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A Roman who encounters a monument commemorating a deed—whether a narrative, a statue, or some other object—experiences a temporal dislocation. For the monument is, in some sense, an outpost of the past: it has been thrust forward in time from the moment of the deed (or rather, of its commemoration) to meet the Roman in his or her own day, and to present the deed to this Roman's eyes or ears. As this Roman engages the monument—by reading or listening to a narrative, analyzing a statue's iconography, registering the type, number, and location of scars, or the like—the monument draws him or her back to the moment of the deed, thus constituting him or her as a secondary spectator who looks (as it were) over the shoulder of the primary spectators. At this point, our spectator experiences the social, ethical, and psychological effects already discussed: this person is invited to replicate the primary audience's judgment, thereby affirming the monument's ethical integrity; he or she should also feel the impulse to imitate, to gain similar glory. The monument, then, makes our spectator complicit in a temporal collapse of past and present. For the spectator is pulled backward in time, required to evaluate a past action by the same criteria that he or she would use in evaluating a contemporary action, and finally dispatched back to his or her own present with the idea that that deed thereby discovered is ethically relevant to one's own choices and actions, and those of one's contemporaries.<sup>72</sup> From this description, we can see that exemplary discourse and the monuments it encompasses presuppose both ethical continuity and

71. See Hölkeskamp 1996, 308–15, 323–24, on the loss of chronological structure around exempla, and the ethical recontextualizing of events that this often enables. Jaeger (1997, 27, 50–53) argues that Livy, in constructing his narrative, systematizes the miscellaneous character of a Roman's subjective experience of the Forum; he effectively "rearranges" its monuments, juxtaposing them in particular ways, to confer particular meanings upon them. For statues furnishing models for imitation, see Bergemann 1990, 33; Hölcher 1978, 340.

72. This description of an encounter with a monument is based on Jaeger 1997, 15–18, itself an interpretation of a difficult passage in Varro (*Ling.* 6.49).



performative analogy. On the one hand, a monument can have such an effect only if the criteria of ethical judgment, and the social values that underpin these criteria, remain tolerably constant over time—constant enough for the actions and judgments of one period to remain comprehensible in another. On the other hand, to believe that a past action is ethically relevant to a contemporary action is to posit an analogical relation between these actions, to regard them as sharing one or more properties—that is, as having structural or categorical similarities—that render them directly comparable in ethical terms, in light of the (assumed) condition of ethical continuity.<sup>73</sup>

Texts that discuss Cloelia illustrate profusely how past and present meet through the conduit of monuments, and illuminate the assumptions about continuity and analogy just described. Let us examine three texts in which Cloelia is explicitly ranked relative to her contemporaries. Manilius, in the first book of his *Astronomica*, lists some Roman heroes who he says reside in the Milky Way. These include all the kings (except Tarquinius Superbus), the three Horatii, Mucius Scaevola, Cloelia—whom he calls “a maiden greater than the men”—and Horatius Cocles.<sup>74</sup> Here Manilius enters into the ranking debates of the remote past by asserting that Cloelia surpassed those male contemporaries whom he lists along with her; she is presented as the greatest hero of early Rome. The elder Pliny enters this same debate, but with a different result. He remarks dyspeptically on Cloelia’s equestrian statue and the honor it represents: “as if it were not enough that she be clothed in a toga, when equestrian statues were not granted to those who expelled the kings, Lucretia and Brutus, thanks to whom Cloelia had been included among the hostages.”<sup>75</sup> Apparently, he takes the statue to mean that Cloelia’s contemporaries—the primary audience—ranked her deed above Lucretia’s and Brutus’, since the latter do not have such statues.<sup>76</sup> But having been drawn backward in time by this statue to become a secondary spectator to her deed, looking over the primary spectators’ shoulders as they evaluate her, he rejects their evaluation on the ground that, in his view, Lucretia’s and Brutus’ deeds were of greater consequence to the collective. Because he assumes that her deed lies as transparently open to his own scrutiny and

73. My use of the terms “continuity” and “analogy” is indebted to Knapp 1989, esp. 129–32. On the historical continuity—even changelessness—presupposed by exempla, see Hölkeskamp 1996, 312–15; Stemmler 2000, 145.

74. Manilius 1.777–81: *Romanique viri quorum iam maxima turba est, / Tarquinioque minus reges et Horatia proles, / tota acies partus, nec non et Scaevola trunco / nobilior, maiorque viris et Cloelia virgo, / et Romana ferens quae texit moenia Cocles.* . . . Here I treat Manilius not as the creator of a monumental text by which his readers may encounter these early heroes, but as a secondary spectator himself to Cloelia’s deed, who has encountered this and the other heroes’ deeds through other, unspecified monuments, and records his own judgments in this text.

75. Plin. *HN* 34.28: *pedestres sine dubio Romae fuere in auctoritate longo tempore; et equestrium tamen origo perquam vetus est, cum feminis etiam honore communicato Cloeliae statua equestri, ceu parum esset toga eam cingi, cum Lucretiae ac Bruto, qui expulerant reges, propter quos Cloelia inter obsides fuerat, non decernerentur.*

76. While no statue of Lucretia is attested from any period, one of Brutus stood on the Capitol, along with statues of seven kings, in the late Republic (anti-Caesarian squibs were written on it). The posture and dress of this statue are not reported. However, the kings were almost certainly pedestrian and togate; that Brutus was included in this group may suggest that his statue was similar. See Schlemeyer 1999, 68–74; Hölischer 1978, 328–31.

evaluation as it did to her contemporaries, he can disagree with them and suggest that Cloelia should have received only a togate statue (presumably pedestrian), which he implies is a lesser honor and better suited to the deed's actual importance. This phenomenon—the secondary spectator who disagrees with his predecessors' judgments—is a key instability in the production of exemplary discourse, which makes it possible always to reappropriate an exemplum in a new way to meet new exigencies.

Now consider again how Livy presents Porsenna's evaluation of Cloelia's deed. On this account, Porsenna was not among the primary spectators, since the deed was reported to him (*quod ubi regi nuntiatum est*, 2.13.7)—a secondary spectator, then, but contemporary with the deed. Still, he evaluates it against contemporary rivals and judges it superior (*supra Coclites Muciosque . . . id facinus esse*, 2.13.8). This is precisely the evaluation that Manilius, Livy's younger contemporary, makes in his own voice, and that Pliny assumes (from the statue) that the primary audience made—though Pliny, as we have seen, contests this judgment. Thus it is evident that Livy imagines (and assumes his audience imagines) that Porsenna would have gone about evaluating Cloelia's deed in the same way and on the same standards as Livy and his contemporaries would, and as Manilius and Pliny in fact do: namely, by comparing her deed to those of her contemporaries in the pertinent ethical categories. The ideology of exemplarity makes no distinction between secondary spectators contemporary with a deed and such spectators at a large temporal remove, regarding how they evaluate a deed and its ethical implications for Romans of any era.

These three passages illustrate how exemplary discourse presupposes the principle of ethical continuity. When Romans of the late Republic and Empire pass judgment on an ancient deed, they assume that both they and the original judging audience are playing the same game by the same rules. They may disagree with the original verdict, but they nevertheless assume that both parties pass judgment in light of persistent ethical standards that obtain equally in both eras. Moreover, it is a monument, of whatever form, that provides the conduit whereby later spectators can access and enter the past that they (re)evaluate. But recall that a monument itself is dislocated in the opposite direction: it projects a deed forward in time, to meet that spectator in his or her own day; the past is thus made available in any given present to inform the choices and actions taken by oneself and one's contemporaries. To see a monument at work in this way, we return to the "Philippic" of Cicero composed by Dio Cassius. Cicero complains that Antony, as consul, gave a speech from the Rostra while "naked," having stripped to a loincloth to serve as *Lupercus* on the occasion of the Lupercalia (45.30). Declaring Antony's (un)dress an outrage to the dignity of the consulship (§30.2, 5), Cicero makes the following comparison (§31.1):

τάχα γ' ἂν οὗτος ἢ τὸν Ὀράτιον τὸν παλαιὸν ἐκεῖνον ἢ καὶ τὴν Κλαιλίαν τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἐμιμήσατο, ὃν ἢ μὲν τὴν ἐσθῆτα πᾶσαν ἐνδεδουκῖα τὸν ποταμὸν διενήξατο, ὁ δὲ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ὀπλῶν ἐς τὸ ρέυμα ἑαυτὸν ἐνέβαλεν. ἄξιόν γε (οὐ γάρ;) καὶ τούτου τινὰ εἰκόνα στήσαι, ἵν' ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐν τῷ Τιβέριδι ὀπλισμένος, ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ γυμνὸς ὀρῶτο.

Perhaps he imitated the famous Horatius of old, or indeed Cloelia of old, of whom the latter swam across the river in a fully clothed state, while the former threw himself into the stream with his armor on as well. It would be fitting indeed (how could it not be?) for a statue to be erected of Antony too, so that the one might be seen in armor even in the Tiber, and the other might be seen naked even in the Forum.

