

# Self, Self-Fashioning, and Individuality in Late Antiquity

New Perspectives

Edited by

Maren R. Niehoff and Joshua Levinson

Mohr Siebeck

ISBN 978-3-16-158990-4 / eISBN 978-3-16-158991-1  
DOI 10.1628/978-3-16-158991-1

ISSN 2510-0785 / eISSN 2568-6623  
(Culture, Religion, and Politics in the Greco-Roman World)

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data are available at <http://dnb.dnb.de>.

© 2019 Mohr Siebeck Tübingen, Germany. [www.mohrsiebeck.com](http://www.mohrsiebeck.com)

This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that permitted by copyright law) without the publisher's written permission. This applies particularly to reproductions, translations and storage and processing in electronic systems.

The book was typeset by epline in Böblingen using Minion typeface, printed on non-aging paper by Gulde-Druck in Tübingen, and bound by Buchbinderei Spinner in Ottersweier.

Printed in Germany.

## Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .....	V
------------------------	---

MAREN R. NIEHOFF Fashioning this Volume .....	1
--	---

### Constructing the Self

DAVID LAMBERT “Desire” Enacted in the Wilderness: Problems in the History of the Self and Bible Translation .....	25
---	----

MATTHEW ROLLER Selfhood, Exemplarity, and Cicero’s Four Personae: On Constructing Your Self after Your Model and Your Model after Your Self .....	51
---	----

MARGARET GRAVER Interiority and Freedom in Seneca’s <i>De Beneficiis</i> : Acts of Kindness and the Perfected Will .....	71
--	----

GRETCHEN REYDAMS-SCHILS How to Become Like God and Remain Oneself .....	89
--	----

KAREN L. KING Becoming Fully Human: Contours and Expressions of the Self according to the <i>Gospel of Mary</i> .....	105
---	-----

YAIR FURSTENBERG Rabbinic Responses to Greco-Roman Ethics of Self-Formation in Tractate <i>Avot</i> .....	125
---	-----

CHARLES M. STANG The Doubled Self and the Worship of the Gods .....	149
--	-----

JOSHUA LEVINSON	
The Divided Subject: Representing Modes of Consciousness in Rabbinic Midrash . . . . .	169
LAURA NASRALLAH	
The Worshipping Self, the Self in Light . . . . .	187
EDWARD WATTS	
The Senses, the Self, and the Christian Roman Imperial Subject: Hagia Sophia as a Space of Directed Interiority . . . . .	213

### Self-Fashioning

CATHARINE EDWARDS	
The Epistolographic Self: The Role of the Individual in Seneca's Letters . . .	227
EVE-MARIE BECKER	
Paul's Epistolary Self in and around Philippians . . . . .	253
ILARIA L. E. RAMELLI	
Autobiographical Self-Fashioning in Origen . . . . .	273
MAREN R. NIEHOFF	
A Hybrid Self: Rabbi Abbahu in Legal Debates in Caesarea . . . . .	293
IRMGARD MÄNNLEIN-ROBERT	
Move Your Self: Mobility and Migration of Greek Intellectuals to Rome . . .	331
REUVEN KIPERWASSER	
Narrating the Self: Tales of Rabbi Zeira's Arrival to the Land of Israel . . . .	353

### Self and Individual in Society

CLIFFORD ANDO	
Self, Society, Individual, and Person in Roman Law . . . . .	375
JÖRG RÜPKE	
Urban Selves: Individualization in Roman Cities . . . . .	393

SARIT KATTAN GRIBETZ Constructions of the Self through Time: Gender, Text, Embodiment, Experience . . . . .	419
MIRA BALBERG The Subject Supposed to Forget: Rabbinic Formations of the Legal Self . . .	445
ISHAY ROSEN-ZVI Two Midrashic Selves: Between Origen and the Mekhilta . . . . .	471
ALFONS FÜRST Individuality and Self-Agency: The Self in Origen's Metaphysics of Freedom . . . . .	505
TOBIAS NICKLAS Constructing Individual Selves within Social Hierarchies: The Letters of Copres and Synesios . . . . .	523
List of Contributors . . . . .	537
Index of Names . . . . .	543
General Index . . . . .	549

# Selfhood, Exemplarity, and Cicero's Four Personae

## On Constructing Your Self after Your Model and Your Model after Your Self

MATTHEW ROLLER

### 1. Introduction

In the development of what might be called “self”-studies in the field of Classics over the past generation, a brief text by Cicero – his exposition in *De Officiis* 1.105–25 of the four *personae*, or “masks,” that define exactly who and what an individual person “is” relative to others – has played a small but significant role. *De Officiis* is a philosophical dialogue written in late 44 BCE, addressed to Cicero's son, the younger Marcus, then 21 years old and studying in Athens. Its title is conventionally, if imperfectly, translated into English as “On Duties” or “On Moral Duties.” The work purports to set out for a young Roman aristocrat the principles of deportment and the social obligations requisite to success in a public career at Rome. As is usual in ancient dialogues, this work aims for a wider readership of Roman aristocrats, and the express addressee (Marcus junior) functions in part as a surrogate for any such reader. Cicero's exposition is drawn to some extent from the second-century BCE Stoic philosopher Panaetius, who is generally credited with introducing the four *personae* theory and expounding it in a work of his own bearing a title (in Greek) that Cicero's title roughly translates. Most scholars agree, however, and I will further argue, that Cicero's exposition of the theory is strongly shaped by his own distinctively Roman and distinctively individual concerns at the time of the work's composition.<sup>1</sup> The pertinence of this Ciceronian passage to scholarly discussions of the ancient “self” was underscored in a landmark study by Christopher Gill in 1988. While Gill at that time was addressing the specificity and characteristics of

---

<sup>1</sup> On Panaetius' work entitled *Peri tou kathekontos*, a title approximately translated by *De Officiis*, see DYCK 1996: 17–28. Many scholars have attempted to reconstruct the Panaetian work from Cicero, and take varied positions on the extent to which Cicero follows, deviates from, and elaborates this source: see DE LACY 1977: 166–70, GILL 1988: 183–99, DYCK 1996: 18–21, BRUNT 2013: 180–242 (published posthumously but evidently last revised in the late 1990s), LEFÈVRE 2001 *passim* (and 57–65 for Off. 1.105–25), all with further references to earlier bibliography on this hoary topic.

the individual in ancient philosophy via the terms “personhood” and “personality,” and had not yet come to focus on the term “self” as he did in subsequent work (e. g., Gill 2006), the relevance of his 1988 study to other scholarship of that era which explicitly thematized the “self,” particularly by Foucault and Taylor, is clear.<sup>2</sup> More recently, scholars investigating the ancient “self” have also found both the Ciceronian passage and Gill’s analysis of it to be helpful points of reference for their own discussions.<sup>3</sup>

In this paper, I reexamine this Ciceronian text from a standpoint that begins with terms and categories characterizing modern debates about self and selfhood. The application of the (modern, English-language) term “self” to ancient social and conceptual configurations already introduces anachronism: it is difficult, as scholars have long noted, to “unthink” the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum*, which is often considered a watershed in the development of the “modern” Western “self” with its privileging of interiority, integration, and autonomy. Thus, “self” is already an etic category for investigating flavors of individual distinctiveness in ancient (hence pre-Cartesian) societies and frameworks of thought. In this spirit, I propose in this chapter to import additional modern (etic) categories in the effort to identify aspects of what we now regard as “selfhood” in the Ciceronian text. But I also consider how other, distinctively Roman, frameworks of thought may cohere with or illuminate the aspects of (modern) “selfhood” so identified, frameworks that do not necessarily line up neatly with modern selfhood. For whatever we identify as a “self” in Roman culture should not be regarded merely as a defective version of the modern idea – the teleological fallacy – but as particular package of elements that makes sense in its own world. In particular, I will assess the significance of the historical exempla with which Cicero peppers his exposition of the four *personae*. The integral presence of these exempla suggests that they are doing crucial conceptual work. I will also consider Cicero’s deployment of exempla for himself (and for “his self”) in his oratory, to provide comparison to the exposition of the four *personae*. Exemplarity is a characteristically Roman way of thinking morally and historically, and both ethics and one’s relationship to the past are (as we shall see) key components of a Roman, no less than a modern, “self.”<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> E. g., FOUCAULT 1986 (particularly interesting to Classicists, though hardly Foucault’s only work from this period thematizing the “self”); TAYLOR 1989.

