most eyes, from the widest range of Romans of every age, sex, and status, in precisely this location.45 Moreover, Pliny asserts that it still stood in his day (quae durat Hodieque, HN 34.22). Third, the statue was bronze, and represented Horatius in armor.46

42. For exhausted, heavily laden soldiers drowning, see Livy 5.38.7–9: circa ripam Tiberis quo armis abiectis totum sinistrum cornu defugit, magna strages facta est, multosque imperitos nundi aut invalidos, graves loricis alisque tegminibus, hausere gurgites; also Livy 22.6.6–7 and Polyb. 3.84.9. Polybius may have his own, programmatic reasons for making Horatius die; his version need not be laid to an alternative tradition (contra Voisin 1992, 261–66, who argues unconvincingly that traces of the Polybian version can be seen in other accounts too). Having described how young Romans are inspired to glorious deeds by narratives they hear at aristocratic funerals, and having invoked Horatius as an instance of such a youth, Polybius may kill him off to close the exemplary loop—to imply that this deed too will be duly narrated at the upcoming funeral, inspiring other Romans in turn.

43. Cic. Off. 1.61; Livy 2.10.12; Dion. Hal. 5.25.2; Plin. HN 34.22; Plut. Publicola 16.9; Gell. 4.5, De vir. ill. 11.

44. Three passages specify the dedicator as the community at large: Livy 2.10.12: grata erga tantam virtutem civitas fuit; statua in comitio posita. Dion. Hal. 5.25.2: εἰκόνα χρυσῆν ἔνωσον ὁ δῆμος ἐκτησαν αὐτοῦ τῆς ἁγορᾶς ἐν τῷ κρατίστῳ. Plut. Publicola 16.9: [sc. Ῥωμαίοι ἀπαντεῖ] . . . πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ εἰκόνα χρυσῆν ἀνέστησαν [αὐτῷ] ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τοῦ Ἡραίου, τὴν γενομένην ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος χωλότητα τῷ ἀνδρὶ μετὰ τιμῆς παρηγοροῦντες. Livy and Plutarch also mention gifts of food and land, presenting the statue as one component in a broader act of reciprocation. For these gifts cf. De vir. ill. 11.2; Plut. Mor. 820E; discussion by Sehlmeyer (1999, 99–93); Münzer (1913, cols. 2333–34). For the gift-exchange dynamic between individual and collective in which an honorific statue takes part (objectifying a relationship of mutual obligation), see Tannen 2000, 25–30.

45. Placement in comitium: Livy 2.10.12 (see previous note), Plin. HN 34.21–22 (apparently); in Volcanal: Plut. Publicola 16.9, De vir. ill. 11.2. Dion. Hal. 5.25.2 (previous note) locates it “in the most important place in the Forum.” For this area’s high visibility see Dion. Hal. 1.87.2, τῆς ἁγορᾶς . . . ἐν τῷ κρατίστῳ χωρίῳ παρὰ τοῖς έμβόλοις (i.e., the Volcanal; again at 3.1.2); 2.29.1, ἐν τῷ φανεροτέρῳ τῆς ἁγορᾶς (the comitium); Plin. HN 34.24, quam oculatissimo loco (the Rostra). Gell. 4.5.1–4 reports that the statue was relocated from the comitium to the Volcanal, apparently a very short move. On the statue’s location(s) see Sehlmeyer 1999, 94–95; Coarelli 1983, 1.168, 174–75; Lahuessen 1983, 12–13, 33–34; Vessberg 1941, 87–88.

46. Bronze: Dion. Hal. 5.25.2; and Plut. Publicola 16.9 (quoted n. 44 above). Armor: Dion. Hal. 5.25.2; perhaps Cic. Off. 1.61 (see below, pp. 21–22).
But archaeologists question this representation. Whether an honorific statue could have been erected in the late sixth century B.C.E. is far from clear, since no certainly historical honorific statues are attested until the late fourth century. Thus it is argued that Horatius’ statue, if properly honorific, must have been erected at least two centuries after the traditional date of his deed, though it was subsequently misremembered as being contemporary with it; or, if in fact archaic, it was a cult or votive statue that was subsequently misunderstood as honorific. For this paper, questions concerning the statue’s actual origins can be left out of account, being irrelevant to what the Romans of the late Republic and Empire made of this monument. The writers through whom we know of this statue believed it to be honorific, set up shortly after Horatius’ great deed (insofar as they credit the deed at all), and their own understanding of their contemporary world is my focus here. Within the framework of this “honorific” interpretation, archaeologists raise a typological question: was it a statua loricata, the “normal” type of armored statue known from the imperial period? Or did it have a form distinctive to itself? This typological/iconographic question is highly pertinent to my study, since it considers how Romans might have comprehended Horatius’ statue in terms of the iconographical types that they themselves deployed through most of the period from which our evidence comes.

What, then, might Roman viewers—the secondary audiences to Horatius’ deed, constituted as such by encountering this statue—have made of it? Two writers, Dionysius and Cicero, provide what may be regarded as interpretations of the object’s iconography. In De officiis 1.61, Cicero describes how one can blame or praise deeds done badly or well. Regarding praise, he writes:

contraque in laudibus, quae magno animo et fortiter excellenterque gesta sunt, ea nescio quo modo quasi pleniore ore laudamus. hinc rhetorum campus de Marathone, Salamine, Plataes, Thermopylis, Leuctris, <hinc no>ster Cocles, hinc Decii, hinc Cn. et P. Scipiones, hinc M. Marcellus, innumerables alii, maximeque ipse populus Romanus animi magnitudine excellit. declaratur autem studium bellicae gloriae quod statuas quoque virtemus ornatu fere militar.


... and conversely in praising, we praise with a kind of “fuller voice,” as it were, deeds done bravely and outstandingly, with great spirit. Hence the battles of Marathon, Salamis, Plataea, Thermopylae, and Leuctra are an exercise ground for the rhetoricians; hence our own Coecles, the Decii, Gnaeus and Publius Scipio, Marcus Marcellus, and innumerable others, and most of all the Roman people itself, are outstanding in the greatness of their spirit. That we see statues in basically military garb also testifies to a zeal for military glory.

Whether these statues commemorate the specific heroes mentioned just above is unclear, though certainly Cicero is referring to what he deems a typological class of statues. Assuming Horatius’ statue was in armor, as Dionysius says, then Cicero, who has just mentioned Horatius, may have his statue in mind here as a member of that class of “statues in military costume, more or less” (*ferē*). Whatever doubts or exceptions may lurk in this *ferē*, Cicero is confident of the costume’s meaning: all persons so commemorated share a zeal for military glory; one can read off from the costuming the values the commemorands embraced and put into action. To look at the statue of Horatius through Cicero’s eyes, then, is to see a statue whose *ornatus militaris* (whatever form this may take) causes it to share with other statues a certain physical form and, consequently, a specific sociocultural meaning.

Now let us turn to Dionysius, who stresses that Horatius went into and came out of the river wearing his armor (5.24.3). He goes on to list the honors and rewards he received publicly and privately (5.25.1–2), including the “bronze statue in armor” (*eἰκόνα χάλκην ἔνοπλον*, 5.25.2). He adds his own praise to these earlier acclamations, bracketing this list of honors with declarations in his own voice that Horatius had achieved something singular: he won “deathless renown,” and was “the most enviable of any Roman at that time.”

Since Dionysius gives Horatius’ armor prominence in his account both of the battle and of the swim in the Tiber, he seems likely to mean that the armor on the statue is Horatius’ own, that very same armor that by (still) being on his body is a towering monument to his valor. This interpretation seems the more likely since Dionysius also says that Horatius’ achievement outstripped those of all other contemporary actors, and was therefore reciprocated by a striking set of honors. To depict Horatius in *his* armor is, precisely, to mark his distinctive and surpassing achievement. It follows that to look at Horatius’ statue through Dionysius’ eyes is to see the hero’s *specificity*; the armor is an individualizing, particularizing element in the statue’s iconography. Yet for Cicero, we saw that it is a generic element. These two texts, then, appear to provide the following answer to the typological question posed above: the statue of Horatius admits either a generalizing or a particularizing interpretation, depending on the circumstances of the interpretive act. Cicero aims to provide a stock of similar examples that one can invoke while praising, and therefore declares that any armored statue attests a praiseworthy hero. Conversely Dionysius, stressing
Horatius’ surpassing valor, clothes him in the significant, distinctive armor that sets him apart from all others. In either case, the statue is a monument that calls the hero’s deed to memory, and so constructs secondary audiences. But the specific interpretation that any given secondary spectator, such as Cicero or Dionysius, imposes upon the statue depends upon the specifics of the rhetorical situation in which the statue is adduced.

By examining how different monuments commemorate Horatius’ deed, we have seen how each form foregrounds different aspects of the deed, and constructs for itself different secondary audiences in different contexts so as to produce different rhetorical and social effects. We have also seen how the production of exemplary discourse is at every point contested and unstable, allowing it to be turned to many different, even opposed, ends. But we have not yet examined one particularly important end of exemplary discourse, which is to authorize and promote certain patterns of action. Hence we turn to the fourth element of the scheme set out above: imitation.

Imitation

Within exemplary discourse, “imitation” entails the production of a (new) action in the public eye in light of a previous deed it resembles in some way, and the submission of this new action to various audiences for judgment and commemoration, with a view to spurring still further imitation in due course. Any action thus potentially looks both backward to some previous deed in light of which it was done, and forward to a subsequent imitation of itself, once constituted as a deed. To examine imitation regarding Horatius, then, is to ask two questions: What deeds does he imitate? And what deeds imitate his?

Although Horatius stands in the tradition as one of the earliest Roman military heroes, exemplary discourse does not permit his deed to be a first. In fact, several accounts identify models that he could be regarded as imitating and striving to surpass. We have seen that Polybius makes Horatius an imitator of the sorts of deeds that young Romans hear narrated during aristocratic funerals, though no particular models are specified. Other accounts are more specific. In the first place, those that explain the cognomen Cocles as “one-eyed” because he had lost the other in a prior battle make him a model for himself. Just as the cognomen, and the injury it indexes, indicate that he displayed *virtus* or *fortitudo* on that earlier occasion, so he does again in defending the bridge. Perhaps, however, the wounds he suffers on each occasion enabled Romans to see a further parallel: here is a soldier who habitually accumulates disabling injuries as monuments to his valor, yielding one body part after another to the ever-greater glory of the parts that remain.51 Provisionally, then, we may identify two distinct ways in which deeds can be “alike”: their resemblance may be categorical, in that

51. So Sallust writes of Sertorius (*Hist. 1.88M, Reynolds’ text*): *magna gloria tribunus militum . . . fuit, multaque duxit eius peracta . . . incelebrata sunt: quae vivos facie sua ostentabat aliquot adversís cicatrices et effoso oculo. quin ille dehonestamento corporis maxime laetabatur neque illis anxius, quia reliquae gloriosius retinebat* (similarly at Dem. *De cor. 67*, on Philip II of Macedon—a passage Gell. 2.27 says Sallust imitates).
Romans could place both under a single ethical rubric like *fortitudo* (Valerius Maximus’ collection of exempla is organized entirely by such categories); or the resemblance may be structural, in that one deed reproduces specific features of another.

In contrast, one account of Horatius’ deed—Seneca’s, in *Epistula* 120—has a stake in denying that there was an earlier valorous performance setting the model for the later one. Here Seneca argues, in a Stoic vein, that no external observer can assess an agent’s moral state—whether that agent is a (Stoic) good or wise man, or not—without observing many actions done over time and in various circumstances. For only long-term patterns of action, exposing the agent’s overall consistency or inconsistency in making moral choices, reveal the virtuousness or viciousness of his disposition. In this context Seneca gives a brief, admiring narration of Horatius’ defense of the bridge (§7): a brilliant deed, as Seneca admits, but he insists that one cannot extrapolate from such a deed the agent’s overall moral state, for no single action provides sufficient evidence. That is, Seneca adduces Horatius as an example of an agent about whom we know only one thing, and about whom any properly moral judgments (as opposed to simply evaluating his one action) are therefore premature. In making such an argument, Seneca is rejecting the long-standing patterns of moral evaluation embedded in exemplary discourse, with its focus on the single great deed. This move, as I and others have argued, is part of a larger Senecan project to offer theorized Stoicism, in place of traditional ethics, as a means by which Roman elites may address certain ethical binds imposed by the emerging imperial regime. So if Seneca accepted that the cognomen Cocles attested a prior valorous deed, his conclusion might seem less cogent, since some readers who concede his point about one deed might disagree about two—believing that *two* valorous deeds do constitute a pattern and offer grounds for inferring that the agent’s moral state is virtuous overall. Admittedly this is an argument from silence. But I speculate that Seneca omits the explanation of the cognomen found elsewhere in the tradition because his immediate argument is best served by presenting Horatius as a one-deed marvel.