Despite the assertion “perhaps he imitated . . .,” Antony’s actions described here—serving as consul, addressing the people, playing the *Lupercus*—have no resemblance to the actions ascribed to Horatius or Cloelia. Rather, “Cicero’s” comparison among these figures turns on their sartorial states. He invokes a moral hierarchy in which being clothed in the Tiber (like Horatius and Cloelia) evinces high virtue, and being naked in the Forum (like Antony) indicates low vice. Presumably the other two combinations—naked in the Tiber, clothed in the Forum—are ethically unmarked and neutral, being the “normal” sartorial states of persons who swim or engage in civic life, respectively. At any rate, monuments to the two archaic heroes provide the moral canons of which Antony’s recent behavior falls short. These monuments are, first, the brief narratives that Cicero himself provides here, describing the heroes’ costumes while in the river; and second, Horatius’ statue, which provides a strong moral contrast with the imagined statue of Antony. For just as the former commemorates Horatius’ (virtuous) swimming the Tiber in armor, so Antony’s will commemorate his (vicious) speaking from the Rostra naked. In this passage, then, monuments of Horatius and Cloelia vicariously bring these heroes into the present, making them available as standards of ethical conduct against which today’s actions can be evaluated. The principle of ethical continuity is clearly taken for granted. But this passage also illustrates, in an indirect way, the principle of performative analogy. Even though Cicero is ironic when he suggests that Antony “imitated” Horatius and Cloelia (for he focuses on how Antony diverges from the archaic heroes, not how he resembles them), this very irony attests the strength of the expectation that a contemporary action will and should have morally salient similarities to an ancient one, and that these actions can be weighed in a moral balance on the basis of their similarities. Indeed, Cicero carries his point precisely by imagining a statue of Antony in the Forum—clearly “analogous” to that of Horatius—whose juxtaposition with the image of the hero will (paradoxically) show not how nearly Antony rivals him, but how far he has fallen short.<sup>77</sup>

Cicero himself never makes such an argument in the extant *Philippics*. But in *De officiis* he does confirm that Cloelia can provide an authoritative standard for evaluating contemporary action. At §1.61, he discusses techniques for praising and blaming. The “praising” portion was quoted and discussed

77. By what iconographical difference might this moral contrast be carried? If Horatius’ statue portrayed him in armor—and here again it must be understood as *his own* armor, the very armor that marks his *virtus* in the river—then Antony’s envisioned statue would have to portray him “naked,” which might mean wearing only the *perizonia* that was the priestly costume of a *Lupercus*. Pliny (*HN* 34.8) mentions statues *Lupercorum habitu* as a recent innovation in honorific statuary, and several such statues from the first to third centuries C.E. have recently been identified (Wrede 1983). So Dio Cassius may be imagining a statue of Antony in a specific iconographical form familiar to himself and his intended audience.

on pages 21–22 above; let us here consider the “blaming” portion. Cicero writes, “And so, one is best equipped to make reproaches if one can say something like this: ‘for you young men have a womanly spirit, but that maiden has a man’s’” (*itaque in probris maxime in promptu est si quid tale dici potest: “vos enim iuvenes animum geritis muliebrem, illa virgo viri”*); he then goes on to discuss praising, for which one may invoke Horatius, the Decii, and so on. Now, the “reproach” that Cicero quotes here is a line of verse, probably a septenarius; Ribbeck tentatively assigns it to Accius’ *Meleager*, in which case the *virgo* is Atalanta.<sup>78</sup> But because Cicero contrasts this “reproach” with the praise that arises from invoking Horatius (and other heroes), I suspect he imagines that his audience will understand this reference as being to Cloelia—that she is the maiden with the manly spirit, whom the orator can invoke as a standard of which certain people fall short here and now.

A striking instance of Cloelia doing exactly the job this verse describes—providing a canon of manliness surpassing anything today’s men can muster—is found in Seneca’s *Consolatio ad Marciam*, addressed to a woman whose father has recently died. About midway through this treatise, Seneca adduces examples of men who courageously endured the deaths of family members, refusing to be bowed by grief (12.4–15.4). He then imagines his addressee Marcia making an objection as follows (16.1–2):

(1) scio quid dicas: “oblitus es feminam te consolari, virorum refers exempla.” quis autem dixit naturam maligne cum mulierum ingeniis egisse et virtutes illarum in artum retraxisse? par illis, mihi crede, vigor, par ad honesta, libeat (modo), facultas est; dolorem laboremque ex aequo, si consuevere, patiuntur. (2) in qua istud urbe, di boni, loquimur? in qua regem Romanis capitibus Lucretia et Brutus deiecerunt: Bruto libertatem debemus, Lucretiae Brutum; in qua Cloeliam contempto et hoste et flumine ob insignem audaciam tantum non in viros transcripsimus: equestri insidens statuae in Sacra Via, celeberrimo loco, Cloelia exprobrat iuvenibus nostris pulvinum escendentibus in ea illos urbe sic ingredi in qua etiam feminas equo donavimus.

(1) I know what you are saying: “You have forgotten you are consoling a woman; you offer up exempla of men.” But who said that nature dealt parsimoniously with women’s spirits and constrained their *virtutes* to a narrow domain? Believe me, they have the same energy, the same capacity for honorable deeds, if they please; they endure pain and toil on equal terms, once they have grown accustomed to it. (2) In what city, by the good gods, are we uttering this? One in which Lucretia and Brutus threw down a king from the Romans’ necks (we owe freedom to Brutus, and we owe Brutus to Lucretia); one in which we have all but enrolled Cloelia as a man because of her outstanding boldness, despising both the enemy and the river. Sitting upon her equestrian statue in the Sacred Way, in a heavily frequented place, Cloelia reproaches the young men of today as they climb up onto their litters, that they go about thus in a city where we have honored even women with a horse.

Here Seneca develops the gender inversion posited in the verse Cicero quotes. Cloelia has all but been reclassified as *vir* on account of her “outstanding boldness” and has indeed received a manly honor, sitting atop a horse like

78. *TRF*<sup>2</sup>, *locus incertus, fabula incerta* 210.

a male hero; meanwhile, today's young men are conveyed in litters in a stereotypically effeminate manner. Thus Seneca not only adduces Cloelia as a canon for evaluating his contemporaries, but also hypostatizes the injunction her statue implicitly delivers, by making her *speak* from her position on horseback, which so conspicuously marks her manly quality. The "reproach" she casts at today's youth is "you must do as I did, in order to get this kind of mount." The past could hardly be brought into the present more vividly: the archaic hero is given voice, becoming a spectator and authoritative evaluator of today's social actors. Far from leaving it to contemporaries to measure today's actions against canonical deeds of the past, the hero herself, the doer of one such deed and therefore the most authoritative judge imaginable, assumes that role. The statue itself enables this fiction, as the figure of Cloelia upon the horse, in a "very crowded" spot on the Sacred Way, is imagined to be alive and sensible to all the activities surrounding her, where she can see and judge everything that occurs in the Forum, just as everyone there can see her. On Seneca's account she *really is* in the present, projected forward by her monument from her own day.<sup>79</sup> Furthermore, in asserting that she speaks to "our" youth (*exprobrat iuvenibus nostris*), and that "we" have honored her with this statue (*etiam feminas equo donavimus*), Seneca completely assimilates himself and his contemporaries to the primary spectators who originally approved her deed. This passage strikingly illustrates how a specific monument constitutes the relationship between present and past as one of ethical continuity and performative analogy. The conditions underpinning the evaluation of the actors are assumed to persist unchanged from Cloelia's day to the present; what connects the actors—the morally salient property they share—is that they are all mounted on some form of conveyance. Where they differ, and where Seneca (/Cloelia) draws an ethical distinction, is in the precise character of that conveyance, since horses and litters have different moral valences in this context.

We have now seen, in Cloelia's case, how monuments provide a conduit between the time of a deed and any subsequent time, in the service of ethics. By means of a monument, Romans in any given present can travel backward to the moment of the deed and, as secondary spectators, validate or second-guess the evaluation that the primary spectators bestowed. They can also bring that deed forward to their own present as an ethical comparandum for contemporary actions. Indeed, monuments of every sort function this way because, by their very nature, they dissolve the strictures of chronology and sociohistorical contingency. A monument's *raison d'être* is to thrust a deed both outward in space and forward in time, making it available

79. This ideologically potent inversion, where the exemplary hero is revived to sit in judgment on posterity, can be observed in many monumental forms. See, e.g., the epitaph of Cn. Cornelius Scipio Hispanus (*ILS* 6 vv. 3–4): *maiorum optenui laudem ut sibi me esse creatum / laetentur*; likewise at aristocratic funerals the *maiores* sit in judgment on the newly deceased and on his son or other relative who delivers the oration (Polyb. 6.53–54, with Habinek 1998, 53; Hölkeskamp 1996, 321–22; Flower 1996, 128–31). Also Cicero, in a striking *prospopoeia* (*Cael.* 33–34), summons up Appius Claudius Caecus to rebuke his descendant Clodia by comparing her doings to his own and those of other Claudii (e.g., §34: . . . *ideone ego pacem Pyrrhi diremi ut tu amorum turpissimorum cotidie foedera ferires?*). Wray (forthcoming) discusses the Senecan passage (*Consolatio ad Marciam* 16) further.

and comprehensible to persons elsewhere and *elsewhen*. These characteristics of monuments, in turn, expose an important aspect of Roman historical consciousness. In the discourse of exemplarity, the past is by no means a “foreign country,” but is ethically and culturally homogeneous with the present.