<sup>3</sup> E. g., DYCK 1996: 281–84; REYDAMS-SCHILS 2005: 27, 93–94.

<sup>4</sup> On the rhetorical, moral, and historiographical dimensions of Roman exemplarity in general, see ROLLER 2018: 10–23.

## 2. Cicero's Four *Personae* Theory

I begin by discussing Cicero's exposition of the four *personae* in *De Officiis*. This exposition is embedded in and framed by a broader discussion of *decorum*, what is "fitting" for a person to do (persons like his addressees, both explicit and implied). Determining what is fitting is essential if we are to discover what our duties (*officia*) are – the topic of the dialogue as a whole.<sup>5</sup> As we shall see, these *personae* provide a theoretical frame within which to view the question of what is *decorum*. The discussion of the four *personae* begins at § 1.105, where Cicero explains how humans are distinguished from other creatures. The difference, he says, lies in the human capacity for rationality, by which the impulses of pleasure (*voluptas*) may be controlled – for animals, and certain men who resemble animals, are governed by *voluptas*.<sup>6</sup> Only by controlling that impulse is there a chance to do what is *decorum* or *honestum* (a closely related quality).<sup>7</sup> At the conclusion of this discussion in § 107, Cicero explicitly defines this human capacity as a *persona* given by nature, and specifically as the first of two nature-given *personae*:

intellegendum etiam est duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est ex eo quod omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis, a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exquiritur [...] (Cic. *Off.* 1.107).

One must further understand that we have been dressed, as it were, by nature in two *personae*, of which one is common from the fact that we all take part in that rationality and excellence in which we surpass the beasts, from which all that is honorable and fitting (*decorum*) is derived and from which a method for discovering our duties (*officia*) is sought [...]

Having just discussed in detail the implications of human rationality for the performance of that which is *decorum* and for the identification of one's *officia*, however, he says no more on this topic and proceeds straightaway to the second *persona*.

The exposition of the second *persona*, which nature gives to humans individually rather than to the species as a whole, unfolds without so much as a sentence break. Yet it is developed at much greater length and in a more characteristically Roman manner than the first, as we shall see. Cicero describes this *persona* as follows:

<sup>5</sup> On the overarching importance of *decorum* in this passage, see GILL 1988: 173, DYCK 1996: 238–49, LEFÈVRE 2001: 53–54.

<sup>6</sup> On rationality as a distinctive feature of human (as opposed to animal) nature in Stoicism, see GRAVER in this volume; for Cicero's development of this idea in his earlier dialogues, see SAUER 2018: 83–84.

<sup>7</sup> DYCK and LEFÈVRE, as cited in n. 5, comment on Cicero's assertion, at *Off.* 1.94 and elsewhere, that *decorum* and *honestum* are virtually indistinguishable.



[...] altera autem quae proprie singulis est tributa. ut enim in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt, alios videmus velocitate ad cursum, alios viribus ad luctandum valere, itemque in formis aliis dignitatem inesse, aliis venustatem, sic in animis existunt maiores etiam varietates (*ibid.*).

[...] and the second (*persona*), which has been given to individuals as their own. For as there are great dissimilarities among bodies – some we see are conditioned by speed for running, others by strength for wrestling, and likewise in some figures there is dignity, and in others comeliness – so there are even greater variations in our dispositions (*animi*).

At this point Cicero provides illustrative examples of such differences among dispositions (*animi*, §§ 108–109). Beginning with prominent political, military, and cultural figures of the late 2<sup>nd</sup> to early 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BCE, he asserts that Lucius Crassus, Lucius Philippus, and Gaius Caesar were distinguished by *lepor* (charm or wit), while Marcus Scaurus and the young Marcus Drusus were noteworthy for their *severitas* (seriousness or sternness). Gaius Laelius, for his part, displayed *hilaritas* (good humor or a merry disposition), though his friend Scipio (Aemilianus) did not. Socrates furnishes a Greek instance of a person who exhibited something like *hilaritas*, while other prominent Greeks lacked this trait. Next, Cicero informs us that the Carthaginian general Hannibal was *callidus* (shrewd or crafty) as was his Roman rival Fabius Maximus; he then enumerates correspondingly crafty Greek figures. Examples follow of both Romans and Greeks who gained their ends either straightforwardly or surreptitiously, after which the reader is told of those whose down-to-earth demeanor made them appear as part of the crowd regardless of their status, and those who showed no such comity yet were great and renowned for that very reason. And so on: Cicero concludes his list of exempla by stating that there are innumerable further differences among the natures and habits of individuals, none of them “worthy of censure” – that is, all falling within the pale of the morally and socially acceptable.<sup>8</sup>

At the start of § 110, Cicero offers several precepts that supply the conclusions he wishes his reader to draw from these examples. It is worth mentioning that this structure is highly characteristic of Roman moral argumentation: precepts, which are rhetorically hortatory and delivered in deontic language, either introduce or summarize (as here) a list of exempla, which for their part substantiate

<sup>8</sup> Innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque, minime tamen vituperandorum (§ 109). GILL 1988: 182–83 wonders whether Cicero can really be endorsing the figures whose nature is such that they will do anything to gain their ends, exemplified in Sulla, Crassus, Lysander, and Callicratidas in § 109. Do these figures not display a vicious nature, notwithstanding the hedge *minime tamen vituperandorum*? Primarily, however, these exempla (along with the others in §§ 108–09) are functioning illustratively, to instantiate the general claim about the varieties of individual dispositions (in animis existunt maiores etiam varietates, § 107; innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque, § 109), and any injunctive dimension (in the sense of “we should take these exempla as norms and potentially imitate these models ourselves”) is secondary, if present at all. On illustrative vs. injunctive exempla, see ROLLER 2018: 11–12.

the injunctions delivered in the precepts.<sup>9</sup> What, then, are the precepts that Cicero derives from these exempla? He writes:

admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique, non vitiosa sed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum illud quod quaerimus retineatur. Sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut etiam si sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi quod adsequi non queas. (§ 110)

Each person must very much hold onto what is his own – not anything morally bad (*vitiosus*), but nevertheless particular to him, so that the fittingness (*decorum*) we seek can be more easily maintained. For the fact is that we must act in such a way that we do not strive against universal nature, but provided that is preserved, we pursue what is particular to us; and [sc. we must also act in such a way] that even if other things are greater and better, we ourselves nevertheless measure our undertakings by the ruler of our own nature. For the fact is it does no good to fight against nature or to pursue something you cannot attain.