Dionysius provides Horatius with other models by supplying a genealogy. He says that Horatius was the nephew of Horatius Pulvillus, suffect consul in year one of the Republic and ordinary consul in year three, the year in which he locates Cocles’ deed. Moreover, Cocles was descended from the surviving Horatius who had, along with his two brothers, defeated the Alban triplets to secure Roman ascendancy over that city. A prominent feature of Roman exemplary discourse is that the most compelling models for imitation often come from within the actor’s own family. Certainly no actor is restricted to familial models, but the idea that certain patterns of behavior do or should run in families—that is, that the deeds done by members

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52. Roller 2001, 64–126 (88–97 on Senecan exempla); Wray forthcoming; Inwood 1995.
53. Dion, Hal. 5.23.3: οὗτος ἀδελφός μὲν ἦν Ὁρατίου Μάρκου θατέρου τῶν υπότων, τὸ δὲ γένος κατήγεν ἀφ’ ἕνος τῶν τριάδομον Ὁρατίου Μάρκου τοῦ νικήσαντος τοὺς Ἀλβανός τριάδομος, ὅτε περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας αἰς πόλεις εἰς πόλεμον καταστάσθαι συνέβησαν.
of a single gens demonstrate structural as well as categorical resemblances—is widespread in Roman culture.\(^{54}\) In Cocles’ case, the surviving member of the triplet Horatii provides not only a categorical model of “valor” and “endurance,” but the structural parallel that both fought initially in a threesome, of whom two fell away leaving the one to face down a more numerous enemy alone. It is also tempting to find a categorical model in Horatius Pulvillus (exemplary for his \textit{fortitudo animi} in Val. Max. 5.10.1, and displaying \textit{robur animi} in Livy 2.8.8), who persisted in dedicating the temple of Jupiter despite being apprised, in the middle of the ritual, of his son’s death.\(^{55}\) Lacking any martial element, however, this deed represents a somewhat different dimension of \textit{fortitudo}.

So much for Horatius’ own models. Let us turn now to the second question: when and how is he himself invoked as a model for others to imitate? To be sure, any monument commemorating his deed presents him as a potential model for imitation, since exemplary discourse posits that those who learn of his deed through a monument should seek to reproduce it to gain similar renown. But let us consider cases where he is clearly invoked as a model or standard of evaluation for others. We have already encountered one case: in the “Philippic” that Dio Cassius places in Cicero’s mouth, Cicero suggests that Antony, in offering a crown to Caesar at the Lupercalia, has fallen short of Horatius’ standard in the category of “defending freedom” (Dio Cass. 45.31.2). Subsequently Fufius Calenus, replying to Cicero, maintains that Antony in fact defended freedom on that occasion more successfully than Horatius had done (46.19.8). Here the deeds in question have no structural resemblance; the comparison is entirely categorical: who has preserved \textit{libertas} most effectively through actions of one sort or another?

Horatius is also invoked as a canon in contexts where the similarities run deeper. Valerius Maximus relates the following anecdote under the rubric \textit{de amicitia}. When the tribune C. Gracchus was being pursued through the city by his enemies, a steadfast friend named Laetorius barricaded the \textit{pons sublicius} and held up the pursuit until Gracchus had crossed the bridge.

\(^{54}\) To list only a few instances: several Scipionic epitaphs speak of the deceased as rivaling or surpassing his ancestors’ deeds, or ennobling his stock, or causing the ancestors to “rejoice that he was born” (\textit{ILS} 4, 6); Polybius offers to teach the young Scipio Aemilianus how to “speak and act in a way worthy of his ancestors” (31.24.5, 10; see Habinek 1998, 50–51); three generations of Decii Mures reportedly die in battle as consuls, and at least two “devote” themselves in almost identical ways (e.g., Cic. \textit{Tusc}. 1.89, \textit{Fin}. 2.61; Dio Cass. \textit{apud} Zonar. 8.5); several generations of Appii Claudii in the early Republic fill identical roles as fearsome enemies of the \textit{plebs}; and M. Iunius Brutus reportedly felt pressure to measure up to the “tyrannicide” heritage of his ancestor, L. Iunius Brutus (e.g., Cic. \textit{Phil}. 2.26; Dio Cass. 44.12; App. \textit{BCiv}. 2.112; see Macmullen 1966, 7–10). Rich reading along these lines in Sen. \textit{Controv}. 10.2, passim. I know no systematic treatment of these familial traditions, unless it be G. D. Farney, “Aristocratic Family Identity in the Roman Republic” (Ph.D. diss., Bryn Mawr, 1999), which I have not been able to examine. For selective treatments see Bernard 2000, 167–96; Flower 1996, 128–58 (esp. 139); and Hölskeskamp 1996, 316–26 (esp. 319–21, 325). Scholars have noted that both Livy and Augustus (in his forum) strive to “nationalize” these familial traditions, to claim them for broader use by other Romans: Jaeger 1997, 107–24; Feldherr 1998, 97–100.

\(^{55}\) Dionysius (5.35.3) has Pulvillus dedicate the temple in year three, the year of his ordinary consulship and Cocles’ deed, while in Livy he dedicates it as suffect consul in year one, the year before Cocles’ deed (see n. 1 above for these authors’ different chronologies). Dionysius alone makes Pulvillus Cocles’ uncle, yet does not mention the death-of-the-son incident when reporting the dedication of the temple. So he, at any rate, does not seem to suggest even a categorical similarity along the lines of \textit{fortitudo}. 


safely. Then, says Valerius, “overwhelmed by force of numbers, he turned his sword against himself and with a rapid leap sought the depth of the Tiber. The fondness for his entire fatherland that Horatius Cocles had once demonstrated on that bridge, Laetorius gave to a single friendship, and added his voluntary death.”56 On the one hand, Valerius here draws a structural parallel: Laetorius imitates Horatius in his one-against-many fight on the pons sublicius, concluding with a leap into the river. Indeed, in saying that he “added” something, namely a suicide, Valerius may imply that he surpassed Horatius, making the deed even more noteworthy (though in another respect it is less so, since the suicide precludes him from rivaling the swim in full armor while wounded).57 On the other hand, the categorical parallels are problematic. Valerius continues, “What fine soldiers the Gracchi could have had, had they been willing to follow their father’s or maternal grandfather’s way of life! With what force and perseverance of spirit would Blossius, Pomponius, and Laetorius have facilitated the Gracchi’s trophies and triumphs, since they were such energetic accomplices to their mad undertakings . . . !”58 By comparing Laetorius’ actions favorably to a soldier’s, he seems to acknowledge that this deed (like Horatius’) manifests courage and steadfastness. Yet unlike such soldiers, and Horatius before them, he insists that Laetorius does not act in the collective interest. On the contrary, he stakes his life only to his friendship with Gracchus, whose “mad undertakings” are (on this account) utterly contrary to the collective interest, and entirely at odds with the “trophies and triumphs” that would have marked valued service to the res publica. So, however close his imitation of Horatius in structural terms, Laetorius perversely acts not for but against the common good. For this reason Valerius deprives him of the positive evaluation that successful imitators might expect to receive. Laetorius becomes an exemplary figure in his own right, as the narrative here and in Velleius attests—but he is exemplary only for (misplaced) amicitia and fides, and not for Horatian-style virtus or fortitudo, outstanding valor on behalf of the res publica at large.

Even when not named explicitly, Horatius may provide an implicit model for others’ heroic deeds. Consider Q. Sertorius, who Plutarch says swam the

56. Val. Max. 4.7.2 (de amicitia): Laetorius autem in ponte sublicio constitit et eum, donec Gracchus transiret, ardore spiritus sui saepsit, ac vi iam multitudinis obrutus converso in se gladio profundum Tiberis petit, quamque in eo ponte caritatem toti patriae Horatius Cocles exhibuerat, unius amicitiae adiecta voluntaria morte praestitit. Note that Gracchus goes the opposite direction from Horatius, passing westward through the porta Trigemina and onto the bridge: on his route see Coarelli 1988, 31–34. Vell. Pat. (2.6.6), giving the friend’s name as Pomponius, draws the structural parallel equally precisely: quo die singularis Pomponii equitis Romani in Gracchum fides fuit, qui more Coclitis sustentatis in ponte hostibus eius gladio se transflixit. See also Plut. Ti. Gracch. 38.1; De vir. ill. 65.

57. Likewise in Polybius’ version, where death precludes the valorous swim. Voisin (1992, 264) suggests that Laetorius’ death, as described by Valerius, preserves a trace of the Polybian version. But Valerius’ phrase adiecta voluntaria morte presents this death not as reproducing Horatius’ death (à la Polybius), but as an “addition,” a respect in which Laetorius’ deed is new and different from Horatius’. That is, Valerius has in mind the “standard” version in which Horatius lives, not the Polybian one where he dies.

58. Val. Max. 4.7.2 (continuing the passage quoted in n. 56): quan bonos Gracchi, si aut patris aut materni avi sectam vitae ingredi voluissent, habere milities potuerant! quo enim impiet, qua perseverantia animi Blossius et Pomponius et Laetorius tropaeae ac triumphos eorum aduisset, furiosi conatus tam strenui comites. . . .
Rhone, wounded but retaining his breastplate and shield, during the Roman defeat at Arausio (105 B.C.E.). Even after attaining high command, he continued putting his body at risk like a common soldier: for instance, he lost an eye, and was proud that the wound offered visible proof of his valor. As evidence of valor, the swimming feat and eye loss suggest the Horatian model both structurally and categorically, though Horatius is not named.

Equally suggestive are the deeds of Cassius Scaeva, one of Julius Caesar’s centurions. Caesar himself, narrating the battle of Dyrrachium, credits Scaeva with warding off a Pompeian attack on a fortification, and says that his shield suffered 120 perforations (B Civ. 3.53.3–5). Later accounts are more elaborate, mentioning not only the perforated shield but also wounds to the shoulder and leg, and the loss of an eye. Lucan’s version makes Scaeva’s performance explicitly spectacular, as Scaeva himself calls upon the opposing commanders to witness his deed (6.158–60), and a group of young soldiers gather around to watch and judge (6.167–69). At the end, they lift up their wounded champion and proclaim him “the living image of great virtus” (6.251–57), though Lucan himself, as a secondary spectator, rejects these eyewitnesses’ positive evaluation and imposes a negative one of his own (257–62), a phenomenon we consider further below.

Several accounts also credit Scaeva with an earlier deed, during Caesar’s campaign in Britain. Valerius Maximus (3.2.23) reports that he defended a narrow spit of land, extending between an island and a rock, against many enemies until his fellow soldiers escaped behind him. His helmet dislodged by blows, his shield “consumed by holes,” and having suffered several wounds, he provided an astonishing spectaculum to both Britanni and Roman spectators. Finally he plunged into the sea wearing two breastplates (oddly) and swam to safety under the eyes of Caesar himself—begging his general’s forgiveness for the armor he left behind. It is hard to imagine

59. Plut. Sert. 3.1: ... κακῶς ἀγωνισμένοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων καὶ τροπῆς γενομένης, ἀποβεβληκός τὸν ἵππον καὶ καταστρατεμένος τὸ σῶμα τὸν Ροδανόν διεπήρασεν, αὐτῷ τῇ τάθησι καὶ θυρέῳ πρὸς ἐναντίον ρέμια πολὺ νηχόμενος. . . . (§§3–4) ὥστε μὴ ύψηκα τῆς στρατιωτικῆς τοίμης εἰς ἄξιμα προεληλθὼς ἥγεμον, ἀλλὰ καὶ χειρὸς ἀποδεικνύοντος ἐργὰ θωμαστά καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοὺς ἁγίουν ἀφρίδας ἐπιδιόκες, τῶν ὄψεως ἀπέβαλε τὴν ἔτεραν ἐκκοπεσίαν. Ἡπὶ τούτῳ δὲ καὶ καλλωπιζόμενοι ἂεὶ διεῖλεί . . . αὐτῷ δὲ τῆς ἀνδραγαθίας παραμένει τὰ γενερίσµατα, τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἔχοντι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἁμα καὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς θετάς. Similari. Sall. Hist. 1.88M (n. 51 above).

60. Though no ancient text, to my knowledge, explicitly links Sertorius and Horatius, modern scholars have done so: Conrad 1994, 43–44; Africa 1970, 532–35; Gagé 1969, 197–98. However, Aulus Gellius (2.27) notes a parallel between Sertorius and Philip II of Macedon (comparing Sall. Hist. 1.88M and Dem. De cor. 67); while Plutarch (Mor. 307D–E) compares Philip and Horatius. It may therefore be only an accident of survival that no text directly compares Horatius and Sertorius.

61. Val. Max. 3.2.23; Lucan 6.140–262; Plut. Caes. 16.3–4; Suet. Iul. 68; App. B Civ. 2.60 (where the perforated shield and lost eye are attributed to a Minucius). Discussion of these passages in relation to Horatius in Capdeville 1972, 602–11.

62. Leigh (1997, 158–90) discusses well the spectacular elements of this episode in Lucan, pointing to the “double audience” of viewers within the text and readers of the text (164–65, 184—primary and secondary spectators, in my terms), rightly noting that the viewers within the text construct the exemplum as such (181–84). He also connects Scaeva with Horatius (174–75), and observes parallels to other exemplary deeds (166–72, 182–90). Thus, while the Scaeva episode is assuredly an epic aristeia, and as such participates in a literary tradition, Leigh shows how this episode is meaningful and effective in distinctively Roman cultural terms (181–82).