### The “Manly Maiden”

Every monument, commemorating every doer of deeds, can and must transcend historical contingency in the manner just described; Cloelia’s monuments are illustrative but not distinctive in this respect. But in another respect Cloelia is strikingly distinctive, and unlike any other exemplary figure: she is a female—in particular an unmarried one, a *virgo*—who displays “manliness,” *virtus*. The texts that attribute *virtus* to her clearly intend it to carry its full etymological force, for they often formulate the resulting paradox with tight rhetorical point: Livy makes the Romans remark upon the novelty of *virtus* in a woman (*novam in femina virtutem*, 2.13.11); Valerius Maximus describes her as “carrying the torch of *virtus* for the men, though a girl” (*viris puella lumen virtutis praeferendo*, 3.2.2); Manilius makes her a “maiden greater than the men” (*maiorque viris et Cloelia virgo*, 1.780); and Florus exclaims that even maidens had *virtus* (*ecce et virginum virtus*, 1.4.3)—a tongue-in-cheek *figura etymologica*, as if *virtus* were derived from *virgo*, not *vir*. Such wordplay even occurs in Greek, since ἀνδρεία parallels *virtus* (in the narrower, military sense) both in its ethical force and in its etymological connection to “man.” Thus Polyaeus says that Porsenna praised “the manliness of the maiden” (τὸ ἀνδρεῖον τῆς κόρης, 8.31.1), and Plutarch extends the pun by declaring that, on account of her manliness (τὸ ἀνδρῶδες αὐτῆς), she received a statue (ἀνδριὰς αὐτῆς, *Publicola* 19.8).<sup>80</sup>

But what does it mean for late republican and imperial Romans to categorize Cloelia’s actions under the rubric of *virtus* (or ἀνδρεία) in the first place? Manifestly, an ideology of gender is encoded in the use of words derived from “man” to label socially consequential, ethically valued feats of military courage. To assign this value to a female is, inevitably, to challenge this ideology in at least one of two ways. Namely: does “womanly *virtus*” problematize the concept of *virtus* by asserting that there is a specifically womanly *sort* of *virtus*—a category of socially valued actions bearing the name *virtus*, but not in fact identical in content to the *virtus* of men? Or does it problematize the category of *vir* by extending it to include a female, so that the criteria employed for categorizing her actions under the rubric *virtus* are exactly or largely the same as those employed in regard to *vir*? Both approaches can be found in late republican and early imperial texts that ad-

80. Scholars accept that *virtus* (in its narrower, traditional usage) and ἀνδρεία label the same (primarily) military value and encode the same gender ideologies: so McDonnell 2003, 235–36; also (apparently) Wray forthcoming; and McInerney 2003. This assumption seems largely correct to me, though certain differences exist (Eisenhut 1973, 13, 175) and a systematic study is needed. In contrast, the relation between *virtus* (in its broader, philosophical usage) and ἀρετή has been studied in some detail: McDonnell 2003, 241–43, 247–58; Eisenhut 1973, 14–22; also Wray forthcoming; Roller 2001, 22–26.

dress gender and ethics, including those involving Cloelia.<sup>81</sup> In her case, I will argue that our texts do not consistently prefer one approach over the other, but tend to mix them up even in the same account. This tendency affects the social and ethical dynamics of exemplarity in Cloelia's case, and also signals a complexity in the evolving discourse of gender at Rome in this period.

As a first approach to Cloelia's "manliness," we may note how she compares to other Roman women of exemplary status. As recent scholarship has convincingly demonstrated, traditional Graeco-Roman discourse on the virtues of women tends to focus on women's bodies, and on behaviors associated with the body—especially sexual conduct, and the matter of which men do or should have sexual access to them. Exemplary women from early Rome, such as the Sabine women, Horatia, Lucretia, and Verginia, function this way: their bodies are objects of contestation among rival groups of men. But this contestation has further consequences: threatened or actual sexual violations of these women's bodies echo, or constitute, threatened or actual political violations of the civic body. Women's bodies function in these ways because they are conduits for both lineal descent and marriage relations, which often exist in tension (to the point of snapping violently) in the legends of early Rome. I cannot pursue these matters here, but would stress that Cloelia, the *virgo*, functions differently. Being *ex hypothesi* too young for marriage, the potential or actual cognate/agnate tension that crystallizes in other female figures is absent in her case. She does not function like other exemplary women because she is not (yet) a woman.<sup>82</sup> In fact, she shares with properly constituted men the characteristic of never having been sexually penetrated, which perhaps forges a conceptual link between the categories of *virgo* and *vir*.<sup>83</sup>

Being "not penetrated" may be a necessary condition for "manliness," but is hardly sufficient. The "manly" ethical categories of *virtus* and ἀνδρεία must, like most other Roman ethical qualities, be won and maintained by the performance of consequential actions in the public eye, in this case normally

81. The first alternative is conservative in respect to gender categories—keeping men's and women's deeds, hence social roles, distinct—but radical in altering the content of the ethical category *virtus*. The second is radical in respect to gender categories (a female is gendered as a *vir*) but conservative in regard to the ethical category *virtus*, making its contents invariant regardless of the actor's sex. Wray (forthcoming) examines these alternatives, and their implications for early imperial politics and gender discourse, in Seneca and Valerius Maximus; McInerney (2003) examines a similar dilemma in Plutarch's *Mulierum virtutes* (*Mor.* 242E–263C).

82. On the primarily bodily virtues of women see McInerney 2003, 328–41; Wray forthcoming. On early Roman exemplary women and their functions see, e.g., Miles 1995, 190–96, 207–12 (and chap. 5 passim); Joshel 1992, 121–28; Konstan 1986, 210–13. The figures of Tarpeia, Tanaquil, and Tullia can be analyzed similarly. Since the legends surrounding these early women reveal tensions between endogamy and exogamy, perhaps a similar anxiety hovers around the Cloelia legend: thus Arcella 1985, 36–38, contends that Cloelia's flight across the Tiber confirms a principle of endogamy. Yet Cloelia's undisputed status as a *virgo* who is not yet marriageable would seem to minimize this anxiety; even if she were sexually violated, this would not result in problematic cognate relations. See Bernard 2000, 214–19, on Livian portrayals of women, noting Cloelia's exceptionality.

83. Late etymologies connect *virgo* with *vir* through words like *vis* and *viridis* (Barton 2001, 41–42). But whether Romans of the late Republic and early Empire regarded these words as connected etymologically, or saw any other intrinsic link between these social categories, is uncertain.

(if not exclusively) through displays of valor in combat.<sup>84</sup> Therefore, to understand what Romans meant when they attributed “manliness” to Cloelia—did they mean that she did exactly what a (real) man would have done, or that she did some other kind of deed that the category *virtus* was extended to encompass?—we must closely examine her action and the evaluations our texts say that it received. On the one hand, the evaluation is always positive, and she is almost always credited with “manliness” in some form—whether by having *virtus* or ἀνδρεία ascribed to her, or by being compared favorably to men. On the other hand, the accounts vary regarding what, precisely, she did. Livy, for instance, lists five distinct achievements: she deceives the guards, leads the other girls, avoids the javelins, swims the river, and restores the hostages safely to their families (*frustrata custodes dux agminis virginum inter tela hostium Tiberim tranavit, sospitesque omnes Romanam ad propinquos restituit*, 2.13.6). Somewhere here “manliness” resides, for on these grounds Porsenna ranks her above Horatius and Mucius (§8), and both he (§9) and the Romans (§11) honor her *virtus*. Dionysius, meanwhile, lists only three elements: she tricks the guards rather elaborately, asking them to withdraw so that the hostages can modestly undress to bathe in the river; then she leads them in swimming across (5.33.1). “Manliness” is here too, for Porsenna subsequently praises her as “having a spirit surpassing her nature and age”—that is, surpassing her female nature and childish age: the spirit, in short, of an adult male—and deems the city blessed “not only for rearing good men, but also maidens equal to the men.”<sup>85</sup> Still other texts mention only one or two elements. Yet even in these spare accounts Cloelia’s actions are often called “manly” in one of the ways described above; this evaluation comes either from her own contemporaries (the Romans or Porsenna), or from the author himself *in propria voce*—the secondary spectator thus reaffirming and validating the original audience’s positive evaluation.<sup>86</sup>

84. Scholars interested in ancient discourses of gender have recently demonstrated that “manhood” does not devolve upon a person by virtue of biological sex or age, but is a prized, precarious quality that must be won competitively and maintained vigorously through social performance (e.g., Gleason 1995; Barton 2001, 38–43). This understanding is entirely consistent with the discourse of exemplarity described in this paper—indeed, it is through exemplary discourse that *virtus* (like most other social values) gets assigned by judging audiences to specific social actors on the basis of actions done under their gaze.