In short, Cicero suggests that each figure adduced by way of illustration in the previous two sections revealed his individual nature in his actions, and, by “holding onto it” – namely, not trying to be what he was not – achieved some measure of *decorum*. The proviso of preserving “universal nature” may be a glance back at the first *persona*, the rational nature of humans as such, which presumably provides the outermost frame to all the various individual natures identified and exemplified in the discussion of the second *persona*. Yet, even now, Cicero is not done with the second *persona*: over the next four sections (§§ 111–114) he adduces further exempla and additional considerations, which we set aside for the moment but to which we will return.

Cicero next addresses the third and fourth *personae*. While scholarly discussions of Cicero's theory normally present all four *personae* at once, in a single analytical move – a presentation evidently tailored to the view that Cicero is making use of a framework developed by Panaetius, and the Panaetian structure is what scholars are often aiming to reconstruct<sup>10</sup> – Cicero himself does nothing of the kind. As we have seen, he introduces the first two *personae* in § 107 as a pair: the first is universal to all humans, and the second is particular to individuals. What they share, and the reason they are presented as a pair, is that both are given by nature. All subsequent discussion, through § 114, pursues the discussion of individual nature, that is, the second *persona* (the first, as previously noted, was elaborated in §§ 105–106, before being formally identified in § 107 as a *persona* given by nature). Only in § 115 does he get around to presenting the third and fourth *personae*. Again, they appear as a pair:

<sup>9</sup> On this characteristic structure of Roman argumentation, see ROLLER 2015a: 134–39 and 135 n. 15, with further bibliography.

<sup>10</sup> E. g., GILL 1988: 173–75, DYCK 1996: 269–70, and to a lesser extent LEFÈVRE 2001: 57–63.

ac duabus iis personis, quas supra dixi, tertia adiungitur, quam casus aliqui aut tempus imponit, quarta etiam, quam nobismet ipsis iudicio nostro accommodamus. nam regna, imperia, nobilitatem, honores, divitias, opes eaque, quae sunt his contraria, in casu sita temporibus gubernantur; ipsi autem gerere quam personam velimus, a nostra voluntate proficiscitur. itaque se alii ad philosophiam, alii ad ius civile, alii ad eloquentiam applicant, ipsarumque virtutum in alia alius mavult excellere. (§ 115)

And to these two *personae* which I mentioned above, a third is added, which some chance or circumstance imposes, and also a fourth which we ourselves apply to ourselves by our own decision. Kingdoms, military commands, high birth, offices, wealth, resources, and the opposites of these, depending as they do on chance, are governed by circumstances, but what *persona* we ourselves wish to bear springs from our own inclination (*voluntas*). Thus, some devote themselves to philosophy, others to civil law, and still others to eloquence; and of the virtues themselves, different people seek to stand out in different ones.

Why should the four *personae* be presented as two distinct pairs that are accorded separate treatment? As the first pair is unified by expressing criteria imposed by nature for how a person will be – first a universal nature shared by all humans as such, and second an individual nature that distinguishes each person from others – the second pair is unified by *not* being attributed to nature, but rather to chance or fortune (third *persona*: the conditions into which one was born or into which one falls), and to personal choice (fourth *persona*: what activities one elects to pursue in life).<sup>11</sup> Yet the two pairs share a structural principle: the first member of each pair furnishes a more general frame that imposes broad limits upon the scope of the second member, which in turn is more closely attached to the individual.<sup>12</sup> We already noted this framing dynamic regarding the first pair of *personae*. To observe it at work regarding the second pair, let us examine the illustrative exempla that Cicero provides in § 116. He begins as follows:

quorum vero patres aut maiores aliqua gloria praestiterunt, ii student plerumque eodem in genere laudis excellere, ut Q. Mucius P. f. in iure civili, Pauli filius Africanus in re militari. quidam autem ad eas laudes quas a patribus acceperunt, addunt aliquam suam, ut hic idem Africanus eloquentia cumulavit bellicam gloriam [...] fit autem interdum, ut nonnulli omissa imitatione maiorum suum quoddam institutum consequantur, maximeque in eo plerumque elaborant ii, qui magna sibi proponunt obscuris orti maioribus.

Those whose fathers or ancestors were distinguished for some kind of positive renown (*gloria*), are typically eager to stand out in the same type of merit (*laus*) – like Quintus Mucius, son of Publius, in civil law, and Africanus the son of Paulus in military matters.

<sup>11</sup> In a Stoic cosmos, *fortuna* is itself divinely caused (like everything else) and is regarded as “chance” by humans only insofar as they cannot understand, with their limited knowledge and capacities, how events must inevitably follow in the causal chain. From the cosmic perspective, then, the third *persona* could be attributed to nature no less than the first two. See LONG 1983: 189–90, ДУСК 1996: 285–86.

<sup>12</sup> EDWARDS (this volume) stresses the importance of the second *persona* as a location of the differentiated individual, in Stoic thought generally and in Seneca in particular. I would add that the fourth *persona* is also such a location. Further discussion in section 3 and n. 19 below.

Now some have added to the merit (*laudes*) they received from their fathers some merit of their own, as (for example) this same Africanus piled eloquence on top of his military *gloria* [...] It also sometimes happens that some people, leaving aside imitation of their ancestors, pursue some intention of their own, and often those people toil at this the most who, though descended from low-status ancestors, intend great things for themselves.

Cicero reaffirms here his prior claim that people can pursue their own inclination (*voluntas*, § 115) in choosing a path for themselves (the fourth *persona*). But he also makes clear how the “chance or circumstances” of their birth (the third *persona*) both enable and constrain that act of choosing. Cicero is drawing upon a familiar Roman idea that exemplary performances run in families, and that one’s own ancestors may serve as highly compelling injunctive exemplary models – the sort to be taken as a norm, and imitated as opportunity permits.<sup>13</sup> On the one hand, then, a young Roman exercising his *voluntas* in choosing a line of work – selecting a *persona* (of the fourth kind) for himself – may feel pressure, internal or social, to pursue and seek distinction in the very activities in which his forefathers shone. On the other hand, the pursuit of activities like eloquence, legal studies, or generalship in the first place is open only to those who have access to elite education, possess the wealth to attract large networks of clients, and participate in the activities of government. One must be born, or climb, into this class in order for these activities even to come into consideration. Yet people can also surpass their ancestors: they can add a new area of activity, as Scipio Africanus (i. e., Aemilianus) did; or they can construct a career entirely from scratch, as “new men” (*novi homines*), lacking forebears who held high office at Rome, must do. Indeed, this latter group, to whom “chance or circumstance” gave obscure parentage, seems to be freest in terms of the self-fashioning of the fourth *persona*, for their third *persona* does not steer them to take these relatives as models for their own endeavors. By the same token, however, they lack a pre-smoothed path in the footsteps of distinguished forebears. In Section 4 below, we will further examine how the third *persona* relates to one particular “new man,” namely, Cicero himself.

Strikingly, in this Ciceronian/Panaetian theory the fourth *persona* is the *only* one concerning which an individual has discretion: this *persona* alone is “up to us,” and Cicero devotes considerable space (§§ 117–21) to discussing how one should make the momentous choice or choices this *persona* affords.<sup>14</sup> His touchstone here is the story of the adolescent Hercules deciding whether to pursue the life of virtue or the life of pleasure (§ 118), though Cicero concedes that, in the

<sup>13</sup> On the particularly powerful injunctive force of familial exempla in Roman culture, see ROLLER 2018: 54–55, 125–32.