63. Other accounts: Plut. Caes. 16.5–7 (explicitly noting Caesar’s witnessing of the deed), Dio Cass. 37.53.2–3 (deed done in Lusitania rather than Britain); discussion by Capdeville (1972, 611–15).
that Valerius did not intend this narrative to be compared closely with the account of Horatius provided at the beginning of this same chapter (3.2.1). Not only are both brought under the same categorical rubric de fortitudine (3.2) and share obvious structural parallels, but Scaeva seems to “cap” and thus surpass Horatius’ deed: for although he emerges from the water without all his equipment, he has the shame and presence of mind to ask Caesar’s pardon for the loss. Thus, says Valerius, he was “great in battle, but greater in his recollection of military discipline,” and was rewarded “not only for his deeds, but especially for his words”—thus achieving something beyond the (mere) valor of Horatius. Scaeva’s engagement with the Horatian model is beyond question here, even though Valerius does not draw the parallel explicitly. 64

That the texts through which we know of Sertorius and Scaeva clearly present them as imitators of Horatius, yet equally clearly feel no need to name him as the exemplary model, seems to indicate that, for authors and readers who had internalized and naturalized the discourse of exemplarity, and for whom seeking out models for imitation and then seeking to set a new model in turn was the fundamental rhythm of action in the public eye, there was no need to point out the obvious by making the model explicit. 65

III. Cloelia

Among the figures constructed as imitators of Horatius, Cloelia is perhaps the most unexpected. Her story goes as follows. It is still the year of Horatius’ deed—year two or three of the Republic, depending on the chronology—but somewhat later.65 Porsenna, his initial assault stymied by Horatius, is now encamped on the Janiculum, laying siege to the city. Mucius Scaevola’s exemplary deed has occurred in the meantime, leading to a truce. The Romans guarantee this truce by sending as hostages to Porsenna the young sons and daughters of leading families. Among these children is a girl—a virgo—named Cloelia.66 Here is Livy’s account (2.13.4–11):

(4) his condicionibus composita pace exercitum ab Ianiculo deduxit Porsenna et agro Romano excessit. (5) patres C. Mucio virtutis causa trans Tiberim agrum dono dedere, quae postea sunt Mucia prata appellata. (6) ergo ita honorata virtute, feminae quoque

64. Val. Max. 3.2.23: cum laude mereris veniam petisti, magnus proelio sed maior disciplinae militaris memoria. itaque ab optimo virtutis aetestimatore cum facta tum etiam verba tua centurionatus honore donata sunt. For Horatius and Scaeva see Capdeville 1972, p. 619, n. 1; also Leigh 1997, 175. Capdeville (1972, 615–18) demonstrates even more extensive parallels: in Valerius and elsewhere, Scaeva is coupled with another Caesarian soldier named Acilius, who loses his right arm attacking a ship in the naval battle at Massilia (Val. Max. 3.2.23; Suet. Iul. 68; Plut. Caes. 16.2; cf. Lucan 3.609–26). Thus the early imperial tradition of Caesar’s wars seems to present Scaeva and Acilius together as a recent analog to Horatius and Mucius Scaevola, the heroic duo of the wars with Porsenna.

65. Livy (2.13.6–11) places both deeds in year two, the consulship of P. Valerius Publicola II and T. Lucretius (likewise Plut. Publicola 16.3); Dion. Hal. (5.33) puts them in year three, the consulship of Valerius Publicola III and Horatius Pulvillus II (see n. 1 above).

66. The gens Cloelia is included by Livy (1.30.2) and Dion. Hal. (3.29.7) among the leading Alban families enrolled in the patriciate after the cities unified; indeed, a Cluilius is among the last kings/leaders of Alba (Livy 1.23.4; Dion. Hal. 3.2.1), and a Cloelius is consul at Rome several years after Cloelia’s deed. On the family see Fugmann 1997, 62; Forsythe 1994, 254–55; Arcella 1985, 35, 39–40; and Münzer 1901, cols. 109–10 (s.v. “Cloelius,” nos. 6, 8, 10–12—all early republican).
ad publica decora excitatae, et Cloelia virgo una ex obsidibus, cum castra Etruscorum forte haud procul ripa Tiberis locata essent, frustrata custodes, dux agminis virginum inter tela hostium Tiberim tranavit, sospitesque omnes Romam ad propinquos restituit. (7) quod ubi regi nuntiatum est, primo incensus ira oratores Romam misit ad Cloelian obsidem deponendam: alias haud magni facere. (8) deinde in admirationem versus, supra Coclites Muciosque dicere id facinus esse, et prae se ferre quemadmodum si non dedatur obse, pro rupto foedus se habiturum, sic deditam intacem inviolatamque ad suos remissurum. (9) utrimque constitit fides; et Romani pignus pacis ex foedere restituerunt, et apud regem Etruscum non tuta solum sed honorata etiam virtus fuit, laudatamque virginem parte obsidum se donare dixit; ipsa quos vellet legeret. (10) productis omnibus elegisse impubes dicitur; quod et virginitati decorum et consensu obsidum iussa erat eam aetatem potissimum liberari ab hoste quae maxime opportuna iniuriae esset. (11) pace redintegrata Romani novam in femina virtutem novo genere honoris, statua equestri, donavere; in summa Sacra Via fuit posita virgo insidens equo.

Livy introduces Cloelia as an imitator: he says that, with the *virtus* of Mucius receiving such acclaim, even women were stirred to act in the public eye for the benefit of the community. Yet on his account Cloelia successfully imitates both Mucius and Horatius in categorical terms, since all three are honored publicly for their *virtus* (Horatius at 2.10.11, Mucius at 2.13.5, Cloelia at 2.13.11)—that is, Livy insists that the community deemed all these actions consequential, evaluated them positively in the category of *virtus*, and constructed monuments in each case. In Cloelia’s case, Porsenna too concurs with the Roman judgment: he esteems *virtus* (*honorata etiam virtus fuit*, §9) just as they do (*ita honorata virtute*, §6), and he expressly declares that her deed surpassed those of Coclès and Mucius (§8). But her imitation of Horatius is structural as well as categorical, inasmuch as she
swims the Tiber from the Etruscan to the Roman side, under a shower of enemy javelins (2.13.6, cf. 2.10.11). Other texts too stress this structural resemblance, suggesting that her parallel with Horatius figured more broadly in the tradition. Valerius Maximus not only places Cloelia under the rubric de fortitudine (3.2.2), like Horatius, but narrates her story immediately following his, linking them closely with the assertion that “she dared her famous deed at almost the same time, against the same enemy, and in the same Tiber.” Thus he takes pains to note a (structural) parallel going beyond what his regular (categorical) organizing principles already assert. Returning to Livy, we note finally that she obtains the desired acclaim. Her countrymen monumentalize her action as consequential and ethically positive through a laudatory narrative and an honorific equestrian statue, placed at the summit of the Sacred Way at the opposite end of the Forum from Horatius’ statue. Even Porsenna, an enemy but perforce a close observer of Roman valor, praises her, deems her a successful imitator of earlier heroes, and gives a gift (§8–9). Thus the exemplary loop closes, with the commemoration of her deed in monumental forms that will inform and inspire future imitators, just as (according to Livy and others) she herself imitated earlier heroes.

The figure of Cloelia is only slightly less resonant than Horatius in Roman culture, to judge by her textual trace: there are about a half dozen extended narratives of her deed, and another dozen or so sparer narratives or mere references. The earliest surviving reference is a fragment of the historian Calpurnius Piso (transmitted by the elder Pliny), dating probably to the later second century B.C.E.; next comes a probable hidden reference in Cicero, followed by a profusion of references and fuller accounts from the Augustan age onward. These accounts present numerous variations: she seized a fortuitous opportunity to escape, or actively tricked her guards; she escaped alone, or with other hostages; she crossed the Tiber by day with many observers watching, or invisibly by night; in a few accounts she does not swim but crosses on horseback. Finally, some accounts say that as she and the other hostages returned to Porsenna, they were ambushed by Tarquin’s forces; here another hostage, Publicola’s daughter Valeria, is said to escape, while Porsenna’s troops come to the rescue.

67. Val. Max. 3.2.2: immemorem me propositi mei Cloelia facit, paene eadem enim tempestate, certe adversus eundem hostem et in eodem Tiberi inclutum ausa facinus. Valerius links these deeds even more closely by causing them, as a pair, to interrupt a narrative of Romulus, which begins at 3.2.praef. and concludes at 3.2.3. Also, whereas Livy categorizes the deeds of Horatius, Mucius, and Cloelia all under virtus, Valerius banishes Mucius to the next chapter (3.3.1) under patientia. Other pairings of Cloelia and Horatius: Verg. Aen. 8.650–51 (without Mucius; likewise Serv. in Aen. 8.646) and Dio Cass. 45.31.1–2. All three are linked at Manilius 1.779–81; Juv. 8.264–65; Flor. 1.4.3. Extensive narration of all three deeds (as in Livy) at Dion. Hal. 5.23–35; Plut. Publicola 16–19; De vir. ill. 11–13.

68. Earliest reference: Piso frag. 20 Peter = frag. 27 Forsythe = frag. 7.22 Beck-Walter (apud Plin. HN 34.29); discussion at Forsythe 1994, 252–57. Differences from the Livian account: she tricks the guards at Dion. Hal. 5.33.1, De vir. ill. 13, Schol. in Iuv. 8.264; she crosses alone at Flor. 1.4.3, Serv. in Aen. 8.646; by night at Val. Max. 3.2.2; on horseback at Val. Max. 3.2.2, Flor. 1.4.3 (alternative versions—swimming or crossing on horseback—given at Plut. Publicola 19.2, 8, Mor. 250C–F), De vir. ill. 13. Tarquins attack returning hostages: Plut. Publicola 19.4–6, Mor. 250D–F, Fetialis apud Plin. HN 34.29 (all naming Valeria as escapee), Dion. Hal. 5.33.3–4.
These variations have spurred source critics, as in the case of Horatius, to scrutinize the tradition for earlier and later (or “better” and “worse”) elements, in the attempt to reconstruct earlier versions of the legend. In this case too, origins have sometimes been sought in early Roman cult and ritual, of which the story as found in surviving texts is seen as a transfigured or misremembered representation. Even if such approaches do, in some cases, recover aspects of the legend’s actual origins or conditions of production, they do so by seeking meanings that were largely or entirely lost to the authors and intended audiences of our texts. Whatever the origins of the legend, I agree that the Romans of this later period had largely forgotten, misremembered, or transfigured them. My own approach, again, is different. By examining this legend’s representation and deployment in and through the monuments that survive from, or are attested for, the late Republic and Empire, I argue that Romans of this period comprehended the story and its variants within the discourse of exemplarity. They thereby put the figure of Cloelia into an ethical dialogue with their own day, with important socio-cultural consequences.

Here I will not illustrate phases in the schema of exemplary discourse, as I did for Horatius. Instead, I focus on certain complexities in this discourse that are especially interesting or problematic in Cloelia’s case. First I examine the moment at which secondary spectators encounter a monument; I consider what these spectators do and experience in the course of this encounter. Then I examine a particular ethical and social paradox that Cloelia presents to these spectators: the paradox of the “manly maiden.”

Continuity and Analogy

We observed above that Polybius’ narrative of Horatius’ deed (6.54–55) removes it entirely from its own sociopolitical circumstances: not a word about Porsenna, the expulsion of the Tarquins, or the like—information that Livy and Dionysius do supply as frames for the deed, and that many modern scholars would deem essential for proper historical understanding. Yet Polybius intimates that the Romans themselves recounted such stories in isolation from their historical circumstances—at funerals, for instance—just as he himself does in this passage. He further implies that such accounts have primarily ethical force, since they endorse certain deeds as consequential and valuable to the community, and thus provide canons of value for future

69. Quellenkritik: see, e.g., Münzer 1901, cols. 110–11 (s.v. “Cloelius’” 9); Ogilvie 1965, 267. At least as old as Peter 1865, 49–50, is the idea that Valerius Antias invented the ambush episode, to give an heroic role to a member of the gens Valeria; Wiseman (1998, 84) has recently reasserted this.

70. E.g., Gagé (1963, 60–62, 271–72) suggests that “Cloelia” and “Valeria” are originally not gentilic names but ritual functions, respectively “purification” and “health”; similarly Gagé 1988, 241. Coarelli (1983, 1.86) accepts this view; Arcella (1985, 33–40) expressly rejects it. Taking a Dumézilian line, Arcella sees the three heroes as “trickster” figures (27–31), on which the city must rely for its defense against a more powerful enemy. He argues that Cloelia’s traversals of the Tiber establish and defend a principle of endogamy, but at the same time bring Roman fides into question (see pp. 43–44 below), which the actions of Valeria repair. In a different vein, Wiseman (1999, 198–99) suggests that the legend—at least the “Tarquin ambush’ version—originated as a risqué mime at the ludi Florales.
actors. That is, these accounts establish values and effect social reproduction. Polybius is right; throughout Roman literature we find tellings of great deeds out of historical context. Valerius Maximus provides a massive collection, grouping his narratives under ethical rubrics and so making clear that his work’s concerns are, above all, moral. Not just narratives, however, but monuments as such, are capable of historically decontextualizing action in this way. Many scholars have observed, for instance, that the honorific statues that filled the Forum by the late Republic were located in no chronological order: if they were, the statues of Horatius and Cloelia would have stood close together, and not at opposite ends of the Forum with (eventually) countless other monuments in between. Yet the fact that such monuments tell no coherent chronological story does not detract from their individual ethical force. Furthermore, the meanings that statues and other physical monuments may be taken to have individually are augmented and nuanced by their topographical location, their juxtaposition with other monuments, and so on. But let us first consider how an individual Roman viewer encounters and engages a single monument.