85. Dion. Hal. 5.34.3: μίαν δὲ παρθένον ἐκ τῶν ὁμήρων, ὅφ’ ἦς ἐπέισθησαν αἱ λοιπαὶ διανήξασθαι τὸν ποταμόν, ἐπαινέσας ὡς κρείττον ἐχούσαν φρόνημα τῆς τε φύσεως καὶ τῆς ἡλικίας, καὶ τὴν πόλιν μακαρίας ἐπὶ τῇ μὴ μόνον ἀνδρας ἀγαθοῦς ἐκτρέφειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρθένους ἀνδράσιν ὁμοίας. Plut. (*Publicola* 19.2, 8) also mentions her leadership and her swim (though here she does not deceive the guards, but opportunistically flees when they are not watching), and has Porsenna deem the performance “manly”: ὡς δ’ οὔτε τινὰ φυλακὴν ἐώραν . . . ὁρμὴν ἔσχον ἀπονήξασθαι πρὸς ῥεῦμα πολὺ καὶ δίνας βαθείας, ἔνοιό δέ φασι μίαν αὐτῶν ὄνομα Κλοελίαν ἵππῳ διεξέλασαι τὸν πόρον, ἐγκελευομένην ταῖς ἄλλαις νεοῦσαις καὶ παραθαρρῶσαι. . . τιμῆσαι τὸ ἀνδρῶδες αὐτῆς τὸν Τυρρηνόν (similarly at *Mor.* 250C–D).

86. Swimming and leadership of hostages, with explicit judgment of “manliness”: Polyaeus, *Strat.* 8.31.1: μία δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν Κλοιλία προὔτρηνεν ἀπάσας . . . διανήξασθαι τὸ ῥεῦμα τοῦ ποταμοῦ δίνας βαθείας δύσπορον. ἐπεὶ δὲ διενήξαντο, Ῥωμαῖοι τὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἀνδρίαν ἐθαύμασαν . . . Ποροίνας ὑπεραγαθεῖς τὸ ἀνδρεῖον τῆς κόρης. Swimming (or riding) and deception of guards, with judgment of “manliness”: Val. Max. 3.2.2: *custodiam egressa equum conscendit celerique traiectu fluminis . . . viris puella lumen virtutis praeferendo*; Flor. 1.4.3: *elapsa custodiam Cloelia per patriam flumen equitabat. et rex quidem tot tantisque virtutum territus monstris; De vir. ill. 13: deceptis custodibus noctu castris eius egressa equum . . . arripuit et Tiberim traiecit . . . cuius ille [sc. Porsenna] virtutem admiratus . . .* Only



Let us examine the three most common elements—crossing the river, leading the girls, and deceiving the guards—for their potential “manliness,” whether individually or in combination. Since the river crossing, with swimming sometimes replaced by a ride on horseback, is present in every account of her deed, it seems a good candidate for the irreducibly “manly” aspect. We saw in Horatius’ case that swimming is a stereotypically “manly” exercise associated with military training and, occasionally, featuring in a battle narrative. Thus, girls who swim might be categorized as “manly” even without being wounded or wearing armor like Horatius and his imitators.<sup>87</sup> The variants in which she crosses on horseback may betray a rationalization, in that a girl might be thought more likely to succeed this way than by swimming unassisted. But this scarcely affects the action’s ethics, for imperial texts praise the bravery and enterprise of German horsemen who cross rivers with their mounts—this too, then, falls within the ambit of *virtus*.<sup>88</sup> Besides, in this version she can be credited with the opportunistic seizure of a horse (Val. Max. 3.2.2, *De vir. ill.* 13). The river crossing, in whatever form, therefore appears to be at least one locus of “manliness.” It is also a specifically masculine sort of *virtus*, as Cloelia has done exactly what men do to be so categorized.

What of her leadership of other girls? Livy’s account gives her deed a decidedly militaristic color: she is a *dux agminis virginum*, and escapes *inter tela hostium* (2.13.6). As *dux virginum* she resembles aristocratic males who, as generals (*duces*), command troops of men in wartime; these aristocrats, discharging their magisterial duties in combat, engage in activities central to the category *virtus*. That the band of girls is described as an *agmen*, and that javelins fly around them, further reinforces the military overtones; Livy’s account all but places Cloelia and her followers in combat.<sup>89</sup> Other accounts of her leadership are less militaristic, crediting her instead with compelling rhetorical skills by which she urged the other hostages along.<sup>90</sup> Either way, her leadership falls into a characteristically male, aristocratic pattern. Texts that represent her action this way are again extending the category of *vir* to encompass this *virgo*, because she has done what men do to be credited with *virtus*. Yet, many accounts that do not mention her leadership still credit her with “manliness.” Thus this aspect of her deed, when present, may contribute to an overall “manly” effect, but does not constitute that effect by itself.

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river crossing (swimming) noted: Dio Cass. 45.31.1, Juv. 8.264–65, Sil. 13.828–30 (with “manliness” judgement). Unique is Sil. 10.496–98: *facta virum sileo. rege haec et foedere et annis / et fluvio spreitis mirantem interrita Thybrim / tranavit*.

87. Some accounts, however, make her achievement more impressive by insisting (as for Horatius) that the water was rough and the swim difficult: Plut. *Publicola* 19.2, *Mor.* 250 C–D; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 8.31.1.

88. Whether these troopers remain mounted while their horses swim, or dismount and swim alongside their horses, is unclear: Tac. *Agr.* 18.4, *Hist.* 4.12.3; Dio Cass. 69.9.6.

89. Livy may include the javelins to make her deed more like Horatius’, who also (on Livy’s account, 2.10.11) swam safely to the Roman side amidst a shower of Etruscan shafts.

90. For her skills at persuasion and exhortation, note the verbs with which her leadership is described: *πείθω* (Dion. Hal. 5.34.3), *ἐγκελεύομαι* and *παραθαρρύνω* (Plut. *Publicola* 19.2, *Mor.* 250D), *προτρέπω* (*Mor.* 250C, Polyaeus, *Strat.* 8.31.1).

Now consider the third common element, the deception of the guards. Roman attitudes toward military trickery and deceit vary greatly, so there need be no surprise that Cloelia's stratagem is nowhere condemned as such (though discomfort attends her incidental violation of the terms of the truce; see below). Nevertheless, stratagems are by definition alternatives to direct, open confrontation on the battlefield, traditionally the primary locus of masculine *virtus*. Thus, her stratagem seems unlikely to be a manifestation of such *virtus*.<sup>91</sup> Perhaps, however, a Roman could hold that deception constitutes a "womanly" sort of *virtus*, through which a woman pursues an end that a *vir* would pursue through (say) violence. This seems to be Silius Italicus' view, as he distinguishes Cloelia's achievement from that of a hypothetical male actor: "if nature had changed her sex, perhaps Porsenna would not have returned to his own territory"—implying, I take it, that as a man she would have killed him rather than merely escaping him.<sup>92</sup>

Some accounts include a further element that softens the masculine character of her leadership and swimming. The story goes that Porsenna, upon her return to his camp, allowed her to choose any hostages she wished to take back to Rome; she chose the *impubes*, as being most at risk of sexual exploitation. While concern for the bodily integrity of freeborn children was of course widespread in Roman society, and by no means limited to any particular status group, Livy pointedly says that Cloelia's choice "befitted her status as *virgo*" (*virginitati decorum*, 2.13.10)—implying that it is particularly appropriate for a freeborn *impubis* to seek to protect other freeborn *impubes* from what most threatens their status. This story appears also in Servius Auctus and *De viris illustribus*, though without the overt declaration that it befitted her own status.<sup>93</sup> To the extent that her *virtus* resides in this action, it is (on Livy's account) a fittingly *childish* form of *virtus*, rather than masculine or feminine—even while, in these very same accounts, her *virtus* also clearly resides in her (masculine) swimming and/or leadership.

Looking at all these accounts as a whole, then, Cloelia's *virtus* seems to have been imagined to reside principally in masculine sorts of achievements (crossing the river, leading the girls), making her a gender deviant—that is, an honorary man who does deeds such as men do. But her *virtus* could also, or alternatively, be seen as residing in achievements considered appropriate to her specific sex or age (deceiving her guards; saving the *impubes*) so that

91. The contrast between stratagem and *virtus* (on the battlefield) is manifest in the stories of the Faliscan schoolmaster, whose attempted betrayal is shunned by Camillus (e.g., Livy 5.27, esp. §§5–8: "*non ad similem*" inquit "*tui nec populum nec imperatorem scelestus ipse cum scelesto munere venit*. . . *ego Romanis artibus, virtute opere armis, sicut Veios vincam*"), and that of Fabricius Luscinus, who alerts Pyrrhus to a poisoning plot (e.g., Plut. *Pyrrh.* 21, esp. §4: . . . ὅπως μὴ τὸ σὸν πάθος ἡμῖν διαβολὴν ἐνέγκῃ καὶ δόλφ δόξωμεν, ὡς ἀρετῇ μὴ δυνάμενοι, κατεργάσασθαι τὸν πόλεμον). On the moral values associated with stratagem in Roman warfare, see Wheeler 1988, esp. 50–92.