<sup>14</sup> GILL 1988: 177 astutely remarks that the first three *personae* involve more or less preset elements of our being that we must “bear in mind,” while the fourth is where we make a choice of our own even as we bear the other three in mind. On the degree to which Cicero supposes that one’s choices are “voluntary” in the causally linked Stoic cosmos, see n. 21 below.

real world, people do not normally have such alternatives laid before them at the appropriate life stage.<sup>15</sup> Below we will say more about choosing the fourth *persona* as Cicero describes it, and the significance of this choice for the concept of the “self” that emerges from this text.

### 3. Four *Personae* Theory and the “Self:” Interiority, Autonomy, Consistency

Let us now return to the question of the “self.” In a recent article, Elwin Hofman presents the results of an extensive survey of scholarship on the “self” from the past couple of decades. He identifies four “axes” along which, he argues, contemporary discussions of selfhood tend to move. These axes are (1) interiority vs. exteriority, (2) stability vs. flexibility, (3) holism vs. fragmentation, and (4) self-control vs. dispossession (to which I would rather refer as greater or lesser “autonomy”). The pair of terms associated with each axis represents not a binary opposition, but a range or spectrum along which Hofman sees modern discussions of “selfhood” as extending. In the post-Cartesian West, he notes, selfhood tends to be understood as featuring interiority, stability, holism, and self-control/autonomy, thus falling toward particular ends of the four axes.<sup>16</sup> While Hofman’s categories and axes are indisputably modern in their genesis and conception, hence *etic* in relation to ancient thought, they seem sufficiently aligned with some of the channels along which ancient discussions flow that they may be usefully deployed as “bridgeheads” for analyzing ancient configurations of “selfhood.”<sup>17</sup> Here, I propose to analyze Cicero’s four *personae* theory in this framework.

I begin with the first axis in Hofman’s framework, that of interiority vs. exteriority. It seems patent that Cicero (and probably Panaetius before him) embraces some kind of concept of interiority, which is evident in both the second and the fourth *personae*. To be more exact, we have seen that the second *persona* is said to “be given by nature” to each person individually, and is not the same for all, or even perhaps for any two people. Indeed, the differences are uncountable

<sup>15</sup> Illud autem maxime rarum genus est, eorum qui [...] spatium etiam deliberandi habuerunt quem potissimum vitae cursum sequi vellent (§ 119).

<sup>16</sup> HOFMAN 2016: 9 and *passim*.

<sup>17</sup> Christopher Gill has influentially articulated a “subjective-individualist” vs. “objective-participant” conception of personality or self – these too are *etic* categories with respect to ancient writing and thinking – and contends that the former is more characteristic of modern, post-Cartesian “selfhood,” while the latter is more characteristic of antiquity (GILL 1996: 5–18, 455–69, further developed and expanded in GILL 2006: 325–407, summarized in BARTSCH 2006: 232–37). Gill’s distinction seems to map primarily onto Hofman’s interiority-exteriority axis, perhaps with some aspects falling onto the autonomy axis. Other scholars have proposed still other categorizations as frameworks for organizing discussions of “selfhood” diachronically and across cultures: e. g., SORABJI 2008: 27–34.

(*innumerabiles [...] dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque*, § 109), and Cicero insists that we must each attend to the particular nature we individually have, measuring our activities by that “ruler” (*studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur*, § 110). We must not try to do things that befit others but not ourselves, or that are contrary to universal nature (i. e., the first *persona*).<sup>18</sup> Following these recommendations is the way to achieve *decorum*, whose attainment is the point of expounding this theory in the first place (*id enim maxime quemque decet quod est cuiusque maxime*, § 113). Now, while the second *persona*, or individual nature, is interior to each individual, Cicero makes clear that it was *given* by nature: we can know it, and choose actions and life courses that accord with it, but it is not, *per se*, up to us to select or change. In his exposition of the fourth *persona*, by contrast, Cicero pervasively employs a rhetoric of deliberation and selection, as we forge our own path in light of the constraints imposed by, or possibilities opened by, the other three *personae*. The idea that this one *persona*, at least, is determined by individual choice, and that this choice differs for each individual by virtue of her or his other three *personae*, further suggests an interiority for the individual that is distinct from the interiority of others – for others’ cogitations about their life paths are internal to them and different from ours in accordance with the uniqueness of their other *personae*. Indeed, Cicero asserts at § 119 that, in our choosing of a life path, we should be especially sensitive to our own nature (*in qua deliberatione ad suam cuiusque naturam consilium est omne revocandum*). At § 120 he elaborates on this point, stating that *natura* has “the greatest force” (*maximam vim*) regarding this reckoning, while *fortuna* comes second (*proximam*); hence, in making this decision, one ought to cleave primarily to one’s own nature (the second *persona*) and secondarily to *fortuna* (the third *persona*).<sup>19</sup> Thus the particularly close alignment that Cicero imagines should be achieved between the second and fourth *personae* also entails an alignment of the interior dispositions and processes that characterize these *personae*, and requires us to attend to these interior states and processes of ours in their distinctiveness from the parallel interior states and processes of others.

<sup>18</sup> Cicero hammers this point home in various ways: § 110 quoted above; also § 111: *aequalitas [...] quam conservare non possis si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam* (see below on *aequalitas* and *constantia*); § 113: *expendere oportebit quid quisque habeat sui eaque moderari, nec velle experiri quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime quemque decet quod est cuiusque maxime*. Cicero is also not entirely consistent with his terminology around the second *persona*: he can say both that nature gives each individual her or his own *persona*, i. e., the second, and that each individual has her or his own distinct nature, by which he seems also to mean the second *persona*.

<sup>19</sup> *Vtriusque omnino habenda ratio est in deligendo genere vitae, sed naturae magis [...] qui igitur ad naturae suae non vitiosae genus consilium vivendi omne contulerit, is constantiam teneat* (§ 120). FUHRMANN 1979: 99–100 underscores the importance of the second *persona* for the selection of the fourth.

I turn next to the autonomy axis, the fourth in Hofman's framework. As noted earlier, the first three *personae* are presented as having been set by nature and fortune, and only the fourth is "up to us." Yet even it must be chosen in view of the constraints imposed and possibilities afforded by the other three. Consider, for example, the *calliditas* or "craftiness" that Cicero says characterizes the individual natures of Hannibal and Fabius. This quality is revealed in their generalship: generalship is evidently a suitable choice of activity (fourth *persona*) for men whose individual natures (second *persona*) are characterized by this quality. Conversely, however, the possibility is also hinted at that the life path one chooses, or actions in which one engages, may misalign with one's individual nature. Hence, an unnamed orator is criticized for inappropriately employing Greek words (§ 111), and people who lacked Cato's rigorous morals are deemed inept for considering whether they should commit suicide as if they were Cato (§ 112). Cicero also discusses how circumstances might compel one to do things that are unsuited to one's *ingenium* (§ 114) – more on this matter below. Cicero's point, in all these cases, is that the actions or potential actions he discusses are at odds with the individual natures of the people performing them, which is to say, at odds with the second *persona* of each such person. Their actions can be changed, but their individual natures cannot. And, when Cicero literalizes the metaphor of the *persona* – the actor's mask – by describing the casting choices that stage actors make, he stresses that they select roles (*personae*, literally the masks associated with particular roles on stage) on the basis of their knowledge of their innate capabilities (§ 114). If actors can make appropriate choices about their literal *personae* in light of their natural endowments, *a fortiori* we, too, should be able to choose our own metaphorical *personae* in light of our own endowments – our nature as humans (first *persona*), our situation in life as given by fortune or chance (third *persona*), and above all our individual nature or disposition (second *persona*).<sup>20</sup> It appears, then, that Cicero's (/Panaetius') four *personae* theory does indeed leave some space for autonomy in the sense that the individual may make certain choices about a life path.<sup>21</sup> However, this autonomy is signifi-

<sup>20</sup> *Suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium, acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere prudentiae. illi enim non optimas sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt [...] ergo histrio hoc videbit in scaena, non videbit sapiens vir in vita?* (§ 114). On this passage and its literalization of the *persona* metaphor, see GILL 1988: 192–93, DYCK 1996: 283–84, and, in more detail, BARTSCH 2006: 219–21; DE LACY 1977: 163–65 discusses the theatrical metaphor of the *persona/prosopon* more generally.