A Roman who encounters a monument commemorating a deed—whether a narrative, a statue, or some other object—experiences a temporal dislocation. For the monument is, in some sense, an outpost of the past: it has been thrust forward in time from the moment of the deed (or rather, of its commemoration) to meet the Roman in his or her own day, and to present the deed to this Roman’s eyes or ears. As this Roman engages the monument—by reading or listening to a narrative, analyzing a statue’s iconography, registering the type, number, and location of scars, or the like—the monument draws him or her back to the moment of the deed, thus constituting him or her as a secondary spectator who looks (as it were) over the shoulder of the primary spectators. At this point, our spectator experiences the social, ethical, and psychological effects already discussed: this person is invited to replicate the primary audience’s judgment, thereby affirming the monument’s ethical integrity; he or she should also feel the impulse to imitate, to gain similar glory. The monument, then, makes our spectator complicit in a temporal collapse of past and present. For the spectator is pulled backward in time, required to evaluate a past action by the same criteria that he or she would use in evaluating a contemporary action, and finally dispatched back to his or her own present with the idea that that deed thereby discovered is ethically relevant to one’s own choices and actions, and those of one’s contemporaries. From this description, we can see that exemplary discourse and the monuments it encompasses presuppose both ethical continuity and

71. See Hökseskamp 1996, 308–15, 323–24, on the loss of chronological structure around exempla, and the ethical recontextualizing of events that this often enables. Jaeger (1997, 27, 50–53) argues that Livy, in constructing his narrative, systematizes the miscellaneous character of a Roman’s subjective experience of the Forum; he effectively “rearranges” its monuments, juxtaposing them in particular ways, to confer particular meanings upon them. For statues furnishing models for imitation, see Bergemann 1990, 33; Hölsscher 1978, 340.

72. This description of an encounter with a monument is based on Jaeger 1997, 15–18, itself an interpretation of a difficult passage in Varro (Ling. 6.49).
performative analogy. On the one hand, a monument can have such an effect only if the criteria of ethical judgment, and the social values that underpin these criteria, remain tolerably constant over time—constant enough for the actions and judgments of one period to remain comprehensible in another. On the other hand, to believe that a past action is ethically relevant to a contemporary action is to posit an analogical relation between these actions, to regard them as sharing one or more properties—that is, as having structural or categorical similarities—that render them directly comparable in ethical terms, in light of the (assumed) condition of ethical continuity.73

Texts that discuss Cloelia illustrate profusely how past and present meet through the conduit of monuments, and illuminate the assumptions about continuity and analogy just described. Let us examine three texts in which Cloelia is explicitly ranked relative to her contemporaries. Manilius, in the first book of his *Astronomica*, lists some Roman heroes who he says reside in the Milky Way. These include all the kings (except Tarquinius Superbus), the three Horatii, Mucius Scaevola, Cloelia—whom he calls “a maiden greater than the men”—and Horatius Cocles.74 Here Manilius enters into the ranking debates of the remote past by asserting that Cloelia surpassed those male contemporaries whom he lists along with her; she is presented as the greatest hero of early Rome. The elder Pliny enters this same debate, but with a different result. He remarks dyspeptically on Cloelia’s equestrian statue and the honor it represents: “as if it were not enough that she be clothed in a toga, when equestrian statues were not granted to those who expelled the kings, Lucretia and Brutus, thanks to whom Cloelia had been included among the hostages.”75 Apparently, he takes the statue to mean that Cloelia’s contemporaries—the primary audience—ranked her deed above Lucretia’s and Brutus’, since the latter do not have such statues.76 But having been drawn backward in time by this statue to become a secondary spectator to her deed, looking over the primary spectators’ shoulders as they evaluate her, he rejects their evaluation on the ground that, in his view, Lucretia’s and Brutus’ deeds were of greater consequence to the collective. Because he assumes that her deed lies as transparently open to his own scrutiny and

73. My use of the terms “continuity” and “analogy” is indebted to Knapp 1989, esp. 129–32. On the historical continuity—even changelessness—presupposed by exempla, see Hölkeskamp 1996, 312–15; Stemmler 2000, 145.

74. Manilius 1.777–81: *Romanique viri quorum iam maxima turba est, / Tarquinioque minus reges et / Horatia proles, / tota acies partus, nec non et Scaevola trunco / nobilior, maiorque viris et Cloelia virgo, / et Romana ferens quae text moenia Cocles. . . .* Here I treat Manilius not as the creator of a monumental text by which his readers may encounter these early heroes, but as a secondary spectator himself to Cloelia’s deed, who has encountered this and the other heroes’ deeds through other, unspecified monuments, and records his own judgments in this text.

75. Plin. *HN* 34.28: *pedestres sine dubio Romae fuere in auctoritate longo tempore; et equestrium tamen origo perquam vetus est, cum feminis etiam honore communicato Cloeliae statua equestri, ceu param esset toga eam cingi, cum Lucretiae ac Bruto, qui expularent reges, propter quos Cloelia inter obsides fuerat, non decernentur.*

76. While no statue of Lucretia is attested from any period, one of Brutus stood on the Capitol, along with statues of seven kings, in the late Republic (anti-Caesarian squibs were written on it). The posture and dress of this statue are not reported. However, the kings were almost certainly pedestrian and togate; that Brutus was included in this group may suggest that his statue was similar. See Sehlmeyer 1999, 68–74; Hölscher 1978, 328–31.
evaluation as it did to her contemporaries, he can disagree with them and suggest that Cloelia should have received only a togate statue (presumably pedestrian), which he implies is a lesser honor and better suited to the deed’s actual importance. This phenomenon—the secondary spectator who disagrees with his predecessors’ judgments—is a key instability in the production of exemplary discourse, which makes it possible always to reappropriate an exemplum in a new way to meet new exigencies.

Now consider again how Livy presents Porsenna’s evaluation of Cloelia’s deed. On this account, Porsenna was not among the primary spectators, since the deed was reported to him (quod ubi regi nuntiatum est, 2.13.7)—a secondary spectator, then, but contemporary with the deed. Still, he evaluates it against contemporary rivals and judges it superior (supra Coclites Muciosque . . . id facinus esse, 2.13.8). This is precisely the evaluation that Manilius, Livy’s younger contemporary, makes in his own voice, and that Pliny assumes (from the statue) that the primary audience made—though Pliny, as we have seen, contests this judgment. Thus it is evident that Livy imagines (and assumes his audience imagines) that Porsenna would have gone about evaluating Cloelia’s deed in the same way and on the same standards as Livy and his contemporaries would, and as Manilius and Pliny in fact do: namely, by comparing her deed to those of her contemporaries in the pertinent ethical categories. The ideology of exemplarity makes no distinction between secondary spectators contemporary with a deed and such spectators at a large temporal remove, regarding how they evaluate a deed and its ethical implications for Romans of any era.

These three passages illustrate how exemplary discourse presupposes the principle of ethical continuity. When Romans of the late Republic and Empire pass judgment on an ancient deed, they assume that both they and the original judging audience are playing the same game by the same rules. They may disagree with the original verdict, but they nevertheless assume that both parties pass judgment in light of persistent ethical standards that obtain equally in both eras. Moreover, it is a monument, of whatever form, that provides the conduit whereby later spectators can access and enter the past that they (re)evaluate. But recall that a monument itself is dislocated in the opposite direction: it projects a deed forward in time, to meet that spectator in his or her own day; the past is thus made available in any given present to inform the choices and actions taken by oneself and one’s contemporaries. To see a monument at work in this way, we return to the “Philippic” of Cicero composed by Dio Cassius. Cicero complains that Antony, as consul, gave a speech from the Rostra while “naked,” having stripped to a loincloth to serve as Lupercus on the occasion of the Lupercalia (45.30). Declaring Antony’s (un)dress an outrage to the dignity of the consulship (§30.2, 5), Cicero makes the following comparison (§31.1):

τάχα γ’ ἢν οὖτος ἢ τὸν Ὄρατιον τὸν παλαιὸν ἐκείνον ἢ καὶ τὴν Κλοελίαν τὴν ἅρχαιαν ἐμιμήσατο, ὅν ἢ μὲν τὴν ἐσθήτα πάσαν ἐνδεδοκυῖα τὸν ποταμὸν διενήχατο, ὁ δὲ καὶ μετὰ τὸν ὀπλὸν ἐς τὸ ψέφισμα ἐκατόν ἐνέβαλεν. ἤξιόν γε (οὖ γάρ;) καὶ τούτῳ τινὰ εἰκόνα στήσαι, ἵν’ ὃ μὲν καὶ ἐν τῷ Τιβέριῳ ὑπόλισμένος, ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ γεμίσεις ὀρόφτω.
Perhaps he imitated the famous Horatius of old, or indeed Cloelia of old, of whom the latter swam across the river in a fully clothed state, while the former threw himself into the stream with his armor on as well. It would be fitting indeed (how could it not be?) for a statue to be erected of Antony too, so that the one might be seen in armor even in the Tiber, and the other might be seen naked even in the Forum.

Despite the assertion “perhaps he imitated . . . ,” Antony’s actions described here—serving as consul, addressing the people, playing the *Lupercus*—have no resemblance to the actions ascribed to Horatius or Cloelia. Rather, “Cicero’s” comparison among these figures turns on their sartorial states. He invokes a moral hierarchy in which being clothed in the Tiber (like Horatius and Cloelia) evinces high virtue, and being naked in the Forum (like Antony) indicates low vice. Presumably the other two combinations—naked in the Tiber, clothed in the Forum—are ethically unmarked and neutral, being the “normal” sartorial states of persons who swim or engage in civic life, respectively. At any rate, monuments to the two archaic heroes provide the moral canons of which Antony’s recent behavior falls short. These monuments are, first, the brief narratives that Cicero himself provides here, describing the heroes’ costumes while in the river; and second, Horatius’ statue, which provides a strong moral contrast with the imagined statue of Antony. For just as the former commemorates Horatius’ (virtuous) swimming the Tiber in armor, so Antony’s will commemorate his (vicious) speaking from the Rostra naked. In this passage, then, monuments of Horatius and Cloelia vicariously bring these heroes into the present, making them available as standards of ethical conduct against which today’s actions can be evaluated. The principle of ethical continuity is clearly taken for granted. But this passage also illustrates, in an indirect way, the principle of performative analogy. Even though Cicero is ironic when he suggests that Antony “imitated” Horatius and Cloelia (for he focuses on how Antony diverges from the archaic heroes, not how he resembles them), this very irony attests the strength of the expectation that a contemporary action will and should have morally salient similarities to an ancient one, and that these actions can be weighed in a moral balance on the basis of their similarities. Indeed, Cicero carries his point precisely by imagining a statue of Antony in the Forum—clearly “analogous” to that of Horatius—whose juxtaposition with the image of the hero will (paradoxically) show not how nearly Antony rivals him, but how far he has fallen short.77

Cicero himself never makes such an argument in the extant *Philippics*. But in *De officiis* he does confirm that Cloelia can provide an authoritative standard for evaluating contemporary action. At §1.61, he discusses techniques for praising and blaming. The “praising” portion was quoted and discussed

77. By what iconographical difference might this moral contrast be carried? If Horatius’ statue portrayed him in armor—and here again it must be understood as *his own* armor, the very armor that marks his *virtus* in the river—then Antony’s envisioned statue would have to portray him “naked,” which might mean wearing only the *perizoma* that was the priestly costume of a *Lupercus*. Pliny (*HN* 34.8) mentions statues *Lupercorum habitu* as a recent innovation in honorific statuary, and several such statues from the first to third centuries C.E. have recently been identified (Wrede 1983). So Dio Cassius may be imagining a statue of Antony in a specific iconographical form familiar to himself and his intended audience.
on pages 21–22 above; let us here consider the “blaming” portion. Cicero writes, “And so, one is best equipped to make reproaches if one can say something like this: ‘for you young men have a womanly spirit, but that maiden has a man’s’” (itaque in probris maxime in promptu est si quid tale dici potest: “vos enim iuvenes animum geritis muliebrem, illa virgo viri”); he then goes on to discuss praising, for which one may invoke Horatius, the Decii, and so on. Now, the “reproach” that Cicero quotes here is a line of verse, probably a septenarius; Ribbeck tentatively assigns it to Accius’ Me-leager, in which case the virgo is Atalanta. But because Cicero contrasts this “reproach” with the praise that arises from invoking Horatius (and other heroes), I suspect he imagines that his audience will understand this reference as being to Cloelia—that she is the maiden with the manly spirit, whom the orator can invoke as a standard of which certain people fall short here and now.

A striking instance of Cloelia doing exactly the job this verse describes—providing a canon of manliness surpassing anything today’s men can muster—is found in Seneca’s Consolatio ad Marciam, addressed to a woman whose father has recently died. About midway through this treatise, Seneca adduces examples of men who courageously endured the deaths of family members, refusing to be bowed by grief (12.4–15.4). He then imagines his addressee Marcia making an objection as follows (16.1–2):

(1) scio quid dicas: “oblitus es feminam te consolari, virorum refers exempla.” quis autem dixit naturam maligne cum mulierum ingenii egisse et virtutes illarum in artum retraxisse? par illis, mihi crede, vigor, par ad honesta, libeat (modo), facultas est; dolorem laboremque ex aequo, si consuevere, patiuntur. (2) in qua istud urbe, di boni, loquimur? in qua regem Romanis capitibus Lucretia et Brutus deiecerunt: Bruto libertatem debeatemus, Lucretiae Brutum; in qua Cloeliam contempto et hoste et flumine ob insignem audaciam tantum non in viros transcripsimus: equestri insidens statuae in Sacra Via, celeberrimo loco, Cloelia exprobrat iuvenibus nostris pulvinum escendentibus in ea illos urbe sic ingredi in qua etiam feminas equo donavimus.