92. Sil. 10.499–501: *cui si mutasset sexum natura, reverti / forsans Tyrrhenas tibi non licuisset in oras, / Porsena*. On trickery and deceit as distinctively female spheres of action see McInerney 2003, 333–35; in a different vein, Arcella 1985, 27–29.

93. Serv. in *Aen.* 8.646: *qui admiratus virtutem puellae dedit ei optionem ut cum quibus vellet rediret. illa elegit virgines*, <Servius Auctus: *quae iniuria poterant esse obnoxiae, unde Porsenna hoc quoque miratus concessit; De vir. ill. 13: cuius ille virtutem admiratus cum quibus optasset in patriam redire permisit. illa virgines puerosque elegit, quorum aetatem iniuria obnoxiam sciebat.*

she remains identified as a female and/or child, doing actions that are merely dignified with the label *virtus* and not at all identical to what men do. These alternative visions of “womanly *virtus*” can coexist in a single account, as when she both swims and tricks the guards. In Livy the juxtaposition is especially striking. He writes that, when Cloelia was returned to Porsenna, “her *virtus* was not only kept safe, but even held in esteem” (*apud regem Etruscum non tuta solum sed honorata etiam virtus fuit*, 2.13.9). The *virtus* that Porsenna keeps safe must be her bodily integrity as a freeborn Roman child, fulfilling the promise of inviolability he had made earlier (*sic deditam <intactam> inviolatamque ad suos remissurum*, §8). But the *virtus* he honors must be that she displayed in leading the girls across the river, the masculine deed for which he ranks her above Horatius and Mucius (§8) and which the Romans later honor with a statue (*Romani novam in femina virtutem novo genere honoris, statua equestri, donavere*, §11). Thus Livy, by a kind of zeugma, asserts both the “childish *virtus*” and “masculine *virtus*” aspects of her deed simultaneously. Such accounts show that her deed is a composite of two or three distinct ways of comprehending *virtus*, and as such poses a conundrum for received gender and ethical categories.

Inseparable from her “manliness” is a further ethical complexity. The hostages were pledged as security for a truce; their flight, whatever *virtus* it displays, abrogates the truce and undermines Roman credibility. Plutarch says that Publicola “neither marvelled nor rejoiced” at the hostages’ safe arrival in Rome, “but was vexed that he might appear worse than Porsenna in his trustworthiness (πίστις), and that the daring of the maidens might give cause for accusing the Romans of trickery.” Thus Publicola holds that the girls’ action harmed the collective in a key respect, wherefore he evaluates it negatively in the category of *fides*/πίστις.<sup>94</sup> In other accounts it is the Romans collectively, or Porsenna, who object that Roman trustworthiness has been tainted, even while they praise the *virtus*/ἀνδρεία of the escape itself—thus judging her deed negatively in one category but positively in another.<sup>95</sup> Her glory is therefore tarnished unless the breach of *fides* can be repaired. Hence the cumbersome exchange whereby the Romans return the hostages to Porsenna (as the agreement requires), who immediately releases them (in acknowledgment of their valor): in this way the Romans reclaim a positive evaluation for *fides*/πίστις from themselves and Porsenna, and thus sweep away the negative ethical repercussions of Cloelia’s deed so that she, and the city, can reap the benefits of its positive repercussions. Far from nullifying Cloelia’s deed, then, her return to Porsenna enables it to enter upon its full, beneficial effect for both actor and community.<sup>96</sup> The deed itself can then be monumentalized, closing the discursive loop in which she

94. Plut. *Publicola* 19.3: οὐκ ἐθαύμασεν οὐδ’ ἠγάπησεν, ἀλλ’ ἠνιάθη, ὅτι Πορσίννα κακίων ἐν πίστει φανεῖται, καὶ τὸ τόλμημα τῶν παρθένων αἰτίαν ἔξει κακούργημα Ῥωμαίων γεγονέναι.

95. Mixed judgments by Romans: Plut. *Mor.* 250D: ἐπεὶ δὲ σωθείσας εἶδον οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι, τὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν τόλμην θαύμασαν, τὴν δὲ κομιδὴν οὐκ ἠγάπησαν οὐδ’ ὑπέμειναν ἐν πίστει χειρὸνες ἐνὸς ἀνδρὸς γενέσθαι (likewise Polyaeus *Strat.* 8.31.1). By Porsenna: Livy 2.13.8–9; Dion. Hal. 5.33.2, 34.3.

96. Breach effaced: Livy 2.13.9: *urimque constitit fides; et Romani pignus pacis ex foedere restituerunt, et apud regem Etruscum non tuta solum sed honorata etiam virtus fuit*; Dion. Hal. 5.34.3: ὁ δὲ τῶν

successfully imitates previous exemplary actors and is herself installed as a model for future imitation.<sup>97</sup> The community not only adds to its stock of exemplary deeds, but also escapes its immediate crisis, as the consuls and Porsenna conclude a final peace. If Cloelia can be blamed for breaking the truce, then, she can also be credited with ending the war.<sup>98</sup>

These competing judgments on Cloelia's performance, supposedly by her own contemporaries, illustrate yet another instability and complexity in the production of exemplary discourse. Many deeds admit of evaluation in multiple ethical categories, with conflicting results. A primary audience may split in its evaluation, and any secondary audience can turn a primary audience's judgment on its head by locating and exploiting such fissures. Livy portrays an enemy of Rome doing exactly this in Book 9, where the Samnite general Pontius complains that the Romans are violating the terms of their surrender at Caudium: "Will you never lack a reason for not abiding, in defeat, by your agreements? You gave hostages to Porsenna, and smuggled them out through trickery. . . ." By omitting to mention Cloelia's own actions and the subsequent return of the hostages (which supposedly effaces the breach of *fides*), this enemy (on Livy's presentation) can invoke her as an exemplum not of Roman *virtus*, but of the very perfidy of which he now accuses them.<sup>99</sup>

Perhaps the most important index of her "manliness," however, is her association with a particular kind of honorific statue. The texts that discuss this statue provide information that is roughly consistent, in two respects. First, its location is said to be on the summit of the Sacred Way, or where the Sacred Way enters the Forum, or opposite the temple of Jupiter Stator in the vestibule of Tarquinius Superbus' house. Interpreted generously, these descriptions can be taken as referring to the same location. Second, the statue represented a woman on horseback, and according to Dionysius (5.35.2) was made of bronze.<sup>100</sup> These accounts also diverge on key points, however.

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Τυρρηθῶν βασιλεὺς τὰ ὄμηρα τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα προαχθῆναι κελεύσας ἀποδίδωσι τῷ ὑπάτῳ εἰπὼν, ὅτι πάσης ὀμηρείας κρείττονα ἡγεῖται τὴν πίστιν τῆς πόλεως. Also, implicitly, at Plut. *Mor.* 250D; *De vir. ill.* 13; Serv. *in Aen.* 8.646. McInerney (2003, 334) is incorrect to say that her deed is nullified by her return to Porsenna, though he discusses well the deed's *fides* repercussions. See also Arcella 1985, 29–31, 36, 40–41.

97. An imitator of Cloelia appears in Silius Italicus, Book 10—a young cavalryman named Cloelius, dying on the battlefield after Cannae. His valor is ascribed to his descent from the family of the legendary Cloelia (472–502), though his deeds are not narrated and therefore no structural parallels are evident. Silius probably invented Cloelius from whole cloth; therefore the connection he forges to Cloelia offers striking evidence that Romans of the late Republic and early Empire (namely, Silius and his intended audience) readily assumed that notable deeds ran in families.

98. Val. Max. 3.2.2: *non solum obsidio se sed etiam metu patriam solvit*; Sil. 13.828–30 (Scipio in the underworld, surveying the shades of heroic women): *illa est quae Thybrim, quae fregit Lydia bella* [i.e., she swam the Tiber and ended the war . . .] / *nondum passa marem* [ . . . though just an unmarried/unpenetrated girl . . .]. *qualis optabit habere / quondam Roma viros, contemptrix Cloelia sexus* [ . . . and so has done what real men should do].

99. Livy 9.11.6: *numquamne causa defiet cur victi pacto non stetis? obsides Porsinnae dedistis, furto eos subduxistis*. Cf. Chaplin 2000, 40. Another such inversion is Lucan's evaluation of Scaeva's deed (6.257–62), in contrast to the evaluation Scaeva's own fellow soldiers bestow (251–56): the latter judge his deed positively as an astonishing display of *virtus*, while the narrator, without disputing the judgment of valor, condemns him as acting contrary to the community's interest, bringing slavery upon it.

100. On the statue's form and location: Livy 2.13.11: *statua equestri donavere; in summa Sacra Via fuit posita virgo insidens equo*; Dion. Hal. 5.35.2: *στάσιν εἰκόνας χαλκῆς ἔδωσαν, ἣν ἀνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τῆς ἱερᾶς*

Several report a variant in which the honorand is not Cloelia but Valeria, Publicola's daughter who escaped the ambush that (on some accounts) the Tarquins laid for the hostages. However, the surviving texts always report this alternative *as* a variant, suggesting that our authors—or the tradition they inherited—had already constructed a hierarchy of versions in which the Cloelia identification was preferred.<sup>101</sup> Also, different dedicators of the statue are reported: the senate, the *populus Romanus*, or the hostages whom Cloelia led to freedom (or their fathers).<sup>102</sup> In any of these cases, however, the dedicators represent a group of evaluators whose interests are those of the community at large, and who deem the action both consequential and beneficial for this community.