<sup>21</sup> This possibility of choice is a noteworthy feature of the theory, given that orthodox Stoicism posits universal causal determinism. Indeed, Cicero seems to believe that one can choose to do either "X" or "not X," as when he speaks of discovering that one has made the wrong choice and must take a corrective path (see below). The possibility of making such a selection is for some the very definition of freedom of decision, in which (as Margaret Graver puts it elsewhere in this volume) "our mental impulses are disjoined from the regular mechanisms of causation" in the Stoic sense of a deterministic causal chain. On the matter of free choice in Stoicism, see section 3 of Graver's contribution to this volume.

cantly constrained by the other three *personae*, and by the second one in particular. This constraint looms large enough that Cicero repeatedly warns of the ways in which people can go wrong in choosing their actions, crashing into the constraints and failing to achieve *decorum*. In this respect, the “self” of Ciceronian four *personae* theory falls toward the less autonomous, or (in Hofman’s terms) “dispossession,” end of this axis. Thus, if this theory entails a significant degree of interiority, as argued in the previous paragraph, such interiority corresponds to a relatively low degree of autonomy or individual control.

Finally, let us consider Hofman’s second axis, that of stability vs. flexibility. Cicero assumes throughout his discussion that the four *personae* can or should be harmonized or integrated so as to render the individual consistent, that is, behaving predictably and similarly over time. Indeed, Cicero regards consistency as an essential condition for achieving *decorum*, the ultimate goal. As early as § 111, in his discussion of the second *persona*, Cicero asserts that, if anything is *decorum*, it is “evenness” or “uniformity” of life (*aequalitas vitae*), which you cannot maintain if you imitate others’ nature and neglect your own.<sup>22</sup> Thus, he already points to the importance of making a suitable choice of action (choices consistent with one’s second *persona*), even before expounding the fourth *persona* where alone such choices can be made. A stronger statement about the importance of consistency appears in the discussion of the fourth *persona*:

nam cum in omnibus quae aguntur ex eo quo modo quisque natus est, ut supra dictum est, quid deceat exquirimus, tum in tota vita constituenda multo est eius rei cura maior adhibenda, ut constare in perpetuitate vitae possimus nobismet ipsis nec in ullo officio claudicare. [...] qui igitur ad naturae suae non vitiosae genus consilium vivendi omne contulerit, is constantiam tenet (id enim maxime decet), nisi forte se intellexerit errasse in deligendo genere vitae. (§§ 119–20)

For in all things we do, we pursue what is fitting (*deceat*) in accordance with how each has been born, as was said above; and more particularly we must apply greater care by far in setting up our whole life, so that we can be consistent (*constare*) with ourselves over the duration of life and not stumble in any duty (*officium*). [...] whoever, then, brings an entire plan of living to bear on the sort of nature he has, provided it is not vicious, let him maintain consistency (*constantia*), for this is fitting above all (*maxime deceat*) – unless perhaps he realizes that he has erred in selecting his type of life.

It is in choosing one’s activities or general plan of life – the fourth *persona*, which alone is up to us – that the desired consistency is to be sought. In terms of Hofman’s second axis, then, Cicero’s theory appears to privilege stability over flexibility, hence presenting a “self” who is recognizably “himself” or “herself” (via

<sup>22</sup> Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequalitas universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam conservare non possis si aliorum naturam imitans omitas tuam (§ 111). GILL 2008: 42–44 discusses the “consistency” theme in this Ciceronian text.



*constantia* or *aequabilitas vitae*), over time and under diverse conditions, as a desirable attainment.<sup>23</sup>

Cicero admits, however, that achieving consistency and harmony among the four *personae* may be challenging, given that everything hinges on the choices we make regarding the fourth *persona* alone. In the concluding clause of the passage just quoted, he returns yet again to the matter of going wrong, of choosing a life path that turns out to be at odds with one's other *personae*. This situation requires corrective action, as he explains:

quod si acciderit (potest autem accidere), facienda morum institutorumque mutatio est. eam mutationem si tempora adiuuabunt, facilius commodiusque faciemus; sin minus, sensim erit pedetemptimque facienda, ut amicitias quae minus delectent et minus probentur magis decere censent sapientes sensim diluere quam repente praecidere. commutato autem genere vitae omni ratione curandum est ut id bono consilio fecisse videamur. (§ 120)

But if it happens (and it can happen) [i. e., that one realizes one has erred in selecting a type of life], one must institute a change in habits and practices. If circumstances assist this change, we will make it the more easily and conveniently; if not, it must be done gradually and by degrees, just as wise men (*sapientes*) deem it more fitting (*decere*) to slowly dissolve friendships that are not pleasing or praiseworthy than to cut them off abruptly. At all events, having changed our type of life, every effort must be made to appear to have done so with good judgment.

That Cicero thinks his reader could benefit from having an exit strategy from his (mis)chosen way of life signals the difficulty of achieving consistency and harmony, hence of attaining *decorum*, on the back of the one *persona* that is up to us to choose.<sup>24</sup> Actual or hypothetical instances of people going astray in this way, and making inappropriate choices concerning their activities or life course, are already adumbrated (as we discussed above) well before he deals with the fourth *persona*. In § 112, he considers how those who lack Cato's stringent morals might err in attempting to mimic his famous suicide: here Cicero's immediate point is that people's individual natures differ (the second *persona*), yet the salience of these differences emerges only via the thought experiment in which he imagines non-Catos attempting to *act* like Cato. Similarly, at § 114, Cicero

<sup>23</sup> ДУСК 1996: 280–81 notes (ad § 111, regarding the desiderated *aequabilitas vitae*) that Cicero/Panaetius seems to have modeled this aim for ordinary people on the longstanding idea that the Stoic sage is completely consistent in all his actions. The occurrences of the lexical items *constare/constantia* in §§ 119–20 allude even more clearly to the characteristics of the sage. See GRAVER and REYDAMS-SCHILS in this volume for further reflection on the relationship of the idea(l) of the sage to the lived lives of real people in imperial Stoicism.