Here Seneca develops the gender inversion posited in the verse Cicero quotes. Cloelia has all but been reclassified as vir on account of her “outstanding boldness” and has indeed received a manly honor, sitting atop a horse like

78. TRF², locus incertus, fabula incerta 210.
a male hero; meanwhile, today’s young men are conveyed in litters in a stereotypically effeminate manner. Thus Seneca not only adduces Cloelia as a canon for evaluating his contemporaries, but also hypostatizes the injunction her statue implicitly delivers, by making her *speak* from her position on horseback, which so conspicuously marks her manly quality. The “reproach” she casts at today’s youth is “you must do as I did, in order to get this kind of mount.” The past could hardly be brought into the present more vividly: the archaic hero is given voice, becoming a spectator and authoritative evaluator of today’s social actors. Far from leaving it to contemporaries to measure today’s actions against canonical deeds of the past, the hero herself, the doer of one such deed and therefore the most authoritative judge imaginable, assumes that role. The statue itself enables this fiction, as the figure of Cloelia upon the horse, in a “very crowded” spot on the Sacred Way, is imagined to be alive and sensible to all the activities surrounding her, where she can see and judge everything that occurs in the Forum, just as everyone there can see her. On Seneca’s account she *really is* in the present, projected forward by her monument from her own day.\(^79\) Furthermore, in asserting that she speaks to “our” youth (*exprobrat iuvenibus nostris*), and that “we” have honored her with this statue (*etiam feminas equo donavimus*), Seneca completely assimilates himself and his contemporaries to the primary spectators who originally approved her deed. This passage strikingly illustrates how a specific monument constitutes the relationship between present and past as one of ethical continuity and performative analogy. The conditions underpinning the evaluation of the actors are assumed to persist unchanged from Cloelia’s day to the present; what connects the actors—the morally salient property they share—is that they are all mounted on some form of conveyance. Where they differ, and where Seneca (*Cloelia*) draws an ethical distinction, is in the precise character of that conveyance, since horses and litters have different moral valences in this context.

We have now seen, in Cloelia’s case, how monuments provide a conduit between the time of a deed and any subsequent time, in the service of ethics. By means of a monument, Romans in any given present can travel backward to the moment of the deed and, as secondary spectators, validate or second-guess the evaluation that the primary spectators bestowed. They can also bring that deed forward to their own present as an ethical comparison for contemporary actions. Indeed, monuments of every sort function this way because, by their very nature, they dissolve the strictures of chronology and sociohistorical contingency. A monument’s raison d’être is to thrust a deed both outward in space and forward in time, making it available

\(^{79}\) This ideologically potent inversion, where the exemplary hero is revivified to sit in judgment on posterity, can be observed in many monumental forms. See, e.g., the epitaph of Cn. Cornelius Scipio Hispanus (*ILS* 6 vv. 3–4): *maiorum optenui laudem ut sibei me esse creatum / laetentur*; likewise at aristocratic funerals the *maiores* sit in judgment on the newly deceased and on his son or other relative who delivers the oration (Polyb. 6.53–54, with Habeinek 1998, 53; Hökseskamp 1996, 321–22; Flower 1996, 128–31). Also Cicero, in a striking *prosopopoeia* (*Cael. 33–34*), summons up Appius Claudius Caecus to rebuke his descendant Clodia by comparing her doings to his own and those of other Claudii (e.g., §34: *... ideone ego pacem Pyrrhi diremi ut tu amorum turpissimorum cotidie foedera fereires?*). Wray (forthcoming) discusses the Senecan passage (*Consolatio ad Marciam* 16) further.
and comprehensible to persons elsewhere and elsewhen. These characteristics of monuments, in turn, expose an important aspect of Roman historical consciousness. In the discourse of exemplarity, the past is by no means a “foreign country,” but is ethically and culturally homogeneous with the present.

The “Manly Maiden”

Every monument, commemorating every doer of deeds, can and must transcend historical contingency in the manner just described; Cloelia’s monuments are illustrative but not distinctive in this respect. But in another respect Cloelia is strikingly distinctive, and unlike any other exemplary figure: she is a female—in particular an unmarried one, a virgo—who displays “manliness,” virtus. The texts that attribute virtus to her clearly intend it to carry its full etymological force, for they often formulate the resulting paradox with tight rhetorical point: Livy makes the Romans remark upon the novelty of virtus in a woman (novam in femina virtutem, 2.13.11); Valerius Maximus describes her as “carrying the torch of virtus for the men, though a girl” (viris puella lumen virtutis praeferendo, 3.2.2); Manilius makes her a “maiden greater than the men” (maiorque viris et Cloelia virgo, 1.780); and Florus exclaims that even maidens had virtus (ecce et virginum virtus, 1.4.3)—a tongue-in-cheek figura etymologica, as if virtus were derived from virgo, not vir. Such wordplay even occurs in Greek, since ἄνδρεία parallels virtus (in the narrower, military sense) both in its ethical force and in its etymological connection to “man.” Thus Polyaienus says that Porsenna praised “the manliness of the maiden” (τὸ ἄνδρειαν τῆς κόρης, 8.31.1), and Plutarch extends the pun by declaring that, on account of her manliness (τὸ ἄνδροδες αὐτῆς), she received a statue (ἄνδριας αὐτῆς, Publicola 19.8).

But what does it mean for late republican and imperial Romans to categorize Cloelia’s actions under the rubric of virtus (or ἄνδρεία) in the first place? Manifestly, an ideology of gender is encoded in the use of words derived from “man” to label socially consequential, ethically valued feats of military courage. To assign this value to a female is, inevitably, to challenge this ideology in at least one of two ways. Namely: does “womanly virtus” problematize the concept of virtus by asserting that there is a specifically womanly sort of virtus—a category of socially valued actions bearing the name virtus, but not in fact identical in content to the virtus of men? Or does it problematize the category of vir by extending it to include a female, so that the criteria employed for categorizing her actions under the rubric vir-

80. Scholars accept that virtus (in its narrower, traditional usage) and ἄνδρεία label the same (primarily) military value and encode the same gender ideologies: so McDonnell 2003, 235–36; also (apparently) Wray forthcoming; and McInerney 2003. This assumption seems largely correct to me, though certain differences exist (Eisenhut 1973, 13, 175) and a systematic study is needed. In contrast, the relation between virtus (in its broader, philosophical usage) and ἄρετα has been studied in some detail: McDonnell 2003, 241–43, 247–58; Eisenhut 1973, 14–22; also Wray forthcoming; Roller 2001, 22–26.
dress gender and ethics, including those involving Cloelia.\textsuperscript{81} In her case, I will argue that our texts do not consistently prefer one approach over the other, but tend to mix them up even in the same account. This tendency affects the social and ethical dynamics of exemplarity in Cloelia’s case, and also signals a complexity in the evolving discourse of gender at Rome in this period.

As a first approach to Cloelia’s “manliness,” we may note how she compares to other Roman women of exemplary status. As recent scholarship has convincingly demonstrated, traditional Graeco-Roman discourse on the virtues of women tends to focus on women’s bodies, and on behaviors associated with the body—especially sexual conduct, and the matter of which men do or should have sexual access to them. Exemplary women from early Rome, such as the Sabine women, Horatia, Lucretia, and Verginia, function this way: their bodies are objects of contestation among rival groups of men. But this contestation has further consequences: threatened or actual sexual violations of these women’s bodies echo, or constitute, threatened or actual political violations of the civic body. Women’s bodies function in these ways because they are conduits for both lineal descent and marriage relations, which often exist in tension (to the point of snapping violently) in the legends of early Rome. I cannot pursue these matters here, but would stress that Cloelia, the \textit{virgo}, functions differently. Being \textit{ex hypothesi} too young for marriage, the potential or actual cognate/agnate tension that crystallizes in other female figures is absent in her case. She does not function like other exemplary women because she is not (yet) a woman.\textsuperscript{82} In fact, she shares with properly constituted men the characteristic of never having been sexually penetrated, which perhaps forges a conceptual link between the categories of \textit{virgo} and \textit{vir}.\textsuperscript{83}

Being “not penetrated” may be a necessary condition for “manliness,” but is hardly sufficient. The “manly” ethical categories of \textit{virtus} and \textit{ándrea} must, like most other Roman ethical qualities, be won and maintained by the performance of consequential actions in the public eye, in this case normally...

\textsuperscript{81} The first alternative is conservative in respect to gender categories—keeping men’s and women’s deeds, hence social roles, distinct—but radical in altering the content of the ethical category \textit{virtus}. The second is radical in respect to gender categories (a female is gendered as a \textit{vir}) but conservative in regard to the ethical category \textit{virtus}, making its contents invariant regardless of the actor’s sex. Wray (forthcoming) examines these alternatives, and their implications for early imperial politics and gender discourse, in Seneca and Valerius Maximus; McInerney (2003) examines a similar dilemma in Plutarch’s \textit{Mulierum virtutes} (\textit{Mor.} 242E–263C).

\textsuperscript{82} On the primarily bodily virtues of women see McInerney 2003, 328–41; Wray forthcoming. On early Roman exemplary women and their functions see, e.g., Miles 1995, 190–96, 207–12 (and chap. 5 passim); Joshel 1992, 121–28; Konstan 1986, 210–13. The figures of Tarpeia, Tanaquil, and Tullia can be analyzed similarly. Since the legends surrounding these early women reveal tensions between endogamy and exogamy, perhaps a similar anxiety hovers around the Cloelia legend: thus Arcella 1985, 36–38, contends that Cloelia’s flight across the Tiber confirms a principle of endogamy. Yet Cloelia’s undisputed status as a \textit{virgo} who is not yet marriageable would seem to minimize this anxiety; even if she were sexually violated, this would not result in problematic cognate relations. See Bernard 2000, 214–19, on Livian portrayals of women, noting Cloelia’s exceptionalism.

\textsuperscript{83} Late etymologies connect \textit{virgo} with \textit{vir} through words like \textit{vis} and \textit{viridis} (Barton 2001, 41–42). But whether Romans of the late Republic and early Empire regarded these words as connected etymologically, or saw any other intrinsic link between these social categories, is uncertain.
(if not exclusively) through displays of valor in combat. Therefore, to understand what Romans meant when they attributed “manliness” to Cloelia—did they mean that she did exactly what a (real) man would have done, or that she did some other kind of deed that the category virtus was extended to encompass?—we must closely examine her action and the evaluations our texts say that it received. On the one hand, the evaluation is always positive, and she is almost always credited with “manliness” in some form—whether by having virtus or ándřeía ascribed to her, or by being compared favorably to men. On the other hand, the accounts vary regarding what, precisely, she did. Livy, for instance, lists five distinct achievements: she deceives the guards, leads the other girls, avoids the javelins, swims the river, and restores the hostages safely to their families (frustrata custodes dux agminis virginum inter tela hostium Tiberim tranavit, sospitesque omnes Romam ad propinguos restituit, 2.13.6). Somewhere here “manliness” resides, for on these grounds Porsenna ranks her above Horatius and Mucius (§8), and both he (§9) and the Romans (§11) honor her virtus. Dionysius, meanwhile, lists only three elements: she tricks the guards rather elaborately, asking them to withdraw so that the hostages can modestly undress to bathe in the river; then she leads them in swimming across (5.33.1). “Manliness” is here too, for Porsenna subsequently praises her as “having a spirit surpassing her nature and age”—that is, surpassing her female nature and childish age: the spirit, in short, of an adult male—and deems the city blessed “not only for rearing good men, but also maidens equal to the men.” Still other texts mention only one or two elements. Yet even in these sparse accounts Cloelia’s actions are often called “manly” in one of the ways described above; this evaluation comes from either her own contemporaries (the Romans or Porsenna), or from the author himself in propria voce—the secondary spectator thus reaffirming and validating the original audience’s positive evaluation.

84. Scholars interested in ancient discourses of gender have recently demonstrated that “manhood” does not devolve upon a person by virtue of biological sex or age, but is a prized, precarious quality that must be won competitively and maintained vigorously through social performance (e.g., Gleason 1995; Barton 2001, 38–43). This understanding is entirely consistent with the discourse of exemplarity described in this paper—indeed, it is through exemplary discourse that virtus (like most other social values) gets assigned by judging audiences to specific social actors on the basis of actions done under their gaze.

85. Dion. Hal. 5.34.3: μίαν δὲ παρθένον ἐκ τῶν ομήρων, ὅρ’ ἦς επισθήσαν αἱ λοιπὶ διανῆξασθαι τὸν ποταμὸν, ἐπανέσας ὡς κρείττον ἔρχουσαν φρόντισα τῆς τε φύσεως καὶ τῆς ἡλίκιας, καὶ τὴν πόλιν μακρισθέντι ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ μόνον ἀνδράς ἀγάθους ἐκτρέφει, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρθένους ἀνδράσιν ὠμός. Plut. (Publicola 19.2, 8) also mentions her leadership and her swim (though here she does not deceive the guards, but opportunistically flees when they are not watching), and has Porsenna deem the performance “manly:” ὧς ὁ ὀὔτε τινὰ φυλάκην ἔφων . . . , ὅρμῃ ἔσχεν ἀποκήλθαι πρὸς ἰματία πολὺ καὶ δίνας βαθείας. ἔνοι δὲ φασὶ μίαν αὐτῶν ὄνομα Κλοίλαν ἴππῳ διεξέλλασα τὸν πόρον, ἐγκελευομένη ταῖς ἀλλαίς νεόταις καὶ παραθηροῦνοις . . . τιμήσα τὸ ἀνδρόδες αὐτῆς τὸν Τιβερίνην (similarly at Mor. 250C–D).