In this case, as in Horatius', archaeologists question whether an honorific bronze equestrian statue could have been erected in the sixth century B.C.E. The earliest attested honorific equestrian statues that are undoubtedly historical date to the late fourth century B.C.E. Therefore, if this statue was indeed honorific, it must have been erected long after her deed (c. 300 B.C.E.). By the time of our texts the actual conditions of its erection had been forgotten, and the statue was mistakenly assumed to be contemporary with her deed. Alternatively, if the statue really dated to the sixth century, it must have been the cult statue of a goddess, say Venus Equestris or Venus Cloacina or Vica Pota; in time its original meaning was lost, and a new, honorific meaning was constructed in connection with Cloelia (making this another instance, then, of an obscure object rendered comprehensible by integration into exemplary discourse). To complicate matters further, Dionysius reports that the statue had been destroyed by fire prior to his own day and no longer stood (5.35.2); yet Seneca, Pliny, Plutarch, and Servius speak of it as being visible to their eyes. Scholars reconcile these accounts by conjecturing that the statue was reerected—plausibly by Augustus, who restored other ancient monuments, erected the statues of other republican heroes in the Forum Augustum, and so on.<sup>103</sup>

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δόδοῦ τῆς εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν φερούσης; Fetialis *apud* Plin. *HN* 34.29: [statuam] equestrem contra Iovis Statoris aedem in vestibulo Superbi domus; Sen. *Consolatio ad Marciam* 16.2: equestri insidens statuae in Sacra Via, celeberrimo loco; Plut. *Publicola* 19.8: ἀνάκειται δὲ τὴν ἱερὰν ὁδὸν πορευομένοις εἰς Παλάτιον ἀνδριάς αὐτῆς ἔφιππος (cf. *Mor.* 250F); *De vir. ill.* 13: huic statua equestris in foro posita; Serv. in *Aen.* 8.646: statua equestris quam in Sacra Via hodieque conspicimus.

101. Nevertheless, the Valeria version is carefully preserved and transmitted, if only as a variant. See Fetialis *apud* Plin. *HN* 34.29; Plut. *Publicola* 19.8, *Mor.* 250F. For Wiseman (1998, 84), the Valeria variant is a fabrication of Valerius Antias; Forsythe (1994, 255–56) explains how Valeria could have been the original identification, later displaced by Cloelia.

102. Dedicator: *Romani*, Livy 2.13.11; *hanc* [sc. statuam] publice dicatam crediderim, Plin. *HN* 34.29; *populus Romanus* (at Porsenna's request), Serv. in *Aen.* 8.646. Dion. Hal. (5.35.1–2) says that the senate decreed it, but the hostages' fathers actually erected it (i.e., bore the cost?), while Piso (*apud* Plin. *HN* 34.29) says the other hostages dedicated it (perhaps implying a private dedication). See Forsythe 1994, 256.

103. Statue destroyed: ταύτην ἡμεῖς μὲν οὐκέτι καίμενην εὔρομεν, ἐλέγετο δ' ἐμπρήσεως περὶ τὰς πληθυσίον οἰκίας γενομένης ἠφανίσθαι (Dion. Hal. 5.35.2); cf. e.g. Serv. in *Aen.* 8.646: cui data est statua equestris . . . quae hodieque conspicimus (he supposes that the statue he sees, in the early fifth century C.E., is some nine hundred years old). On the problem of early honorific statuary at Rome, cf. n. 47 above. On the dating, original identity, and posited reerection of Cloelia's statue see Sehlmeier 1999, 98–101; Fugmann 1997, 65; Papi 1995, 226; Forsythe 1994, 254–56; Flory 1993, 289; Bergemann 1990, 32–33, 157 (L11); Verzár 1980, 58–61; Hölscher 1978, 332, 334–35; Vessberg 1941, 88.

As in Horatius' case, here too we can pass over these questions, despite their intrinsic archaeological and historical interest, as being irrelevant to this paper's purposes. The writers who inform us about this statue unanimously accepted that it was honorific, commemorating the deed done by Cloelia (though some would say Valeria) during the war with Porsenna in the first years of the Republic, and that this monument placed her deed before the eyes of posterity to rediscover, reevaluate in light of the original evaluation, deploy as a canon of value, and imitate in due course. It is these beliefs about the statue, and the social functions that follow from these beliefs, that I investigate here—not its actual origins. Furthermore, the statue reerected by Augustus, if real, would have replaced the original statue, whatever its actual date and original function, with a new one representing what the original statue was *thought* to be: that is, the Augustan statue would really have been an honorific equestrian statue commemorating the Cloelia of legend,<sup>104</sup> and it is this statue that imperial authors would have seen and interpreted. Augustus might even have attached an identifying label and explanatory inscription, as he did for another set of honorific statues he erected—the *summi viri* of the Forum Augustum. Now, to regard the statue as honorific is to raise a typological question: was it regarded as a “normal” honorific equestrian statue of the type well attested from the late fourth century B.C.E. onward, and taken as ascribing outstanding *virtus* to the honorand? Or does the monument instead represent the uniqueness of her particular deed? Like the parallel question for Horatius' statue, we will see that our authors confront this question repeatedly. For them, interpreting the statue's iconography was inseparable from knowing and evaluating her deed, and pertinent to comprehending her “manliness.”

Several texts describing the statue insist that it was a “manly” honor. Servius is most explicit: he says that Porsenna admired her *virtus* and asked the Roman people to decree “something manly” (*aliquid virile*), whereupon she was given an equestrian statue.<sup>105</sup> Plutarch reports that Porsenna gave her a horse as a gift; some people, he says, explained that Porsenna “admired her strength and daring as superior to that of a woman, and deemed her worthy of a gift befitting an adult male warrior. At any rate, an equestrian statue of a woman stood on the Sacred Way. . . .” The implication is that the gift-horse honored her “manliness,” and that the equestrian statue represents her upon that very horse.<sup>106</sup> The statue's “manliness” is stressed in earlier texts too. Livy says that the equestrian statue was “a novel honor for novel *virtus* in a woman;” Seneca sees the horse in the statue as proof of Cloelia's all-but-male status; and Pliny remarks about Cloelia that *even* women could receive an equestrian statue—implying that, in his view, equestrian statues were overwhelmingly associated with men.<sup>107</sup>

104. Astutely observed by Sehlmeier 1999, 100–101.

105. Serv. in *Aen.* 8.646: *qui admiratus virtutem puellae . . . rogavit per litteras populum Romanum ut ei aliquid virile decerneretur: cui data est statua equestris. . . .*

106. Plut. *Mor.* 250F, quoted below (p. 49).

107. Livy 2.13.11: *Romani novam in femina virtutem novo genere honoris, statua equestri, donavere. Sen. Consolatio ad Marciam* 16.2: *tantum non in viros transcripsimus: equestri insidens statuae . . . Cloelia*

Leaving Cloelia and the gender conundrums she poses aside, these authors have good reason to gender equestrian statues as “masculine” ex hypothesi. Hundreds of such statues honoring men are attested in literary and epigraphic texts, by plastic remains, and on coins; yet there is no evidence for any other equestrian statue honoring a woman, from any period, in Rome itself or anywhere in the Roman world. Already in Livy’s day—the earliest author ascribing “manliness” to Cloelia’s statue—many equestrian statues honoring male aristocrats stood in the city’s public places, including a recent group near the Rostra. The occasions for their dedication, when known, are the honorands’ success as military leaders or in discharging high magistracies, activities falling within the normal ambit of *virtus* for male aristocrats.<sup>108</sup> In the imperial period this gendered pattern was reinforced, as equestrian statues honoring male members of the imperial family and their close associates were erected throughout the city. They were also erected elsewhere in the empire, together with equestrian statues honoring local magistrates.<sup>109</sup> Imperial authors therefore had even stronger cause than Livy to associate this type with aristocratic males and their characteristic public activities, hence to regard Cloelia’s statue as anomalous. The paradox of the “manly maiden” that Cloelia’s story poses is thus posed independently by the unique iconography of the statue.<sup>110</sup>

How did Romans of the late Republic and Empire understand this anomalous monument in their midst? Evidently, it predisposed some viewers to comprehend her deed in terms of the characteristically male achievements, military or magisterial, which all other equestrian statues commemorated. On this view, hers was a “normal” equestrian statue such as men otherwise had, where the horse merely signified the actor’s outstanding *virtus*. So Livy interprets the statue when he says that it marked a novel honor for novel *virtus* (2.13.11: *Romani novam in femina virtutem novo genere honoris, statua*

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*exprobrat iuvenibus nostris* [note *equestri* in emphatic position: this is the key evidence for her masculinity]. Plin. *HN* 34.28: *et equestrium tamen origo perquam vetus est, cum feminis etiam honore communicato Cloeliae statua equestri* [similarly telling is *etiam* at Sen. *Consolatio ad Marciam* 16.2: . . . *in qua etiam feminas equo donavimus*].