<sup>24</sup> That the wise man supposedly dissolves unpleasing friendships “gradually” and does not cut them off abruptly may further signal Cicero's concern for (at least the appearance of) consistency. The particular circumstances that may make such a change faster and more convenient – imposing the sharp break that the concern for consistency would otherwise rule out – might be imagined to include (say) the fortuitous death or exile of the unpleasing friend.

ponders how ambient conditions might prevent people from acting in accordance with their internal nature. Under such conditions, attaining “fittingness” (*decorum*) is impossible, though one should still seek to minimize the “unfittingness.”<sup>25</sup> Again, his immediate argument concerns individual internal nature (the second *persona*), but the problem in question is revealed precisely by considering how people *act* in light of their internal nature.<sup>26</sup> So, for all that Cicero's theory seems to present a stable, consistent “self” as a desideratum, a relatively low degree of autonomy in light of nature's and fortune's influence (as described above) makes that stability difficult to achieve. The quest to identify a “self” in Cicero's four *personae* theory, then, yields a notably non-modern configuration of selfhood – one that features a tolerable degree of interiority along with a fairly low degree of autonomy, and that seeks stability but struggles to achieve it in light of that limited autonomy.<sup>27</sup>

#### 4. Ciceronian “Self”-fashioning: a Personal *Exemplum*

We can further illuminate Cicero's four *personae* theory, and the concept of “self” embedded therein, by examining Cicero's own practice of self-fashioning via exempla as revealed in other texts produced under other circumstances for other purposes. We have already noted that Cicero presents the third *persona* – given by *fortuna* – as a source of opportunity and constraint, particularly regarding one's ancestry and the exemplary models for imitation that ancestors may afford. He also states that ambitious men to whom fortune has given humble ancestors dispense with such imitation, as their forebears provide no models rele-

<sup>25</sup> Sin aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit quae nostri ingenii non erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura meditatio diligentia ut ea, si non decore, at quam minime indecore facere possimus (§ 114). Cicero may here be reflecting on his own current situation, that of being “retired” from activities of government under Caesar's dictatorship: FUHRER 2018: 99–104.

<sup>26</sup> The idea that a “normative,” best version of oneself may stand as a model toward which one's actual, struggling, imperfect, “occurrent” self should strive, and relative to which it feels disappointment in its own shortcomings, has recently received some scholarly attention – particularly in regard to Seneca, who thematizes this conflict (BARTSCH 2006: 191–208, 230–43; LONG 2009: 26–36, ROLLER 2015b: 62). In the terms of four *personae* theory, this conflict between a notionally better, ideal self and an actually worse, everyday self could be understood as choosing a life course or individual actions (fourth *persona*) that one comes to believe is inconsistent with one or more of the other *personae*.

<sup>27</sup> The last of Hofman's axes, that of holism vs. fragmentation, to my eyes is not clearly addressed in Cicero's four *personae* theory. DE LACY 1977: 170–72 suggests (and then rejects) the idea that fragmentation is entailed by the very idea of four *personae* potentially pulling in different directions. But I cannot see that the four *personae* may or even can pull in different directions, as (say) the parts of the Platonic tripartite soul routinely do. Rather, the first three *personae* afford various kinds of stable, durable constraints and opportunities in relation to which a person's selection of the fourth *persona* must be made.

vant to the pursuit of high office – the goal these men set for themselves.<sup>28</sup> Cicero himself was precisely such a “new man,” lacking the illustrious forebears whose success in public careers might entice or impel him to pursue similar activity. Yet Cicero never lacked exemplary models; indeed the astonishing range of models he selected for himself, and the inventiveness with which he marshalled these exempla to support his political and social ambitions, has long been remarked upon, and has recently been the subject of two monographic studies.<sup>29</sup> In what follows, I present a single instance (among a great many possibilities) of how Cicero selects and deploys an exemplary model for himself. I further consider how his actual employment of this model compares to the theory he presents in the passage of *De Officiis* analyzed above, and to the configuration of “selfhood” inscribed in that theory.

The example I choose to examine is Marcus Aemilius Scaurus, consul in 115 BCE and thereafter *princeps senatus*, the leading man of the senate. Cicero makes reference to Scaurus in a number of his works, including a passing mention in the section of *De Officiis* just discussed.<sup>30</sup> Generally speaking, Cicero presents Scaurus in these passages as a man of virtue and integrity, praising his *gravitas*, *constantia*, *fortitudo*, *prudencia*, and *consilium*. Scaurus had evidently done business with Cicero’s grandfather in Arpinum, and Cicero implies (as we shall see) that he himself met and remembered him. Since Scaurus died in 90 BCE, when Cicero was sixteen years old, it is not implausible that he had encountered the great man in the context of those business dealings between Scaurus and the young Cicero’s older relatives, in Cicero’s hometown.<sup>31</sup>

With this background in mind, let us look at a couple of ways Cicero deploys Scaurus as an exemplary model for himself. In 56 BCE, Cicero delivered a speech in defense of Publius Sestius, a political supporter who had recently helped procure Cicero’s recall from exile and had labored to stymie Cicero’s mortal enemy, Publius Clodius. At one point in this speech (§ 101), Cicero expatiates on the kinds of men who seek to uphold the commonwealth (*res publica*), whom he calls *optimates*. He contrasts such men with those who seek to destroy the *res publica*, whom he calls *populares*. The *optimates*, he says, tend to melt away when attacked by the *populares*, unless they are very strong. He then directly addresses the presiding magistrate of the court, who is himself named Marcus Aemilius Scaurus – the son, as it happens, of the exemplary figure under discussion here. His words to the younger Scaurus are as follows:

<sup>28</sup> Fit autem interdum ut nonnulli omnia imitatione maiorum suum quoddam institutum consequantur, maximeque in eo plerumque elaborant ii qui magna sibi proponunt obscuris orti maioribus (§ 116).

<sup>29</sup> DUGAN 2005; BLOM 2010.

<sup>30</sup> Scaurus is mentioned in Off. 1.108 along with Marcus Drusus; both are said to display *singularis severitas*, one of many forms that individual nature (the second *persona*) might assume.

<sup>31</sup> On the overall evidence for Scaurus, see LEWIS 2001 (esp. 345–48 on Scaurus’ relations with the Tullii Cicerones of Arpinum, and on Cicero’s portrayal of him).

propugnatores autem rei publicae [...] permanent illi soli atque omnia rei publicae causa perferunt qui sunt tales qualis pater tuus, M. Scaure, fuit, qui a C. Graccho usque ad Q. Varium seditiosis omnibus restitit, quem numquam ulla vis, ullae minae, ulla invidia labefecit; aut qualis Q. Metellus, patruus matris tuae, qui [...] L. Saturninum censor notas-set [...] aut [...] qualis nuper Q. Catulus fuit [...] (Sest. 101).

Only those defenders of the *res publica* remain, and endure everything on behalf of the commonwealth, who are such as your own father, Marcus Scaurus, was, who resisted all the plotters (*seditiosi*) from Gaius Gracchus down to Quintus Varius – a man whom no violence, no threats, and no unpopularity ever shook; or alternatively, who are such as your mother's uncle Quintus Metellus was, who as censor imposed a black mark on Lucius Saturninus, [...] or such as Quintus Catulus more recently was.

To make the mapping clear, the elder Scaurus, along with Metellus and Catulus, are presented as *optimates*, defenders of the commonwealth, against the seditious violence of *populares* like Gracchus, Varius, and Saturninus. The parallels Cicero wishes to draw to the current day are patent: Cicero himself, along with his ally Sestius (the defendant in this trial), are the latter-day *optimates*, championing the commonwealth in their turn against Clodius and his ilk, the contemporary instantiation of violent and seditious *populares*. And in case anyone missed the point, he proceeds to exhort the judges to imitate the deeds of the *optimates* if they would seek high standing, glory, and praise for themselves.<sup>32</sup> So Cicero here presents the elder Scaurus, *inter alios*, as an exemplary model, imitable by himself and others, of absolute integrity in the service of a highly conservative, anti-popular politics.<sup>33</sup>

But this is not all Scaurus can do for Cicero. Two years later, in 54 BCE, Cicero defended the younger Marcus Scaurus, the very man who had presided at the trial of Sestius, on a charge of extortion while governing the province of Sicily. The speech on behalf of Scaurus does not survive in full: the beginning is missing from the manuscript tradition, though some material from the missing portion is known from quotations and summaries in later texts. Asconius, a commentator on Cicero writing in the first century CE, provides a summary of the speech's argumentation, including portions not transmitted by the manuscripts. He also quotes and comments upon passages from portions of the speech that are missing from the manuscript tradition. One of these quotations is as follows:

dicit iterum de patre M. Scauri: "non enim tantum admiratus sum ego illum virum, sicut omnes, sed etiam praecipue dilexi. primus enim me flagrantem studio laudis in spem impulit posse virtute me sine praesidio fortunae quo contendissem labore et constantia pervenire." (Asc. Scaur. 22c)

[sc. Cicero] again says, regarding the father of Marcus Scaurus [i. e., the defendant]: "The fact is that I admired that man not as much as everyone did, but indeed I esteemed him

<sup>32</sup> Haec imitami, per deos immortalis, qui dignitatem, qui laudem, qui gloriam quaeritis! haec ampla sunt, haec divina, haec immortalia [...] (Sest. 102).