86. Swimming and leadership of hostages, with explicit judgment of “manliness”: Polyaeus. Strat. 8.31.1: μία δὲ εὗτος Κλοίλα προτρεπεῖν ἄπασας . . . διανῆξασθαι τὸ ἱματία τοῦ ποταμοῦ δίνας βαθείας διότι φοβοῦσαν, ἔπει δὲ διενήργησαν. ὅρμῳ τὴν μὲν ἄρετὴν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἀνδράν ἑδαμαισάνσας . . . Πορσενίας ὑπεραγαγάς τὸ ἀνδρότερον τῆς κόρης. Swimming (or riding) and deception of guards, with judgment of “manliness”: Val. Max. 3.2.2: custodium egressa equam conscendit celerique traiectu fluminis . . . viris puella lumen virtutis praeferendo; Flor. 1.4.3: elapsa custodium Cloelia per patriam flumen equitabant. et rex quidem tot tantisque virtutem territus monstris; De vir. ill. 13: deceptis custodiibus nocte castris eis egressa equam . . . arripuit et Tiberim traiectit . . . cuius ille [sc. Porsenna] virtutem admiratus . . . Only
Let us examine the three most common elements—crossing the river, leading the girls, and deceiving the guards—for their potential “manliness,” whether individually or in combination. Since the river crossing, with swimming sometimes replaced by a ride on horseback, is present in every account of her deed, it seems a good candidate for the irreducibly “manly” aspect. We saw in Horatius’ case that swimming is a stereotypically “manly” exercise associated with military training and, occasionally, featuring in a battle narrative. Thus, girls who swim might be categorized as “manly” even without being wounded or wearing armor like Horatius and his imitators. The variants in which she crosses on horseback may betray a rationalization, in that a girl might be thought more likely to succeed this way than by swimming unassisted. But this scarcely affects the action’s ethics, for imperial texts praise the bravery and enterprise of German horsemen who cross rivers with their mounts—this too, then, falls within the ambit of *virtus*. Besides, in this version she can be credited with the opportunistic seizure of a horse (Val. Max. 3.2.2, *De vir. ill.* 13). The river crossing, in whatever form, therefore appears to be at least one locus of “manliness.” It is also a specifically masculine sort of *virtus*, as Cloelia has done exactly what men do to be so categorized.

What of her leadership of other girls? Livy’s account gives her deed a decidedly militaristic color: she is a *dux agminis virginum*, and escapes *inter tela hostium* (2.13.6). As *dux virginum* she resembles aristocratic males who, as generals (*duces*), command troops of men in wartime; these aristocrats, discharging their magisterial duties in combat, engage in activities central to the category *virtus*. That the band of girls is described as an *agmen*, and that javelins fly around them, further reinforces the military overtones; Livy’s account all but places Cloelia and her followers in combat. Other accounts of her leadership are less militaristic, crediting her instead with compelling rhetorical skills by which she urged the other hostages along. Either way, her leadership falls into a characteristically male, aristocratic pattern. Texts that represent her action this way are again extending the category of *vir* to encompass this *virgo*, because she has done what men do to be credited with *virtus*. Yet, many accounts that do not mention her leadership still credit her with “manliness.” Thus this aspect of her deed, when present, may contribute to an overall “manly” effect, but does not constitute that effect by itself.

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87. Some accounts, however, make her achievement more impressive by insisting (as for Horatius) that the water was rough and the swim difficult: Plut. *Publicola* 19.2, *Mor.* 250 C–D; Polyaenus, *Strat.* 8.31.1. Whether these troopers remain mounted while their horses swim, or dismount and swim alongside their horses, is unclear: Tac. *Agr.* 18.4, *Hist.* 4.12.3; Dio Cass. 69.9.6.
88. Livy may include the javelins to make her deed more like Horatius’, who also (on Livy’s account, 2.10.11) swam safely to the Roman side amidst a shower of Etruscan shafts.
89. For her skills at persuasion and exhortation, note the verbs with which her leadership is described: *παρακαλεώ* (Dion. Hal. 5.34.3), *ἐγκαλείπομαι* and *παραθύρων* (Plut. *Publicola* 19.2, *Mor.* 250D), *προτρέπω* (*Mor.* 250C, Polyaenus, *Strat.* 8.31.1).
Matthew B. Roller

Now consider the third common element, the deception of the guards. Roman attitudes toward military trickery and deceit vary greatly, so there need be no surprise that Cloelia’s stratagem is nowhere condemned as such (though discomfort attends her incidental violation of the terms of the truce; see below). Nevertheless, stratagems are by definition alternatives to direct, open confrontation on the battlefield, traditionally the primary locus of masculine virtus. Thus, her stratagem seems unlikely to be a manifestation of such virtus. Perhaps, however, a Roman could hold that deception constitutes a “womanly” sort of virtus, through which a woman pursues an end that a vir would pursue through (say) violence. This seems to be Silius Italicus’ view, as he distinguishes Cloelia’s achievement from that of a hypothetical male actor: “if nature had changed her sex, perhaps Porsenna would not have returned to his own territory”—implying, I take it, that as a man she would have killed him rather than merely escaping him.

Some accounts include a further element that softens the masculine character of her leadership and swimming. The story goes that Porsenna, upon her return to his camp, allowed her to choose any hostages she wished to take back to Rome; she chose the impubes, as being most at risk of sexual exploitation. While concern for the bodily integrity of freeborn children was of course widespread in Roman society, and by no means limited to any particular status group, Livy pointedly says that Cloelia’s choice “befitted her status as virgo” (virginitati decorum, 2.13.10)—implying that it is particularly appropriate for a freeborn impibus to seek to protect other freeborn impubes from what most threatens their status. This story appears also in Servius Auctus and De viris illustribus, though without the overt declaration that it beftitted her own status. To the extent that her virtus resides in this action, it is (on Livy’s account) a fittingly childish form of virtus, rather than masculine or feminine—even while, in these very same accounts, her virtus also clearly resides in her (masculine) swimming and/or leadership.

Looking at all these accounts as a whole, then, Cloelia’s virtus seems to have been imagined to reside principally in masculine sorts of achievements (crossing the river, leading the girls), making her a gender deviant—that is, an honorary man who does deeds such as men do. But her virtus could also, or alternatively, be seen as residing in achievements considered appropriate to her specific sex or age (deceiving her guards; saving the impubes) so that

91. The contrast between stratagem and virtus (on the battlefield) is manifest in the stories of the Faliscan schoolmaster, whose attempted betrayal is shunned by Camillus (e.g., Livy 5.27, esp. §§5–8: “non ad similem” inquit “tui nec populum nec imperatorem scelestus ipse cum scelesto manere venisti. . . . ego Romanis artibus, virtute opere armis, sicut Veios vincam”), and that of Fabricius Luscinus, who alerts Pyrrhus to a poisoning plot (e.g., Plut. Pyrrh. 21, esp. §4: . . . ὅπως ἡττήσῃ τὸ σῶν πάθος ἡμῖν διαβολὴν ἐνέγκῃ καὶ δόλῳ δοξάσην, ὃς ἁρετή μὴ δυνάμενον, κατεργάσονται τὸν πόλεμον). On the moral values associated with stratagem in Roman warfare, see Wheeler 1988, esp. 50–92.


93. Serv. in Aen. 8.646: qui admiratus virtutem puellae dedit ei optionem ut cum quibus velit rediret. illa elegit virgines. 〈Servius Auctus: quae inuitiae poterant esse omoixae,〉 unde Persenna hoc quoque miratus concessit; De vir. ill. 13: cuius ille virtutem admiratus cum quibus optasset in patriam redire permisit. illa virgines puerosque elegit, quorum actatem inuitiae omoixam sciebat.
she remains identified as a female and/or child, doing actions that are merely dignified with the label *virtus* and not at all identical to what men do. These alternative visions of “womanly *virtus*” can coexist in a single account, as when she both swims and tricks the guards. In Livy the juxtaposition is especially striking. He writes that, when Cloelia was returned to Porsenna, “her *virtus* was not only kept safe, but even held in esteem” (*apud regem Etruscum non tuta solum sed honorata etiam virtus fuit*, 2.13.9). The *virtus* that Porsenna keeps safe must be her bodily integrity as a freeborn Roman child, fulfilling the promise of inviolability he had made earlier (*sic deditam <intactam> inviolatamque ad suos remissurum*, §8). But the *virtus* he honors must be that she displayed in leading the girls across the river, the masculine deed for which he ranks her above Horatius and Mucius (§8) and which the Romans later honor with a statue (*Romani novam in femina virtutem novo genere honoris, statua equestri, donavere*, §11). Thus Livy, by a kind of zeugma, asserts both the “childish *virtus*” and “masculine *virtus*” aspects of her deed simultaneously. Such accounts show that her deed is a composite of two or three distinct ways of comprehending *virtus*, and as such poses a conundrum for received gender and ethical categories.

Inseparable from her “manliness” is a further ethical complexity. The hostages were pledged as security for a truce; their flight, whatever *virtus* it displays, abrogates the truce and undermines Roman credibility. Plutarch says that Publicola “neither marvelled nor rejoiced” at the hostages’ safe arrival in Rome, “but was vexed that he might appear worse than Porsenna in his trustworthiness (*πίστις*), and that the daring of the maidens might give cause for accusing the Romans of trickery.” Thus Publicola holds that the girls’ action harmed the collective in a key respect, wherefore he evaluates it negatively in the category of *fides*/*pistis*.94 In other accounts it is the Romans collectively, or Porsenna, who object that Roman trustworthiness has been tainted, even while they praise the *virtus*/*andrēsia* of the escape itself—thus judging her deed negatively in one category but positively in another.95 Her glory is therefore tarnished unless the breach of *fides* can be repaired. Hence the cumbersome exchange whereby the Romans return the hostages to Porsenna (as the agreement requires), who immediately releases them (in acknowledgment of their valor): in this way the Romans reclaim a positive evaluation for *fides*/*pistis* from themselves and Porsenna, and thus sweep away the negative ethical repercussions of Cloelia’s deed so that she, and the city, can reap the benefits of its positive repercussions. Far from nullifying Cloelia’s deed, then, her return to Porsenna enables it to enter upon its full, beneficial effect for both actor and community.96 The deed itself can then be monumentalized, closing the discursive loop in which she


95. Mixed judgments by Romans: Plut. *Mor.* 250D: ἐπεὶ δὲ σῳδεῖας εἶδον οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι, τὴν μὲν ἄρετὴν καὶ τὴν τόμαν ἐθαύμασαν, τὴν δὲ κακῆν οὐκ ἠγάπησαν οὐδ’ ὑπέμειναν ἐν πίστει χιρονες ἐνός ἀνδρὸς γενέσθαι (likewise Polyainus *Strat.* 8.31.1). By Porsenna: Livy 2.13.8–9; Dion. Hal. 5.33.2, 34.3.

96. Breach effaced: Livy 2.13.9: utrimque constitit fides; et Romanis pigius pacis ex foedere restituerunt, et apud regem Etruscum non tuta solum sed honorata etiam virtus fuit; Dion. Hal. 5.34.3: ὀ δὲ τῶν
successfully imitates previous exemplary actors and is herself installed as a model for future imitation. The community not only adds to its stock of exemplary deeds, but also escapes its immediate crisis, as the consuls and Porsenna conclude a final peace. If Cloelia can be blamed for breaking the truce, then, she can also be credited with ending the war.

These competing judgments on Cloelia’s performance, supposedly by her own contemporaries, illustrate yet another instability and complexity in the production of exemplary discourse. Many deeds admit of evaluation in multiple ethical categories, with conflicting results. A primary audience may split in its evaluation, and any secondary audience can turn a primary audience’s judgment on its head by locating and exploiting such fissures. Livy portrays an enemy of Rome doing exactly this in Book 9, where the Samnite general Pontius complains that the Romans are violating the terms of their surrender at Caudium: “Will you never lack a reason for not abiding, in defeat, by your agreements? You gave hostages to Porsenna, and smuggled them out through trickery. . . .” By omitting to mention Cloelia’s own actions and the subsequent return of the hostages (which supposedly effaces the breach of fides), this enemy (on Livy’s presentation) can invoke her as an exemplum not of Roman virtus, but of the very perfidy of which he now accuses them.

Perhaps the most important index of her “manliness,” however, is her association with a particular kind of honorific statue. The texts that discuss this statue provide information that is roughly consistent, in two respects. First, its location is said to be on the summit of the Sacred Way, or where the Sacred Way enters the Forum, or opposite the temple of Jupiter Stator in the vestibule of Tarquinius Superbus’ house. Interpreted generously, these descriptions can be taken as referring to the same location. Second, the statue represented a woman on horseback, and according to Dionysius (5.35.2) was made of bronze. These accounts also diverge on key points, however.

97. An imitator of Cloelia appears in Silius Italicus, Book 10—a young cavalryman named Cloelius, dying on the battlefield after Cannae. His valor is ascribed to his descent from the family of the legendary Cloelia (472–502), though his deeds are not narrated and therefore no structural parallels are evident. Silius probably invented Cloelius from whole cloth; therefore the connection he forges to Cloelia offers striking evidence that Romans of the late Republic and early Empire (namely, Silius and his intended audience) readily assumed that notable deeds ran in families.