108. Republican equestrian statues in Rome itself are attested only in literary texts (Bergemann 1990, nos. L9–10, 12–25) and on coins, where certain images of horses and riders likely portray equestrian statues (Bergemann 1990, nos. M1–21b); see id., pp. 14–20, on the attested locations of these statues, the status of the honorands, and the occasions for erection. Also Lahusen 1983, 56–61.

109. Imperial equestrian statues in the city of Rome: see Bergemann 1990, nos. P27, 51 (presumably); E1–5; L27–28, 30–32, 34–40.

110. If we survey other forms of honorific statuary, Cloelia’s appears only slightly less exceptional. Flory (1993, 287–92) shows that prior to 35 B.C.E. only three other honorific statues of women are reported from Rome, for only one of which is any iconographical information known: Cornelia *mater Gracchorum* was seated (also Sehlmeier 1999, p. 99, n. 325). Beyond Rome, fragments of apparently honorific statues of women (standing) are known from the late Republic in Italian towns (Bergemann 1990, no. P1 and pls. 9–10), and Plin. (*HN* 34.31) says that Cato in his censorship objected to the erection of statues of Roman women in the provinces (Forsythe 1994, 256–57). From the Augustan age onward, many honorific statues of the spouses and female relations of emperors are attested in literature, and many portraits survive (see Flory 1993, 293–306, on statues of Livia and Octavia; Bartman 1999, *passim*, on Livia’s portraits; and Lahusen 1984, 66–67, 70–71, 73–74, 76, 81–82, for the literary references). That a woman had an honorific statue at all, then, must have seemed stranger to Livy and Dionysius than to authors of the early Empire and later, who were more accustomed to seeing women so commemorated. But even then, Cloelia’s association with an *equestrian* statue put her in exclusively male company (as far as we know).

*equestri, donavere*), implying that the horse signifies the (high) general level of her achievement. Pliny too interprets it as a “normal” equestrian statue, for he introduces it as the earliest example of the type (*HN* 34.28: *et equestrium tamen origo perquam vetus est, cum feminis etiam honore communicata Cloeliae statua equestri*). His declaration that the monument is excessive, and that she deserved only a togate statue (. . . *ceu parum esset toga eam cingi, cum Lucretiae ac Bruto . . . non decernerentur*), further shows that he takes the horse (and the toga) as ascribing to her a certain, generic level of achievement.<sup>111</sup> Finally, Seneca interprets the statue this way, and deploys it in support of a philosophical polemic. In section 16 of his *Consolatio ad Marciam*, quoted above, he develops the Stoic argument that women and men are equal in their capacity for virtue: specifically, they have the same *vigor, facultas ad honesta*, and tolerance for pain and toil (§1). To corroborate this assertion (§2), he invokes briefly Lucretia, then at greater length Cloelia: he declares that “we have all but enrolled her as a man” on account of her “outstanding boldness,” which he describes in such a generalized way that it could indeed apply equally to Horatius: “despising the enemy and the river” (*contempto et hoste et flumine*). Finally, to put the fully masculine quality of her performance beyond doubt, and thus prove the point about the ethical equality of the sexes, he declares outright that “we have given equestrian statues even to women” (sc. right along with the men whom such statues normally honor), and that her statue hurls a reproach at today’s underachieving youth. That is, he takes the statue to indicate the fully masculine quality of her performance, not essentially different from the performance of men so honored.<sup>112</sup> In these authors’ views, then, Cloelia’s

111. For equestrian statues as the most prestigious honorific type, surpassing (standing) togate and loricate statues, see Bergemann 1990, 20. Bergemann (157) interprets Pliny’s phrase *ceu parum esset toga eam cingi* as meaning that the monument represented Cloelia both mounted and togate, the toga (he suggests, 32) emphasizing her citizen status. But Pliny clearly contrasts *toga* (note its emphatic position in its clause) with *statua equestri*, a contrast that is only meaningful in the context of alternative types of honorific statue. Thus he means, “she has a *statua equestris*, as though it were not enough to have a (standing) *statua togata*,” i.e., the lesser honor, which implies nothing about her costume on the actual equestrian statue. Gabelmann (1985, 517–25) and Goette (1990, 5–6, 80–83, 158–59, pl. 70) have shown that citizen girls of every status likely wore the *toga praetexta* in the late Republic and early Empire, at least on ceremonial occasions, just as boys did; only at marriage would the (now) woman assume the *stola*. Thus Pliny may have understood this (imagined) togate statue of Cloelia in the same way he understood togate statues of adult males, with each figure wearing his or her normal citizen’s costume. Because Cloelia is not an adult, the toga does not imply she is a prostitute: for togas marking transgressive sexuality in adult women, see McGinn 1998, 156–71, 208–11, with further bibliography.

Regardless of Pliny’s meaning, Bergemann may be right that the equestrian statue itself showed Cloelia togate. If indeed the statue was reerected under Augustus, it might well have rendered this citizen *virgo* in the standard formal attire for such a person in this period, just as equestrian statues for men represent them in appropriate costumes—whether togas, military garb, or heroic nudity.

112. See Wray (forthcoming) on Seneca’s articulation of the Stoic doctrine of the ethical equality of the sexes, including this passage in particular. It is notable that Seneca’s rhetoric in this passage is at odds with his overarching philosophical point. In constructing the gender inversion of the woman who sets a standard of masculine achievement to which today’s effeminate youth cannot measure up, he *eo ipso* appeals to his readership’s ingrained presumption of ethical inequality of the sexes—the very view he is formally contesting. Throughout his ethical prose Seneca makes similar, apparently self-contradictory appeals to the very “common conceptions” he is out to overturn; he does so precisely to heighten the effectiveness of his rhetorical persuasion among readers who, at least initially, accept those “common conceptions” (see Roller 2001, 75–77, 84–88).



monument is a “normal” equestrian statue such as men otherwise have, signifying the same type and level of achievement.<sup>113</sup>

Other viewers, however, coped with the anomaly in a different way. Consider the alternative interpretations offered by Plutarch (*Mor.* 250E–F):

ἀγασθεὶς ὁ Πορσίνας ἐκέλευσεν ἵππον ἀχθῆναι κεκοσμημένον εὐπρεπῶς, καὶ τῇ Κλοιλίᾳ δωρησάμενος ἀπέπεμψεν εὐμενῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως πάσας. τοῦτο ποιοῦνται σημεῖον οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ τὴν Κλοιλίαν ἵππῳ διεξέλασαι τὸν ποταμόν· οἱ δ' οὐ φασιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ῥώμην θαυμάσαντα καὶ τὴν τόλμαν αὐτῆς ὡς κρείττονα γυναικὸς ἀξιῶσαι δωρεᾶς ἀνδρὶ πολεμιστῇ πρεπούσης. ἀνέκειτο γοῦν ἔφιππος εἰκὼν γυναικὸς ἐπὶ τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς ἱερᾶς λεγομένης, ἣν οἱ μὲν τῆς Κλοιλίας οἱ δὲ τῆς Οὐαλερίας λέγουσιν εἶναι.

In admiration, Porsenna ordered a horse to be brought, fittingly adorned, and presenting it to Cloelia sent all the maidens away in a kindly, well-disposed manner. Most people take this as an indication that Cloelia crossed the river on horseback. Others deny this, saying that he marvelled at her strength and daring as being greater than a woman's, and judged her worthy of a gift befitting an adult male warrior. At any rate (γοῦν), an equestrian statue of a woman stood on the so-called Sacred Way, which some say was of Cloelia and others say was of Valeria.

The particle γοῦν here is crucial, in its “part proof” function: the equestrian statue authorizes the inference of “most people” that she crossed the river on horseback, and of “others” that she was given the horse as a gift. These viewers do not comprehend the monumental horse as generically certifying that she did a certain sort of deed at a high level, but instead connect it with one or another version of the story of her deed—in fact, Plutarch surmises (γοῦν) that they retroject their preferred versions of her story from the monument itself.<sup>114</sup>

Thus it is clear—more so for Cloelia than for Horatius—that her statue's iconography admitted both generalizing and particularizing interpretations, which in turn carried divergent ideological and ethical freight.<sup>115</sup> The generalizing interpretation, regarding her monument as a typical equestrian

113. Some modern scholars also take this view. Sehlmeier 1999, 101: “Das Pferd . . . lies deutlich werden, daß die dargestellte Frau eine militärische Leistung vollbracht hatte, denn das Pferd symbolisierte . . . einen konkreten Erfolg im Krieg.” Flory 1993, 288: “Because there was no cultural tradition or public context for statues of women, when later Romans saw public statues of women or found records of them . . . they created stories to explain the statues in terms of the situation for men.”