<sup>33</sup> For additional evidence of this dimension of Scaurus' political activity, see LEWIS 2001: 345–46 and n. 4.

especially. For when I was afire with eagerness to gain renown, he was the first to urge me toward the hope that by my own capabilities I could arrive where I was aiming with effort and persistence, without the protection of fortune [i. e., noble ancestry].”

While this fragment is missing its original Ciceronian context, we may suppose that Cicero here is praising the defendant’s father as a way of praising the defendant’s own nobility and virtue – a familiar strategy in Cicero’s defense speeches, itself related to the idea that exemplary performances run in families. Yet the elder Scaurus is not merely a glorious progenitor for Cicero’s client: Cicero is also holding the elder Scaurus up as an exemplary model for his own younger self to follow, and which he implies that he did indeed follow. Specifically, Cicero cites Scaurus’ high achievement in a public career as causing him, in his youth, to believe that he could attain such success himself, despite his lack of noble ancestry.

How does this exemplary modeling work in this case? Asconius’ comment on this quotation is illuminating:

possit aliquis quaerere cur hoc dixerit Cicero, cum Scaurus patricius fuerit: quae generis claritas etiam inertes homines ad summos honores provexit. verum Scaurus ita fuit patricius ut tribus supra eum aetatibus iacuerit domus eius fortuna. nam neque pater neque avus neque etiam proavus – ut puto, propter tenues opes et nullam vitae industriam – honores adepti sunt. itaque Scauro aeque ac novo homini laborandum fuit. (*Asc. Scaur.* 23c)

One might ask why Cicero said this, when Scaurus was a patrician – a familial distinction that has carried even useless men to the highest offices. But Scaurus [i. e., the elder] was ‘patrician’ with the proviso that the fortunes of his house had been at a low ebb for three generations before him. For neither his father nor his grandfather nor even his great-grandfather had gained office – I suppose due to slender resources and lack of a hard-working lifestyle. Consequently, Scaurus had to toil just like a new man.

Asconius begins by remarking that incompetent people have been elevated to high office thanks to precisely the sort of lofty ancestry that Scaurus enjoyed (he was a member of the *gens Aemilia*, an ancient patrician clan that had produced many consuls over many centuries). But this is the very opposite of the dynamic Cicero himself seems to be invoking. How can Scaurus be regarded as “fitting” Cicero’s self-described situation of embarking on a public career “without the protection of fortune” (*sine praesidio fortunae*), such that the young *novus homo* can take that lofty patrician as an exemplary model? Asconius explains as follows: Scaurus’ immediate forebears, notwithstanding their patrician heritage, had been too poor and lazy to pursue a public career successfully. The prestige of this branch of the family was consequently so tarnished that, far from benefiting from his Aemilian lineage, the elder Scaurus had had to prove his worth and fight for his public career just as a new man must. It is in this respect, Asconius implies, that Scaurus “fits” Cicero’s situation and provides him a model for pursuing his own career ambitions.<sup>34</sup> To be sure, all this is apparently Asconius’

<sup>34</sup> On Scaurus as an exemplum for Cicero by virtue of being a quasi-“new man,” see BLOM

conjecture, his own interpretation of the Ciceronian passage he quoted just previously – a passage that, in my view, can bear Asconius' interpretation but does not demand it.<sup>35</sup> But if Asconius is right about Cicero's meaning here, this exemplary figuration of Scaurus could hardly be more different from that found in the *Pro Sestio*, where (as we saw) Cicero presents Scaurus as the paragon of conservative, establishment, optimate values, a man fully embodying his patrician heritage. In that speech, Cicero implicitly aligns himself with Scaurus in precisely this optimate guise, and expressly encourages his audience to imitate Scaurus in this same respect.

These contrasting deployments of Scaurus as an exemplum have implications for Ciceronian "selfhood." As a thought experiment, let us consider the extent to which Cicero's self-fashioning in relation to the Scaurus exemplum, as presented in these two speeches from the mid-50s BCE, can be analyzed in terms of the four *personae* theory Cicero articulates in the *De Officiis* written a decade later. The *Pro Sestio* passage reveals Cicero's determination to embrace for himself, and to urge on his addressees, an "optimate" political path such as Scaurus pursued (fourth *persona*). This path may align with Cicero's individual nature or disposition (second *persona*), but the passage does not directly address this. The *Pro Scauro* passage, for its part, seems to underscore Cicero's ambitious individual nature (second *persona*) and his choice to pursue public office (fourth *persona*) in accordance with that ambitious nature, all the while stressing the constraints imposed by his status as a new man (third *persona*). Scaurus matters to Cicero (at least according to Asconius) in all these interlinked respects: he provides an exemplary model for aspiring to, pursuing, and achieving success in a public career despite a "new man"-like familial background. Yet there is more to Cicero's use of Scaurus in this latter passage. For this passage shows Cicero doing precisely what he says in *De Officiis* that people must do if they aim for great things yet lack exemplary models within the family: they must "follow some plan of their own" (*suum quoddam institutum consequantur*, *Off.* 1.116). Specifically, this passage shows Cicero seizing upon the freedom afforded by his lack of noble ancestry to select a forebear for himself, as it were – or rather, to select a suitable exemplary model for translating personal ambition into success in a public career. Far from feeling constrained by *fortuna*, then, Cicero exploits his modest back-

---

2010: 217–22. DUGAN 2005: 203–4 discusses Scaurus' exemplarity for Cicero as an orator. On how exempla do or do not "fit" (or can be made to "fit") the situation of the person for whom they are adduced, see ROLLER 2018: 12–13 in general; also 191–93 and 256–57 for further Ciceronian instances.