98. Val. Max. 3.2.2: non solum obsidio se sed etiam metu patriam solvit; Sil. 13.828–30 (Scipio in the underworld, surveying the shades of heroic women): illa est quae Thybrim, quae fregit Lydia bella [i.e., she swam the Tiber and ended the war . . .] / nondum passa marem [. . . though just an unmarried/unpenetrated girl . . .], quals optabit habere / quondam Roma viros, contemptrix Cloelia sexus [. . . and so has done what real men should do].

99. Livy 9.11.6: numquamne causa defiet cur victi pacto non stetis? obsides Porsinnae dedisti, furto eos subduxisti. Cf. Chaplin 2000, 40. Another such inversion is Lucan’s evaluation of Scaeva’s deed (6.257–62), in contrast to the evaluation Scaeva’s own fellow soldiers bestow (251–56): the latter judge his deed positively as an astonishing display of virtus, while the narrator, without disputing the judgment of valor, condemns him as acting contrary to the community’s interest, bringing slavery upon it.

100. On the statue’s form and location: Livy 2.13.11: statua equestri donavere; in summa Sacra Via fuit posita virgo insidens equo; Dion. Hal. 5.35.2: statuam eumaei in equestre apud equum; hanc animitavit et hanc creavat; hanc imita se aeqvis.
Several report a variant in which the honorand is not Cloelia but Valeria, Publicola’s daughter who escaped the ambush that (on some accounts) the Tarquins laid for the hostages. However, the surviving texts always report this alternative as a variant, suggesting that our authors—or the tradition they inherited—had already constructed a hierarchy of versions in which the Cloelia identification was preferred.101 Also, different dedicators of the statue are reported: the senate, the *populus Romanus*, or the hostages whom Cloelia led to freedom (or their fathers).102 In any of these cases, however, the dedicators represent a group of evaluators whose interests are those of the community at large, and who deem the action both consequential and beneficial for this community.

In this case, as in Horatius’, archaeologists question whether an honorific bronze equestrian statue could have been erected in the sixth century B.C.E. The earliest attested honorific equestrian statues that are undoubtedly historical date to the late fourth century B.C.E. Therefore, if this statue was indeed honorific, it must have been erected long after her deed (c. 300 B.C.E.). By the time of our texts the actual conditions of its erection had been forgotten, and the statue was mistakenly assumed to be contemporary with her deed. Alternatively, if the statue really dated to the sixth century, it must have been the cult statue of a goddess, say Venus Equestris or Venus Cloacina or Vica Pota; in time its original meaning was lost, and a new, honorific meaning was constructed in connection with Cloelia (making this another instance, then, of an obscure object rendered comprehensible by integration into exemplary discourse). To complicate matters further, Dionysius reports that the statue had been destroyed by fire prior to his own day and no longer stood (5.35.2); yet Seneca, Pliny, Plutarch, and Servius speak of it as being visible to their eyes. Scholars reconcile these accounts by conjecturing that the statue was reerected—plausibly by Augustus, who restored other ancient monuments, erected the statues of other republican heroes in the Forum Augustum, and so on.103

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101. Nevertheless, the Valeria version is carefully preserved and transmitted, if only as a variant. See Fetialis *apud* Plin. *HN* 34.29; *statuam equestrem contra Iovis Statoris aedium in vestibulo Superbi domus*; Sen. *Consolatio ad Marciam* 16.2: *equestri insidens statuæ in Sacra Via, celeberrimo loco*; Plut. *Publicola* 19.8: ἰδίως δὲ τὴν ἑδὲν ὁμούσιον εἰς Παλάτινον ἀνθρώπῳ αὐτῆς ἔργον (cf. Mor. 250F); *De vir. ill. 13*: *hae statua equestris in foro posita; Serv. in Aen. 8.646: statua equestris quam in Sacra Via hodieque conspicimus*.

102. Dedicator: *Romani*, Livy 2.13.11; *hanc [sc. statuam] publice dicatum crediderim*, Plin. *HN* 34.29; *populus Romanus* (at Porsenna’s request), *Serv. in Aen.* 8.646. Dion. Hal. (5.35.1–2) says that the senate decreed it, but the hostages’ fathers actually erected it (i.e., bore the cost?), while Piso (*apud* Plin. *HN* 34.29) says the other hostages dedicated it (perhaps implying a private dedication). See Forsythe 1994, 256.

103. Statue destroyed: ταύτινη μειζόναν οὐκ ἐκείμενην εὑρόμενον, ἐλέγετο δ᾽ ἐμπρόσθεν μὲν τὰς πλῆσιον οἰκίας γενομένης ἡμασίας (Dion. Hal. 5.35.2); cf. e.g. *Serv. in Aen.* 8.646: *quia data est statua equestris . . . quae hodieque conspicimus* (he supposes that the statue he sees, in the early fifth century C.E., is some nine hundred years old). On the problem of early honorific statuary at Rome, cf. n. 47 above. On the dating, original identity, and posited reerection of Cloelia’s statue see Sehlmeyer 1999, 98–101; Fugmann 1997, 65; Papi 1995, 226; Forsythe 1994, 254–56; Flory 1993, 289; Bergemann 1990, 32–33, 157 (L11); Vessár 1980, 58–61; Hölscher 1978, 332, 334–35; Vessberg 1941, 88.
As in Horatius’ case, here too we can pass over these questions, despite their intrinsic archaeological and historical interest, as being irrelevant to this paper’s purposes. The writers who inform us about this statue unanimously accepted that it was honorific, commemorating the deed done by Cloelia (though some would say Valeria) during the war with Porsenna in the first years of the Republic, and that this monument placed her deed before the eyes of posterity to rediscover, reevaluate in light of the original evaluation, deploy as a canon of value, and imitate in due course. It is these beliefs about the statue, and the social functions that follow from these beliefs, that I investigate here—not its actual origins. Furthermore, the statue reerected by Augustus, if real, would have replaced the original statue, whatever its actual date and original function, with a new one representing what the original statue was thought to be: that is, the Augustan statue would really have been an honorific equestrian statue commemorating the Cloelia of legend,104 and it is this statue that imperial authors would have seen and interpreted. Augustus might even have attached an identifying label and explanatory inscription, as he did for another set of honorific statues he erected—the summi viri of the Forum Augustum. Now, to regard the statue as honorific is to raise a typological question: was it regarded as a “normal” honorific equestrian statue of the type well attested from the late fourth century B.C.E. onward, and taken as ascribing outstanding virtus to the honorand? Or does the monument instead represent the uniqueness of her particular deed? Like the parallel question for Horatius’ statue, we will see that our authors confront this question repeatedly. For them, interpreting the statue’s iconography was inseparable from knowing and evaluating her deed, and pertinent to comprehending her “manliness.”

Several texts describing the statue insist that it was a “manly” honor. Servius is most explicit: he says that Porsenna admired her virtus and asked the Roman people to decree “something manly” (aliquid virile), whereupon she was given an equestrian statue.105 Plutarch reports that Porsenna gave her a horse as a gift; some people, he says, explained that Porsenna “admired her strength and daring as superior to that of a woman, and deemed her worthy of a gift befitting an adult male warrior. At any rate, an equestrian statue of a woman stood on the Sacred Way. . . .” The implication is that the gift-horse honored her “manliness,” and that the equestrian statue represents her upon that very horse.106 The statue’s “manliness” is stressed in earlier texts too. Livy says that the equestrian statue was “a novel honor for novel virtus in a woman;” Seneca sees the horse in the statue as proof of Cloelia’s all-but-male status; and Pliny remarks about Cloelia that even women could receive an equestrian statue—implying that, in his view, equestrian statues were overwhelmingly associated with men.107

105. Serv. in Aen. 8.646: qui admiratus virtutem puellae . . . rogavit per litteras populum Romanum ut ei aliquid virile decernetur: cui data est statua equestris. . . .
106. Plut. Mor. 250F, quoted below (p. 49).
Leaving Cloelia and the gender conundrums she poses aside, these authors have good reason to gender equestrian statues as “masculine” ex hypothesi. Hundreds of such statues honoring men are attested in literary and epigraphic texts, by plastic remains, and on coins; yet there is no evidence for any other equestrian statue honoring a woman, from any period, in Rome itself or anywhere in the Roman world. Already in Livy’s day—the earliest author ascribing “manliness” to Cloelia’s statue—many equestrian statues honoring male aristocrats stood in the city’s public places, including a recent group near the Rostra. The occasions for their dedication, when known, are the honorands’ success as military leaders or in discharging high magistracies, activities falling within the normal ambit of viri\textit{tus} for male aristocrats.\textsuperscript{108} In the imperial period this gendered pattern was reinforced, as equestrian statues honoring male members of the imperial family and their close associates were erected throughout the city. They were also erected elsewhere in the empire, together with equestrian statues honoring local magistrates.\textsuperscript{109} Imperial authors therefore had even stronger cause than Livy to associate this type with aristocratic males and their characteristic public activities, hence to regard Cloelia’s statue as anomalous. The paradox of the “manly maiden” that Cloelia’s story poses is thus posed independently by the unique iconography of the statue.\textsuperscript{110}

How did Romans of the late Republic and Empire understand this anomalous monument in their midst? Evidently, it predisposed some viewers to comprehend her deed in terms of the characteristically male achievements, military or magisterial, which all other equestrian statues commemorated. On this view, hers was a “normal” equestrian statue such as men otherwise had, where the horse merely signified the actor’s outstanding viri\textit{tus}. So Livy interprets the statue when he says that it marked a novel honor for novel viri\textit{tus} (2.13.11: Romani novam in femina virtutem novo genere honoris, statua exprobrat iuvenibus nostris [note equestri in emphatic position: this is the key evidence for her masculinity], Plin. \textit{HN} 34.28: et equestrium tamen origo perquam per quam vetus est, cum feminis etiam honore communicato Cloeliae statuae equestri [similarly telling is etiam at Sen. \textit{Consolatio ad Marciam} 16.2: . . . in qua etiam feminas equo donavimus].

\textsuperscript{108} Republican equestrian statues in Rome itself are attested only in literary texts (Bergemann 1990, nos. L9–10, 12–25) and on coins, where certain images of horses and riders likely portray equestrian statues (Bergemann 1990, nos. M1–21b); see id., pp. 14–20, on the attested locations of these statues, the status of the honorands, and the occasions for erection. Also Lahusen 1983, 56–61.


\textsuperscript{110} If we survey other forms of honorific statuary, Cloelia’s appears only slightly less exceptional. Flory (1993, 287–92) shows that prior to 35 B.C.E. only three other honorific statues of women are reported from Rome, for only one of which is any iconographical information known: Cornelia mater Gracchorum was seated (also Sehmeyer 1999, p. 99, n. 325). Beyond Rome, fragments of apparently honorific statues of women (standing) are known from the late Republic in Italian towns (Bergemann 1990, no. P1 and pls. 9–10), and Plin. (\textit{HN} 34.31) says that Cato in his censorship objected to the erection of statues of Roman women in the provinces (Forsythe 1994, 256–57). From the Augustan age onward, many honorific statues of the spouses and female relations of emperors are attested in literature, and many portraits survive (see Flory 1993, 293–306, on statues of Livia and Octavia; Bartman 1999, passim, on Livia’s portraits; and Lahusen 1984, 66–67, 70–71, 73–74, 76, 81–82, for the literary references). That a woman had an honorific statue at all, then, must have seemed stranger to Livy and Dionysius than to authors of the early Empire and later, who were more accustomed to seeing women so commemorated. But even then, Cloelia’s association with an equestrian statue put her in exclusively male company (as far as we know).
equestri, donavere), implying that the horse signifies the (high) general level of her achievement. Pliny too interprets it as a “normal” equestrian statue, for he introduces it as the earliest example of the type (HN 34.28: et equestrium tamen origo perquam vetus est, cum feminis etiam honore communicata Cloeliae statua equestri). His declaration that the monument is excessive, and that she deserved only a togate statue (... ceu parum esset toga eam cingi, cum Lucretiae ac Bruto ... non decernerentur), further shows that he takes the horse (and the toga) as ascribing to her a certain, generic level of achievement.111 Finally, Seneca interprets the statue this way, and deploys it in support of a philosophical polemic. In section 16 of his Consolatio ad Marciam, quoted above, he develops the Stoic argument that women and men are equal in their capacity for virtue: specifically, they have the same vigor, facultas ad honesta, and tolerance for pain and toil (§1). To corroborate this assertion (§2), he invokes briefly Lucretia, then at greater length Cloelia: he declares that “we have all but enrolled her as a man” on account of her “outstanding boldness,” which he describes in such a generalized way that it could indeed apply equally to Horatius: “despising the enemy and the river” (contempto et hoste et flumine). Finally, to put the fully masculine quality of her performance beyond doubt, and thus prove the point about the ethical equality of the sexes, he declares outright that “we have given equestrian statues even to women” (sc. right along with the men whom such statues normally honor), and that her statue hurls a reproach at today’s underachieving youth. That is, he takes the statue to indicate the fully masculine quality of her performance, not essentially different from the performance of men so honored.112 In these authors’ views, then, Cloelia’s

111. For equestrian statues as the most prestigious honorific type, surpassing (standing) togate and loricate statues, see Bergemann 1990, 20. Bergemann (157) interprets Pliny’s phrase ceu parum esset toga eam cingi as meaning that the monument represented Cloelia both mounted and togate, the toga (he suggests, 32) emphasizing her citizen status. But Pliny clearly contrasts toga (note its emphatic position in its clause) with statua equestri, a contrast that is only meaningful in the context of alternative types of honorific statue. Thus he means, “she has a statua equestris, as though it were not enough to have a (standing) statua togata,” i.e., the lesser honor, which implies nothing about her costume on the actual equestrian statue. Gabelmann (1985, 517–25) and Goette (1990, 5–6, 80–83, 158–59, pl. 70) have shown that citizen girls of every status likely wore the toga praetexta in the late Republic and early Empire, at least on ceremonial occasions, just as boys did; only at marriage would the (now) woman assume the stola. Thus Pliny may have understood this (imagined) togate statue of Cloelia in the same way he understood togate statues of adult males, with each figure wearing his or her normal citizen’s costume. Because Cloelia is not an adult, the toga does not imply she is a prostitute: for togas marking transgressive sexuality in adult women, see McGinn 1998, 156–71, 208–11, with further bibliography.