114. Other accounts too say Cloelia crossed on horseback (Val. Max. 3.2.2; *De vir. ill.* 13) or was given a horse as a gift (Dion. Hal. 5.34.3; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 8.31.1; Dio Cass. frag. 14.4; both alternatives again at Plut. *Publicola* 19.7–8), though only Plutarch in the passage quoted expressly connects these versions to the horse in the monument. Some scholars take a similar view, either accepting that the deed involved the horse that is depicted in the statue (Bergemann 1990, 32–33, “Im Falle Cloelias hatte der Ablauf ihrer Tat, nämlich ihre Flucht zu Pferd, die Aufstellung der Reiterstatue motiviert. . . . Es war also ein Handlungsbildnis . . .”; cf. Fugmann 1997, 66), or that the versions of her story involving a horse are retrojected from the statue (e.g., Forsythe 1994, 254; Gagé 1988, 238; Arcella 1985, 30).

115. Roman art often represents the general in and through images that may also appear to represent particular events: see, for example, Fittschen's (1972) discussion of Trajan's arch at Beneventum, arguing that its scenes articulate key ideas and values associated with the emperor rather than simply showing particular events of recent years. But as the statues of Cloelia and Horatius show, Roman viewers themselves could move between generalizing and particularizing interpretations, and they debated the ideological implications of their iconographical practices just as modern scholars do—or rather, modern scholarship replicates the interpretive divide already found in ancient texts.

statue marking a generic level of (stereotypically masculine) military or magisterial achievement, makes Cloelia into a gender deviant—ethically a real *vir*—just as the “swimming” and “leadership” components of many of her narratives do. Like these aspects of her deed, this interpretation of the statue bestows a characteristically masculine form upon her *virtus*. She can thus be made to challenge the established ethical hierarchy of the sexes, as Seneca shows: she rivals, surpasses, even *becomes* one of the men, while they are effeminized and must struggle, in their degenerate condition, to emulate a *virgo*’s exemplary *virtus*. Conversely the particularizing interpretation, making the horse part of her story and the monument a unique instance rather than a general type, thereby regards its resemblance to a “normal” equestrian statue as fortuitous, and so eliminates the gender deviancy. Like the “deceiving the guards” and “saving the *impubes*” aspects of her deed, the monument on this interpretation credits her not with a manly form of *virtus*, but with some other form more fitted to the particularities of her age, status, and circumstances. At any rate, the conundrum of gender and ethics posed by the figure of the “manly maiden” is articulated and worked out in similar ways both in the interpretation of her actions (as described in the narratives) and in the interpretation of her statue’s iconography.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS

In part, this paper has argued that it is useful to assemble several cultural phenomena that are well attested through Roman texts and images—consequential action in the public eye; the evaluation of such action in ethical terms; actions and their evaluations being commemorated in monumental form; encounters with monuments spurring emulation—and to identify them as collectively constituting a discourse. Such an identification, with its four-part schematic structure, is useful because it stands to provide us moderns with a heuristic device by which we can perhaps better understand certain aspects of Roman historical consciousness. In and through this discourse, I suggest, Romans of the late Republic and Empire encountered their past, gave it value and meaning, and deployed it in the service of the present. Through it they also gave value and meaning to contemporary actions, in the expectation that these actions would have repercussions in the future just as past actions were having repercussions in the present. Of course, “discourse” and “historical consciousness” are modern concepts, and when imposed upon ancient ways of thinking necessarily do a degree of violence to them. No ancient text, to my knowledge, puts the four elements together to construct a discursive loop as I have, even though the individual elements and the pairwise links between them are abundantly attested in texts and images (as we have seen). It is hard to know, then, whether a Roman would recognize her or his culture in the analysis presented here. Nevertheless, to assemble these elements in this way helps us address questions that we find pressing (such as, “What did the Romans make of their own past?”), even if these questions are not the Romans’ own. Being unable to inhabit their

culture ourselves, we can still come to understand them better, at least in our own terms.

What, then, did the Romans make of their past? I have sought to show, by analyzing Horatius and Cloelia as protagonists in a discourse of exemplarity, that the past had a thriving, evolving, ideologically efficacious life in any given present. This contention contains a hidden polemic, as it is sometimes claimed that exemplary figures from the republican era became “fossilized” under the Empire. Through habitual deployment in particular modes, their meanings fixed by compilers like Valerius Maximus, particular figures came to be so closely associated with particular values as to become mere metonyms or personifications—hence unattainable, incontestable, eminently “dead” ideals (so the argument goes).<sup>116</sup> Certainly, Horatius and Cloelia are closely associated with values like *fortitudo* and *virtus*. Yet the association is complex: a constellation of specific actions and monuments constitutes each exemplum. For Horatius there is his defense of the bridge, his swimming, his armor, his wound, his statue, his possible earlier deed, and his subsequent attempt to convert his valor into public office. Any given invocation of the hero as a canon of value may engage a different one (or more) of these aspects, leading to divergent and sometimes contested evaluations. These contestations, these instabilities in the production of exemplary discourse, are precisely what make exempla so good for Romans to think with. Consider the disagreement Dio Cassius stages between Cicero and Fufius Calenus regarding how Antony and Horatius measure up as defenders of *libertas*; or the debate (of which Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus give us one side) regarding whether Laetorius imitated Horatius properly; or how Livy’s Samnite general invokes Cloelia as an example of Roman perfidy; or the many texts that propose divergent ways of understanding how a *virgo* can display *virtus*, and what such a display means.<sup>117</sup> All of these texts, of course, were composed by literary artists. Yet I have little doubt that, in and through debates like these, actual Romans living in any given present addressed contemporary issues of fundamental sociopolitical importance, such as articulating gender roles and the shifts they undergo, defining the collective interest and how one properly serves it, considering how the claims of the collective and individual should be balanced, and so on. Exemplary discourse has an important role in such debates precisely because of the instabilities and contestations that entangle its production. These are what make the discourse flexible, useful, and vital in the social debates of any given historical moment.

116. This view goes back at least to Litchfield 1914; see his table (28–35) correlating heroes with virtues. Hölkeskamp (1996, 314–20, 323–26) rightly insists on a more complex correlation between exemplary figures and abstract values. But in suggesting that exemplary figures are ethically uncontested, and that they set “binding rules” (317), he seems to render them monolithic—dominating any given present—rather than serving as flexible ethical touchstones by which that present can interrogate itself, as I see them doing.

117. For more on exempla whose meanings are contested in various contexts, see the salutary discussion of Chaplin 2000, 31–49 and 73–105 (on Livy).

Finally, a reflection on the project of examining exemplarity in general through the investigation of two specific exemplary figures. Scholars who study examples, whether in classical or other contexts, sometimes distinguish two functional modes, illustrative and injunctive. An example deployed illustratively is, or purports to be, an utterly typical instance of a series of similar objects, a “one among many.” Conversely, an example deployed injunctively is singled out as distinctive, as crucially *unlike* other objects, especially in its ethical import (that is, it is uniquely good or bad), and to single it out amounts to demanding that other objects *should* be like or unlike this one.<sup>118</sup> This distinction is useful, though in practice the two modes often intermingle. Thus, an example purporting to be illustrative may subsume and include a normative element that in fact amounts to an injunction. Conversely, an example used injunctively is presented as distinctive, but aspires to become illustrative: it aims to generate a new series of objects like itself, thereby reducing itself to a “one among many.” This paper has largely been concerned with the injunctive mode, examining how Horatius and Cloelia are invoked as standards and models for the actions of others. “Exemplary discourse,” as defined here, is mostly concerned with the injunctive mode. However, several passages discussed above in fact deploy these figures in an illustrative way: Seneca adduces Horatius and Fabricius as typical, illustrative instances of the class of people who are admired for just one or two brilliant deeds (*Ep.* 120.6–7); and Cicero lists Horatius, the Decii, the Scipios, and Marcellus as typical instances within a much larger class of figures who are outstanding for their *magnitudo animi* (*Off.* 1.61).

Yet if my analytical focus has been on the injunctive deployment of Horatius and Cloelia, my own rhetoric in this paper is otherwise. I adduce these figures illustratively, as being typical instances of injunctive exempla—that is, as representatives of a larger class of mythistorical figures that Romans liked to deploy injunctively, in the context of exemplary discourse. Hence, I imply that the analytic approach developed here could equally be applied, and with similar results, to other figures whom the Romans used injunctively: Fabricius, the Decii, Regulus, Fabius Cunctator, Cato the Elder, and so on. Except, of course, that I chose to examine Horatius and Cloelia because they seemed exceptionally *good* “typical instances.” Being so heavily attested, they illustrate a particularly wide and rich range of exemplary phenomena, and pose striking problems unique to themselves (to judge from surviving representations). So how typical of this class are they, really? Thus, my own examples, like so many others, entail a mixing of the illustrative and injunctive modes. For I present them, in part, as models for how other, less richly attested exemplary figures might—ought to—have functioned socially and ethically, and might be seen to function, had more monuments survived. In working with exemplarity, this kind of self-reflection is

118. The terms “injunctive” and “illustrative” were suggested to me by Noel Carroll. For more on these two modes (though with different terminology) in a Roman context, see Chaplin 2000, 137–40; and Stemmler 2000, 157–58.

difficult to avoid: willy-nilly, one is investigating the foundations of one's own argumentation, and of mental ideation itself.<sup>119</sup>

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119. See Goldhill 1994 for an engaging discussion/performance of such self-reflection, and an overview of the philosophical scholarship on examples.

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