<sup>35</sup> The Ciceronian quotation could, alternatively, be interpreted as meaning that Scaurus simply encouraged the young Cicero to pursue his ambition for a public career as a new man, without in any way suggesting that Scaurus himself had experienced a similar struggle – just as, for example, the patrician Lucius Valerius Flaccus supposedly spotted and cultivated the talent of Cato the Elder, who likewise lacked noble ancestry (*Nep. Cato* 1.1; *Plut. Cat. Mai.* 3.1).

ground so as to shift the whole third *persona* into the realm of things that are up to him to choose.<sup>36</sup>

I do not believe, however, that the Cicero of the forensic speeches of the 50s BCE is constructing a biography for himself in the Panaetian philosophical terms he articulates a decade later in *De Officiis*, notwithstanding the intriguing points of contact that emerge from this thought experiment. Indeed, Cicero's deployment of the Scaurus exemplum is (to my mind) even more complex and interesting than the analysis in four *personae* terms indicates. In both of the appropriations of Scaurus just discussed, Cicero presents himself as fashioning himself, or "his self" (in the sense of his present role), after Scaurus, his model. But in each case, he has started by fashioning his model after "his self." For in order to satisfy the needs of the immediate rhetorical situation, Cicero in each case makes Scaurus into what he needs Scaurus to be in order to authorize the "self" that he currently needs to present himself as possessing. To be less riddling: in the contrasting rhetorical situations presented by the *Pro Sestio* and the *Pro Scauro*, Cicero needs to advocate for, and must himself stand for, contrasting values – in the former case, to constitute a conservative bulwark against rabble-rousers, and in the latter to instantiate the insurgent politician who has clawed his way to the top from obscurity. Scaurus is thus shaped into an exemplary model for the specific "Cicero" the orator requires in each case – in the former case the conservative patrician, and in the latter one a successful politician who applied his native talents in order to overcome a supposed lack of familial authorization. Both "Cicero" and "Scaurus," then, can be molded into the form called for by the current rhetorical situation. Such malleability seems to provide an additional way for the individual to be autonomous and in control of himself (Hofman's fourth axis).

The malleability displayed by both "Cicero" and "Scaurus" in these speeches also seems to suggest a model of selfhood that more warmly embraces flexibility, and is less preoccupied with achieving stability (Hofman's second axis), than the four *personae* theory, with its valorization of *constantia*, seems to allow or at least desire. That is – returning to our thought experiment – one might argue that Cicero's individual nature must, per Cicero's exposition of the second *persona*, accord with one or the other, but not both, of the rhetorically constructed "Ciceros" in the two orations. Therefore, by constructing himself, and Scaurus as an exemplum for himself, in two such distinct ways in these orations, he has necessarily – one way or the other – fallen afoul of his exhortation in *De Officiis* to harmonize one's actions with one's individual nature. To explore such a conundrum fully would require a much more detailed and expansive study of Cicero's practice in constructing selfhood and appropriating exempla for himself (/his self) across his entire oeuvre. But I suspect that Cicero's actual practice as observed across

---

<sup>36</sup> He might, on the contrary, have stressed the "constraint" aspect of lacking familial models: his ancestry provides him no footsteps in which to follow.

the oeuvre would never be found to align well with the Panaetian schema laid out in *De Officiis*, and that further thought experiments along these lines would only confirm the distance between Cicero's actual practice(s) of "self"-fashioning and his late theorizing on the topic. For now, however, we may affirm concretely that the speeches of the mid-50s BCE and the philosophical dialogue from 44 BCE show at least two distinct ways in which Ciceronian "selfhood" may be conceived; furthermore, the similarities and differences between these conceptions may be measured within the framework provided by Hofman's axes. Hofman's framework also allows us to measure the distance between either of these Ciceronian "selves" and a modern, post-Cartesian self; neither Ciceronian flavor of "self" appears particularly modern by this method of comparison. Employing a framework (such as Hofman's) within which different conceptions of "self" become commensurable diachronically and cross-culturally is essential for any continuing analysis along these lines.<sup>37</sup>

### Works Cited

- BARTSCH, SHADI. *The Mirror of the Self: Sexuality, Self-knowledge, and the Gaze in the Early Roman Empire*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006.
- BLOM, HENRIETTE VAN DER. *Cicero's Role Models: The Political Strategy of a Newcomer*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- BRUNT, PETER A. *Studies in Stoicism*. Edited by Miriam Griffin and Alison Samuels. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- DE LACY, PHILLIP H. "The Four Stoic Personae." *Illinois Classical Studies* 2 (1977): 163–72.
- DUGAN, JOHN. *Making a New Man: Ciceronian Self-fashioning in the Rhetorical Works*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- DYCK, ANDREW. *A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996.
- FOUCAULT, MICHEL. *The History of Sexuality Vol. 3: The Care of the Self*. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986.
- FUHRER, THERESE. "Gesellschaftliche und literarische Rollenkonzepte für eine Selbstdefinition des Philosophen in Rom: Philosophische Literatur in Rom als Medium der definition sozialer Rollen." In *Philosophie in Rom – Römische Philosophie?: Kultur-, li-*

<sup>37</sup> On how particular dimensions of "selfhood" change over time, across philosophical traditions, and from author to author in the Graeco-Roman world, see, e.g., SORABJI 2008: 16–26.

I am grateful to all participants in the "Contours of the Ancient Self" conference in Jerusalem in May 2018, where a lively and highly productive exchange took place between and among the scholars of both Graeco-Roman antiquity and ancient Judaism. I particularly thank Maren Niehoff for organizing the event and for valuable suggestions on this paper, along with Shadi Bartsch, Gretchen Reydam-Schils, and an anonymous referee, all of whose comments significantly improved this discussion.



- teratur- und philosophiegeschichtliche Perspektiven. Edited by Gernot Michael Müller and Fosca Mariani Zini, 99–114. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2018.
- FUHRMANN, MANFRED. “*Persona*, ein römischer Rollenbegriff.” In *Identität*. Edited by Odo Marquard and Karlheinz Stierle, 83–106. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1979.
- GILL, CHRISTOPHER. “The Ancient Self: Issues and Approaches.” In *Ancient Philosophy of the Self*. Edited by Paulina Remes and Juha Sihvola, 35–56. New York: Springer, 2008.
- . *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- . *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: The Self in Dialogue*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.
- . “Personhood and Personality: The Four-*Personae* Theory in Cicero, *De officiis* I.” In *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*. Vol. 6. Edited by Julia Annas, 169–99. Oxford: Clarendon, 1988.
- HOFMAN, ELWIN. “How to Do the History of the Self.” *History of the Human Sciences* 29, 3 (2016): 8–24.
- LEFÈVRE, ECKARD. *Panaitios’ und Ciceros Pflichtenlehre: vom philosophischen Traktat zum politischen Lehrbuch*. Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2001.
- LEWIS, R. G. “Scope for Scaurus.” *Athenaeum* 89, 2 (2001): 345–54.
- LONG, ANTHONY A. “Seneca on the Self: Why Now?” In *Seneca and the Self*. Edited by Shadi Bartsch and David Wray, 20–36. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- . “Greek Ethics after MacIntyre and the Stoic Community of Reason.” *Ancient Philosophy* 3, 2 (1983): 184–99.
- REYDAMS-SCHILS, GRETCHEN. *The Stoics: Self, Responsibility, and Affection*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
- ROLLER, MATTHEW. *Models from the Past in Roman Culture: A World of Exempla*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- . “Precept(or) and Example in Seneca.” In *Roman Reflections: Studies in Latin Philosophy*. Edited by Gareth D. Williams and Katharina Volk, 129–56. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015a.
- . “The Dialogue in Seneca’s *Dialogues* (and Other Moral Essays).” In *The Cambridge Companion to Seneca*. Edited by Shadi Bartsch and Alessandro Schiesaro, 54–67. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015b.
- SAUER, JOCHEN. “Römische Exempla-Ethik und Konsenskultur? Philosophie und *mos maiorum* bei Cicero und Seneca.” In *Philosophie in Rom – Römische Philosophie?: Kultur-, literatur- und philosophiegeschichtliche Perspektiven*. Edited by Gernot Michael Müller and Fosca Mariani Zini, 67–95. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2018.
- SORABJI, RICHARD. “Graeco-Roman Varieties of Self.” In *Ancient Philosophy of the Self*. Edited by Paulina Remes and Juha Sihvola, 13–34. New York: Springer, 2008.
- TAYLOR, CHARLES. *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.