Regardless of Pliny’s meaning, Bergemann may be right that the equestrian statue itself showed Cloelia togate. If indeed the statue was reerected under Augustus, it might well have rendered this citizen virgo in the standard formal attire for such a person in this period, just as equestrian statues for men represent them in appropriate costumes—whether togas, military garb, or heroic nudity.

112. See Wray (forthcoming) on Seneca’s articulation of the Stoic doctrine of the ethical equality of the sexes, including this passage in particular. It is notable that Seneca’s rhetoric in this passage is at odds with his overarching philosophical point. In constructing the gender inversion of the woman who sets a standard of masculine achievement to which today’s effeminate youth cannot measure up, he eo ipso appeals to his readership’s ingrained presumption of ethical inequality of the sexes—the very view he is formally contesting. Throughout his ethical prose Seneca makes similar, apparently self-contradictory appeals to the very “common conceptions” he is out to overturn; he does so precisely to heighten the effectiveness of his rhetorical persuasion among readers who, at least initially, accept those “common conceptions” (see Roller 2001, 75–77, 84–88).
monument is a “normal” equestrian statue such as men otherwise have, signifying the same type and level of achievement.\footnote{113. Some modern scholars also take this view. Sehlmeyer 1999, 101: “Das Pferd . . . liegt deutlich: die dargestellte Frau eine militärische Leistung vollbracht hatte, denn das Pferd symbolisierte . . . einen konkreten Erfolg im Krieg.” Flory 1993, 288: “Because there was no cultural tradition or public context for statues of women, when later Romans saw public statues of women or found records of them . . . they created stories to explain the statues in terms of the situation for men.”} Other viewers, however, coped with the anomaly in a different way. Consider the alternative interpretations offered by Plutarch (Mor. 250E–F):

\[\text{\textit{In admiration, Porsenna ordered a horse to be brought, fittingly adorned, and presenting it to Cloelia sent all the maidens away in a kindly, well-disposed manner. Most people take this as an indication that Cloelia crossed the river on horseback. Others deny this, saying that he marvelled at her strength and daring as being greater than a woman’s, and judged her worthy of a gift befitting an adult male warrior. At any rate (γοῦν), an equestrian statue of a woman stood on the so-called Sacred Way, which some say was of Cloelia and others say was of Valeria.}}\]

The particle γοῦν here is crucial, in its “part proof” function: the equestrian statue authorizes the inference of “most people” that she crossed the river on horseback, and of “others” that she was given the horse as a gift. These viewers do not comprehend the monumental horse as generically certifying that she did a certain sort of deed at a high level, but instead connect it with one or another version of the story of her deed—in fact, Plutarch surmises (γοῦν) that they retroject their preferred versions of her story from the monument itself.\footnote{114. Other accounts too say Cloelia crossed on horseback (Val. Max. 3.2.2; De vir. ill. 13) or was given a horse as a gift (Dion. Hal. 5.34.3; Polyaeus, Strat. 8.31.1; Dio Cass. frag. 14.4; both alternatives again at Plut. Publicola 19.7–8), though only Plutarch in the passage quoted expressly connects these versions to the horse in the monument. Some scholars take a similar view, either accepting that the deed involved the horse that is depicted in the statue (Bergemann 1990, 32–33, “Im Falle Cloelias hatte der Ablauf ihrer Tat, nämliche Flucht zu Pferd, die Aufstellung der Reiterstatue motiviert. . . . Es war also ein Handlungsbildnis . . .”; cf. Fugmann 1997, 66), or that the versions of her story involving a horse are retrojected from the statue (e.g., Forsythe 1994, 254; Gagé 1988, 238; Archila 1985, 30).}

Thus it is clear—more so for Cloelia than for Horatius—that her statue’s iconography admitted both generalizing and particularizing interpretations, which in turn carried divergent ideological and ethical freight.\footnote{115. Roman art often represents the general in and through images that may also appear to represent particular events: see, for example, Fittschen’s (1972) discussion of Trajan’s arch at Beneventum, arguing that its scenes articulate key ideas and values associated with the emperor rather than simply showing particular events of recent years. But as the statues of Cloelia and Horatius show, Roman viewers themselves could move between generalizing and particularizing interpretations, and they debated the ideological implications of their iconographical practices just as modern scholars do—or rather, modern scholarship replicates the interpretive divide already found in ancient texts.} The generalizing interpretation, regarding her monument as a typical equestrian
statue marking a generic level of (stereotypically masculine) military or
garisterial achievement, makes Cloelia into a gender deviant—ethically a
real vir—just as the “swimming” and “leadership” components of many of
her narratives do. Like these aspects of her deed, this interpretation of the
statue bestows a characteristically masculine form upon her virtus. She can
thus be made to challenge the established ethical hierarchy of the sexes, as
Seneca shows: she rivals, surpasses, even becomes one of the men, while they
are effeminized and must struggle, in their degenerate condition, to emulate
a virgo’s exemplary virtus. Conversely the particularizing interpretation,
making the horse part of her story and the monument a unique instance
rather than a general type, thereby regards its resemblance to a “normal”
equestrian statue as fortuitous, and so eliminates the gender deviancy. Like
the “deceiving the guards” and “saving the impubes” aspects of her deed,
the monument on this interpretation credits her not with a manly form of
virtus, but with some other form more fitted to the particularities of her age,
status, and circumstances. At any rate, the conundrum of gender and ethics
posed by the figure of the “manly maiden” is articulated and worked out in
similar ways both in the interpretation of her actions (as described in the
narratives) and in the interpretation of her statue’s iconography.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

In part, this paper has argued that it is useful to assemble several cultural
phenomena that are well attested through Roman texts and images—conse-
quential action in the public eye; the evaluation of such action in ethical
terms; actions and their evaluations being commemorated in monumental
form; encounters with monuments spurring emulation—and to identify them
as collectively constituting a discourse. Such an identification, with its four-
part schematic structure, is useful because it stands to provide us moderns
with a heuristic device by which we can perhaps better understand certain
aspects of Roman historical consciousness. In and through this discourse, I
suggest, Romans of the late Republic and Empire encountered their past,
gave it value and meaning, and deployed it in the service of the present.
Through it they also gave value and meaning to contemporary actions, in
the expectation that these actions would have repercussions in the future
just as past actions were having repercussions in the present. Of course,
“discourse” and “historical consciousness” are modern concepts, and when
imposed upon ancient ways of thinking necessarily do a degree of violence
to them. No ancient text, to my knowledge, puts the four elements together
to construct a discursive loop as I have, even though the individual elements
and the pairwise links between them are abundantly attested in texts and
images (as we have seen). It is hard to know, then, whether a Roman would
recognize her or his culture in the analysis presented here. Nevertheless, to
assemble these elements in this way helps us address questions that we find
pressing (such as, “What did the Romans make of their own past?”), even
if these questions are not the Romans’ own. Being unable to inhabit their
culture ourselves, we can still come to understand them better, at least in our own terms.

What, then, did the Romans make of their past? I have sought to show, by analyzing Horatius and Cloelia as protagonists in a discourse of exemplarity, that the past had a thriving, evolving, ideologically efficacious life in any given present. This contention contains a hidden polemic, as it is sometimes claimed that exemplary figures from the republican era became “fossilized” under the Empire. Through habitual deployment in particular modes, their meanings fixed by compilers like Valerius Maximus, particular figures came to be so closely associated with particular values as to become mere metonyms or personifications—hence unattainable, incontestable, eminently “dead” ideals (so the argument goes).116 Certainly, Horatius and Cloelia are closely associated with values like fortitudo and virtus. Yet the association is complex: a constellation of specific actions and monuments constitutes each exemplum. For Horatius there is his defense of the bridge, his swimming, his armor, his wound, his statue, his possible earlier deed, and his subsequent attempt to convert his valor into public office. Any given invocation of the hero as a canon of value may engage a different one (or more) of these aspects, leading to divergent and sometimes contested evaluations. These contestations, these instabilities in the production of exemplary discourse, are precisely what make exempla so good for Romans to think with. Consider the disagreement Dio Cassius stages between Cicero and Fufius Calenus regarding how Antony and Horatius measure up as defenders of libertas; or the debate (of which Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus give us one side) regarding whether Laetorius imitated Horatius properly; or how Livy’s Samnite general invokes Cloelia as an example of Roman perfidy; or the many texts that propose divergent ways of understanding how a virgo can display virtus, and what such a display means.117 All of these texts, of course, were composed by literary artists. Yet I have little doubt that, in and through debates like these, actual Romans living in any given present addressed contemporary issues of fundamental sociopolitical importance, such as articulating gender roles and the shifts they undergo, defining the collective interest and how one properly serves it, considering how the claims of the collective and individual should be balanced, and so on. Exemplary discourse has an important role in such debates precisely because of the instabilities and contestations that entangle its production. These are what make the discourse flexible, useful, and vital in the social debates of any given historical moment.

116. This view goes back at least to Litchfield 1914; see his table (28–35) correlating heroes with virtues. Hölkeskamp (1996, 314–20, 323–26) rightly insists on a more complex correlation between exemplary figures and abstract values. But in suggesting that exemplary figures are ethically uncontested, and that they set “binding rules” (317), he seems to render them monolithic—dominating any given present—rather than serving as flexible ethical touchstones by which that present can interrogate itself, as I see them doing.

117. For more on exempla whose meanings are contested in various contexts, see the salutary discussion of Chaplin 2000, 31–49 and 73–105 (on Livy).
Finally, a reflection on the project of examining exemplarity in general through the investigation of two specific exemplary figures. Scholars who study examples, whether in classical or other contexts, sometimes distinguish two functional modes, illustrative and injunctive. An example deployed illustratively is, or purports to be, an utterly typical instance of a series of similar objects, a “one among many.” Conversely, an example deployed injunctively is singled out as distinctive, as crucially unlike other objects, especially in its ethical import (that is, it is uniquely good or bad), and to single it out amounts to demanding that other objects should be like or unlike this one.118 This distinction is useful, though in practice the two modes often intermingle. Thus, an example purporting to be illustrative may subsume and include a normative element that in fact amounts to an injunction. Conversely, an example used injunctively is presented as distinctive, but aspires to become illustrative: it aims to generate a new series of objects like itself, thereby reducing itself to a “one among many.” This paper has largely been concerned with the injunctive mode, examining how Horatius and Cloelia are invoked as standards and models for the actions of others. “Exemplary discourse,” as defined here, is mostly concerned with the injunctive mode. However, several passages discussed above in fact deploy these figures in an illustrative way: Seneca adduces Horatius and Fabricius as typical, illustrative instances of the class of people who are admired for just one or two brilliant deeds (Ep. 120.6–7); and Cicero lists Horatius, the Decii, the Scipios, and Marcellus as typical instances within a much larger class of figures who are outstanding for their magnitudo animi (Off. 1.61).

Yet if my analytical focus has been on the injunctive deployment of Horatius and Cloelia, my own rhetoric in this paper is otherwise. I adduce these figures illustratively, as being typical instances of injunctive exempla—that is, as representatives of a larger class of mythistorical figures that Romans liked to deploy injunctively, in the context of exemplary discourse. Hence, I imply that the analytic approach developed here could equally be applied, and with similar results, to other figures whom the Romans used injunctively: Fabricius, the Decii, Regulus, Fabius Cunctator, Cato the Elder, and so on. Except, of course, that I chose to examine Horatius and Cloelia because they seemed exceptionally good “typical instances.” Being so heavily attested, they illustrate a particularly wide and rich range of exemplary phenomena, and pose striking problems unique to themselves (to judge from surviving representations). So how typical of this class are they, really? Thus, my own examples, like so many others, entail a mixing of the illustrative and injunctive modes. For I present them, in part, as models for how other, less richly attested exemplary figures might—ought to—have functioned socially and ethically, and might be seen to function, had more monuments survived. In working with exemplarity, this kind of self-reflection is

118. The terms “injunctive” and “illustrative” were suggested to me by Noel Carroll. For more on these two modes (though with different terminology) in a Roman context, see Chaplin 2000, 137–40; and Stemm-ler 2000, 157–58.
difficult to avoid: willy-nilly, one is investigating the foundations of one’s own argumentation, and of mental ideation itself.\textsuperscript{119}

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\textsuperscript{119} See Goldhill 1994 for an engaging discussion/performance of such self-reflection, and an overview of the philosophical scholarship on examples.

\textbf{Literature Cited}


